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Abstract
This research considered a novel approach to network security by combining
a new networking architecture based on the Identifier Locator Network Pro-
tocol (ILNP) and the existing Domain Name System (DNS). Specifically,
the investigations considered mitigation of network-level and transport-level
based Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The solutions presented for DoS are
applicable to secure servers that are visible externally from an enterprise
network. DoS was chosen as an area of concern because in recent years DoS
has become the most common and hard to defend against attacks.
The novelty of this approach was to consider the way the DNS and ILNP
can work together, transparently to the application, within an enterprise
scenario. This was achieved by the introduction of a new application-level
access control function — the Capability Management System (CMS) —
which applies configuration at the application level (DNS data) and network
level (ILNP namespaces). CMS provides dynamic, ephemeral identity and
location information to clients and servers, in order to effectively partition
legitimate traffic from attack traffic. This was achieved without modifying
existing network components such as switches and routers and making stan-
dard use of existing functions, such as access control lists, and DNS servers,
all within a single trust domain that is under the control of the enterprise.
The prime objectives of this research were:
• to defend against DoS attacks with the use of naming and DNS within
an enterprise scenario.
• to increase the attacker’s effort in launching a successful DoS attack.
• to reduce visibility of vulnerabilities that can be discovered by an
attacker by active probing approaches.
• to practically demonstrate the effectiveness of ILNP and DNS working
together to provide a solution for DoS mitigation.
The solution methodology is based on the use of network and trans-
port level capabilities, dynamic changes to DNS data, and a Moving Tar-
get Defence (MTD) paradigm. There are three solutions presented which
use ILNP namespaces. These solutions are referred to as identifier-based,
iii
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locator-based, and combined identifier-locator based solutions, respectively.
ILNP-based node identity values were used to provide transport-level per-
client server capabilities, thereby providing per-client isolation of traffic.
ILNP locator values were used to allow a provision of network-level traffic
separation for externally accessible enterprise services. Then, the identifier
and locator solutions were combined, showing the possibility of protecting
the services, with per-client traffic control and topological traffic path sep-
aration.
All solutions were site-based solutions and did not require any modifi-
cation in the core/external network, or the active cooperation of an ISP,
therefore limiting the trust domain to the enterprise itself. Experiments
were conducted to evaluate all the solutions on a test-bed consisting of off-
the-shelf hardware, open-source software, an implementation of the CMS
written in C, all running on Linux. The discussion includes considering the
efficacy of the solutions, comparisons with existing methods, performance
of each solution, and critical analysis highlighting future improvements that
could be made.
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Glossary ix
Glossary
Attack Surface An attack surface is one or more accessible vulnerabilities
in a communication system.
Capabilities A capability is a sequence of bits, with small lifetime, which
authorizes a client to access a server or its network.
DNS Capabilities A DNS capability is a type of capability that is dis-
tributed through DNS.
DoS Attack Vector It is a means through which an attacker can launch
a successful DoS attack.
DoS Detection An act of identifying an imminent or ongoing DoS attack.
DoS Mitigation An act of applying a solution to a DoS attack.
Enterprise A commercial or an industrial undertaking, esp. one involving
risk; a firm, company, or business [OED, 2018].
Fast Flux DNS It is a DNS supported mechanism to shift a node from
one namespace to another after a short duration for the same fully
qualified domain name (FQDN).
Host Mobility An act of changing the mobile host location from one net-
work to another.
Identifier Locator Network protocol It is a host-based network proto-
col which provides host/network mobility, host/network multihoming,
and scalability of the Internet core as a first class functionality.
ILNPv4 An instantiation of ILNP which is inter-operable with IPv4.
ILNPv6 An instantiation of ILNP which is inter-operable with IPv6.
LC64 Defence A form of ILNP based defence that uses L64 (64-bit Lo-
cator) namespace values as capabilities to defend a network against
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Each LC64 capability uses a different
L64 value with a path that is different from other LC64 capability
values.
Acronyms x
LNC64 Defence A form of ILNP based defence that simultaneously uses
L64 (64-bit Node Locator) and NID (64-bit Node Identifier) namespace
values as capabilities to defend a host and a network against Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks.
Locator It is an ILNP namespace that locates a node. It is formed using
upper 64-bits of IPv6 address.
MTD It is a form of defence in which a node’s configuration is random-
ized frequently to secure it from Denial of Service attack while still
maintaining operational integirty.
Multi-Vector DoS Attacks DoS attacks which use more than one attack
vector to launch a successful DoS attack are termed as multi-vector
attacks.
Namespace A namespace is a space of all names for a given node name.
IPv6 addresses are node/network names with a space of the number
of possible IPv6 addresses that can be created through 128-bits. In
IPv6, it is termed as an address space. ILNP has two namespaces with
2 to the power of 64 names in each namespace.
NC64 Defence A form of ILNP based defence that uses NID64 namespace
values as capabilities to defend a host against Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks.
Network Mobility An act of shifting the mobile network from one net-
work to another.
Node Identifier (NID) It is an ILNP namespace that identifies a par-
ticular node, whereas a node can be a physical or virtual host or a
physical or virtual network. Each element of this namespace is formed
using second half of an IPv6 128-bit address.
Acronyms
ACK Acknowledgement.
ACL Access Control List.
AD Administrative Domain.
AH Authentication Header.
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure.
API Application Programming Interface.
Acronyms xi
AS Autonomous System.
BAck Binding Acknowledgement.
BGP Border Gateway Protocol.
BU Binding Update.
CAP Capability.
CAPAX Capital Expenditure.
ccTLD country code TLD.
CERL Computer-based Education Research Laboratory.
CGA Cryptographically Generated Addresses.
CM Capability Mapping.
CMS Capabilities Management System.
CMSD CMS Daemon.
CMSVD CMS Victim Daemon.
CN Correspondent Node.
CoA Care of Address.
DAD Duplicate Address Detection.
DDNS Dynamic DNS.
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service.
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.
DMZ Demilitarized Zone.
DNS Domain Name System.
DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions.
DoS Denial of Service.
DPI Deep Packet Inspection.
E2E End-to-End.
EDNS0 Extension Mechanisms for DNS.
Acronyms xii
EID Endpoint Identifier.
EIP Evasive Internet Protocol.
ESD End System Designator.
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload.
ETR Egress Tunnel Router.
EUI-64 64-bit Extended Unique Identifier.
FA Foreign Agent.
FHSS Frequency Hopping Spread Sprectrum.
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name.
FSM Finite State Machine.
GL Glocal Locator.
GLI-Split Global Locatro, Local Locator, and Identifier Split.
GSE Global, Site, and End-system address elements.
GSO Generic Segmentation Oﬄoad.
gTLD generic TLD.
HA Home Agent.
HI Host Identifier.
HIP Host Identity Protocol.
HMIPv6 Hierarchical Mobile IPv6.
HTTP Hyper Text Transport Protocol.
HTTPS HTTP Secure.
IAB Internal Architectural Board.
ICANN The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol.
ICMPv6 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6.
ID Identifier.
Acronyms xiii
IDS Intrusion Detection System.
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
IEN Internet Experiment Note.
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force.
IKE Internet Key Exchange.
ILCC Identifier Locator Communications Cache.
ILNP Identifier-Locator Network Protocol.
ILNPv6 Identifier Locator Network Protocol version 6.
IL-v Identifier-Locator vector.
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem.
IoT Internet of Things.
IP Internet Protocol.
IPSec Internet Protocol Security.
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4.
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6.
IRTF Interent Research Task Force.
ISP Internet Service Provider.
ITR Ingress Tunnel Router.
IXP Internet eXchange Point.
L Locator.
L64 64-bit Locator.
LAN Local Area Network.
LC64 L64-based Capabilities.
LISP Locator/ID Separation Protocol.
LKDDB Linux Kernel Driver DataBase.
LL Local Locator.
LNC64 L64 and NID64-based Capabilities.
Acronyms xiv
LP Locator Pointer.
LRR Locator Rewriting Relay.
LSR Loose Source Routing.
LTE Long Term Evolution.
LU Locator Update.
LU-ACK Locator Update Acknowledgement.
MAC Media Access Control.
MAG Mobile Access Gateway.
MAN Metropoliton Area Network.
MANET Mobile Adhoc NETwork.
MAP Mapping.
MILSA Mobility and Multihoming Supporting Identifier-Locator Split Ar-
chitecture.
MIP Mobile-IP.
MIPv4 Mobile-IP version 4.
MIPv6 Mobile-IP version 6.
MN Mobile Node.
MP-TCP Multipath Transmission Control Protocol.
MSS Maximum Segment Size.
MTD Moving Target Defence.
MTU Maximum Transmission Unit.
NAT Network Address Translation.
NC64 NID64-based Capabilities.
ND Neighbour Discovery.
NEMO Network Mobility.
NGN Next Generation Networks.
NID Node IDentity.
Acronyms xv
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NPTv6 IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation.
OPEX Operational Expenditure.
OS Operating System.
OSI Open Systems Interconnections.
QoE Quality of Experience.
QoS Quality of Service.
RA Router Advertisement.
RAM Random Access Memory.
RANGI Routing Architecture for the Next Generation Internet.
rDNS Reverse Domain Name System.
RESTful REpresentational State Transfer.
RFC Request For Comments.
RG Routing Goop.
RLOC Routing Locator.
RO Route Optimization.
ROVER Route Origin VERification.
RPKI Resource Public Key Infrastructure Framework.
RR Resource Record.
RRDNS Round-Robin DNS.
RTT Round Trip Time.
SA Security Association.
SACK Selective ACK.
SANE Secure Architecture for the Networked Enterprise.
SBR Site Border Router.
SCTP Stream Control Transmission protocol.
Acronyms xvi
SDN Software Defined Network.
SHIM6 Level 3 Multihoming Shim Protocol for IPv6.
SIP Session Initiation Protocol.
SLAAC Stateless Address Auto Configuration.
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.
SOCKS SOCKet Security.
SSH Secure Shell Protocol.
SSL Secure Socket Layer Protocol.
TCB Transmission Control Block.
TCP Transport Control Protocol.
TLD Top Level Domain.
TLS Transport Layer Security.
TSO TCP Segmentation Oﬄoad.
TTL Time To Live.
TVA Traffic Validation Architecture.
UDP User Datagram Protocol.
ULID Upper Layer Identifier.
URI Uniform Resource Identifier.
VIP Virtual Internet Protocol.
vLAN virtual Local Area Network.
VNA Virtual Network Address.
VoIP Voice over IP.
WAN Wide Area Network.
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network.
XML Extensible Markup Language.
XMLRPC eXtensible Markup Language - Remote Procedure Call.
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Introduction
The wide adoption of Internet services has sparked an interest in their se-
curity. This is partly due to the design of IP which did not incorporate
DoS security. DoS attacks have become widespread due to their ease of ex-
ecution and high impact while most of the enterprises offer mission critical
services to its clients. Such services may include banking, shopping, and
communications. Enterprises deploy security appliances in their networks
and sometimes delegate the responsibility to security service providers while
paying a heavy financial cost.
DoS attacks are one of the basic tools which attackers use to deny en-
terprise services to its external clients. So, enterprises lose client trust,
enterprise reputation, and money. DoS attacks are a constant threat since
their inception. They are easy to launch, using diverse ways, and employ
plethora of easily accessible tools to circumvent service availability of even
high profile enterprises.
This research introduces new mechanisms to thwart some common DoS
attacks. These mechanisms make use of ILNP whose design can help provide
an effective DoS security approach which is not possible through IP. Simi-
larly, our mechanisms make use of the DNS infrastructure which is widely
deployed and almost every service depends on it. Our mechanisms will pro-
vide a first line of defence for such services as their discovery is dependent
mostly on DNS.
What follows is an introduction to DoS attacks, our enterprise scenario,
challenges in enterprise defence, and our security building blocks, i.e., ILNP
architecture and DNS infrastructure.
1
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1.1 DoS Attacks
1.1.1 Definition
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
DoS attacks are defined as:
Actions that prevent the system from functioning in accordance
with its intended purpose. A piece of equipment or entity may
be rendered inoperable or forced to operate in a degraded state;
operations that depend on timeliness may be delayed. [(NIST),
2001]
This work will mitigate some of such actions.
1.1.2 Severity
DoS attacks are becoming rampant, complex, and hard to mitigate [CD-
Networks, 2017], [Verisign, 2018]. Since DoS attacks target availability of a
host and a network, it becomes a threat to enterprises which are connected
either through an intranet or the Internet. DoS attacks are easy to launch
and sustain because technologies required to perform such actions are easily
available on the Internet. They require sophisticated mechanisms to tackle,
and innovation in detecting system vulnerabilities and creating new attack
vectors (see §2.3.2) is faster than their mitigations. DoS attacks affect busi-
nesses in terms of financial cost, market reputation, industry value, and
service uptime. In response, businesses have to spend resources on complex
defences, host/network downtime tolerance, security staff, and non-security
staff readiness alike [Bhardwaj et al., 2016,Zargar et al., 2013].
Most enterprise solutions are complex, financially burdensome, ineffec-
tive, and lack agility. There is much research or works which help mitigate
DoS attacks (see §§2.3.6 and 2.3.7). Most of these research works demon-
strate complex solutions but real world implementations demand simplicity,
ease of execution, maintenance, and even non-extension based first class
solutions.
Over time, attackers become more sophisticated and informed, thereby
we have new variants of DoS itself, e.g., Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).
Vulnerabilities in existing systems, defences, and network engineering are
being exposed due to old IP protocols whose design did not consider such
attacks. Due to these reasons new research is mainly focused on creating
protocols and architectures which take lessons from previous mistakes in
design.
In this research, an effort has been made to address the challenge of DoS
mitigation to provide defences which are simple to implement, efficient in
operation, and technically feasible in rolling out. These solutions make use
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of existing technologies in cooperation with innovative defence paradigms
proposed in recent research.
Our research proposes and investigates three DoS defences which pro-
vide an enterprise controlled (no requirements to trust external entities,
e.g., upstream Internet service providers, independent security providers,
etc) backend processor to dynamically generate DNS responses with new
host/network naming information from ILNP. It also provides traffic filtra-
tion mechanism to separate a legitimate traffic from an attack traffic.
1.1.3 Attack Vector Diversity
DoS attacks can make use of multiple ways to reduce an enterprise service
availability. Cyberattack engineering employs social engineering, protocol
and application vulnerability testing, and traffic based volumetric floods of
packets in order to achieve service disruption to legitimate clients. We will
consider a few attack vectors relevant to our research in §2.3.2, with some
example attacks on enterprises in §2.3.1.
1.1.4 Ease Of Attack Execution
A plethora of DoS attack software tools are easily accessible over the in-
ternet, e.g., via Github1, Bitbucket2, etc. Similarly, there are cloud based
DoS-for-hire organizations, providing BOOTERS [Santanna et al., 2017],
STRESSERS, and DDOSERS [Mahadev et al., 2016], where one can buy
their services to attack any desired on-line resource. Such attacks involve
spoofing of source addresses to introduce anonymity of the attacker, and
difficulty in filtering attack traffic. It is achieved using simple packet forg-
ing mechanisms available in programming languages, such as C (libpcap3),
Python (scapy4), or even iperf35. In our research, we employed thcsyn66,
and iperf3 to emulate DoS traffic in a controlled environment.
1.1.5 Lack In Deployment Of Mitigations
The principle of being conservative in what you send and liberal in what you
accept [Shue et al., 2012], or universal reachability [Ballani et al., 2005], is
strongly being debated in favour of providing security and privacy against
current and future multi-vector cyberattacks. This principle along with the
lack in enterprise-wide deployment of well-researched architectures [Yaar
et al., 2004, Andersen, 2003, Anderson et al., 2004, Argyraki & Cheriton,
1https://github.com
2https://bitbucket.org
3https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap
4https://scapy.net
5https://iperf.fr
6https://tools.kali.org/information-gathering/thc-ipv6
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2005b,Handley & Greenhalgh, 2004,Stoica et al., 2002,Ioannidis & Bellovin,
2002], contribute to limited security. The pace of attack adoption and at-
tack execution is far more aggressive in comparison to deployment of DoS
defences. We present further sets of solutions ( chapter 3, chapter 4, and
chapter 5), which demonstrate the feasibility of new novel approaches to
DoS defence.
1.2 Reference Enterprise Scenario
This research evaluated DoS defences for an enterprise network. Figure 1.1
shows our reference enterprise network diagram. Our defences are placed
within the enterprise network without any modification to the outside net-
work except the Internet access router (Site Border Router (SBR)) which
itself is controlled by the enterprise. The client node can access any ser-
vice within the enterprise network based on network policies. The attacker
node either uses SYN flood or UDP flood using spoofed source packets. The
attacker can only reach an enterprise network using the Internet.
There is no modification done to the firewalls either in the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) or the protected network. A DMZ is a part of an enterprise
network which exposes public services of the enterprise to the untrusted
networks. Our defences make use of a host-based firewall which is placed in
the web server, mail server, or any other publicly accessible enterprise host.
We use the term victim in two contexts. First, it is the publicly accessible
enterprise victim host/server. And second, it is the enterprise network itself.
Our defences can mitigate attacks on either enterprise host, its network, or
both, based on particular ILNP namespace(s) that is/are in use as part of
that defence.
Attackers and clients are assumed to be outside the enterprise network
while the enterprise is only accessible through one or more of its Internet
Service Provider (ISP)s.
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Figure 1.1: Reference Enterprise Network Diagram
1.3 Challenges in Enterprise Defence
1.3.1 Host Security
There are studies about intrusion detection in host security, specifically
streamlined towards the application layer [Warrender et al., 1999, Stolfo
et al., 2005,Zhang et al., 2004,Zhou et al., 2010]. TCP design makes it vul-
nerable to attacks as its unauthenticated three-way handshake allows forged
header fields. An attacker is able to reach its victims using forged packets
which can make its victims unresponsive to new connections. There is a
need to device defences which can protect victims from unintended sources.
The most common type of attack in such scenarios is a SYN flood, which is
the host (an enterprise server that is accessible from the outside enterprise
network) challenge addressed in our research.
Approaches to TCP level host security rely on SYN Cookies, SYN Caches,
Access Control List (ACL)-based traffic filtration, TCP’s Transmission Con-
trol Block (TCB) backlog increments, reduction in SYN-RECEIVED Timers,
recycling of old half-open connections in TCB, and use of proxies [Eddy,
2007]. But from all the approaches mentioned here, SYN Cookies and SYN
Caches are mostly seen as acceptable [Eddy, 2007].
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SYN Cookies are lacking in support for TCP packet option fields, whereas
SYN Caches do not allow piggybacking of application data over TCP’s three-
way handshake. Our objective is to investigate an alternative defence which
can prevent such shortcomings in SYN Cookies and SYN Caches for Trans-
port layer TCP SYN floods against TCB exhaustion attacks. SYN Cookies
will be part of our evaluation while SYN Caches will be part of our discus-
sion.
Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Secure Socket Layer Protocol (SSL)
[Freier et al., 2011], Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) [Ylonen & Lonvick, 2006],
and SOCKet Security (SOCKS) [Leech et al., 1996] does provide Transport
layer security but their goals are not to mitigate SYN attacks but to support
data encryption, client/server Application layer authentication, and data in-
tegrity once the connections are already setup.This area is thoroughly tested,
and mitigations to breaches in integrity and authentication are trusted using
TLS/SSL.
Our goal is to provide client authentication at the connection setup level.
Our defences make use of TLS/SSL for the integrity of control messages
only which are used in interactions of victims with our backend processor.
But, our defences do allow flexibility to use any other protocol once an
authenticated mechanism is in place before TCP connection establishment.
Host-based security mechanisms rely on TCP protocol modifications,
e.g., SYN Cookies change the way a host responds to SYN packets by mod-
ifying SYN ACKs, and SYN Caches change the way TCP half-open states
of all applications are manipulated in TCBs and global hash tables. These
modifications have trade-offs which are not always acceptable [Eddy, 2007].
Our goals are to achieve the same goals of SYN Cookies and SYN Caches
but without their respective trade-offs.
There are certain defence approaches which support the perspective that
defences must allow end hosts to instruct the network who should be able
to initiate connections [Ballani et al., 2005, Handley & Greenhalgh, 2004].
Our solution to host security instructs the victim to configure its firewall,
or access control lists, with information on who should be able to initiate
the connection. Our solution can, itself, be a subject to a DoS attack. This
aspect will also be discussed in the chapters 2, 3 and 6.
In chapter 3, we present an ILNP based defence mechanism that miti-
gates low rate SYN floods. It has a backend which allows hosts to configure
their firewall based on per-client authentication. Our backend derives the
DNS responses and the host firewall by allocating a per-client ephemeral
naming information that is unique for the duration of an incoming session
from the same client. Our backend uses DNS servers as request forwarders
to allow interception and modification of individual responses.
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1.3.2 Network Security
Enterprise network reachability and its uninterrupted availability is suscep-
tible to volumetric DoS attacks. Network security procedures try to ensure
that public hosts running in the network are accessible and the ingress/egress
data is authenticated and has integrity. In this work, we will deal with the
network accessibility part.
DoS attacks which target network access are termed as traffic based
network attacks. Network security makes use of mechanisms which can
either be placed at the edge or within the enterprise network. Similarly,
there are approaches in which an enterprise requires help from ISPs. We
will take the former approach thereby providing defences that are within an
enterprise network and within its control.
We see a rise in network-based attacks on mission critical infrastructures
of most of the enterprises. Some of such mission-critical infrastructures are
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) smart grid networks, industrial
Internet of Things (IoT) networks, industrial control systems [Ylmaz et al.,
2018], DNS root servers [Brownlee et al., 2001,Rootops, 2015,ENISA, 2016],
Internet eXchange Points (IXPs), fibre-optic backbones, medical systems
and military systems.
In 2013, Arbor networks reported DDoS attacks with an average size
of 1.77 Gbps (19.5% increase from year 2012) [eSecurity Planet, 2013]. In
contrast, we saw an average of 11.2 Gbps in Q1 of 2018 [Verisign, 2018]. In
the same quarter, Kaspersky reported that 57.3% of all DDoS attacks were
SYN floods [Kupreev; & Badovskaya, 2018].
Some network security defences for DoS make use of edge network ap-
pliances (also see §2.3.7.3) which do not scale (in terms of control and data
traffic unless more financially burdensome appliances are provisioned) with
the intensity of the DDoS attack. Other defences rely on security service
providers which handle attack traffic on behalf of an enterprise thereby mak-
ing all external traffic visible to the security provider (see §2.3.7.2). We
provide a solution to DoS attacks against network reachability in chapter 4.
We did not test the scalability (in terms of control traffic only) of our so-
lution but it ensures that an enterprise has complete control over defence
provisioning and its traffic. We make use of ILNP’s topologically signifi-
cant namespaces along with a backend which controls enterprise DNS and
its edge routers. The backend itself is in the protected network of the en-
terprise. Our solutions are tested to work against UDP and SYN based
volumetric DoS attacks.
1.3.3 Across-The-Board Security
An enterprise is required to provide multi-level security to its hosts and
networks. It should have mechanisms to thwart attacks on a single host as
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well as on the whole network. While ILNP’s non-topologically significant
namespace (see §2.1.1.1) provides defence for the host, and ILNP topologi-
cally significant namespace (see §2.1.1.2) provides defence for the network;
we can combine both approaches or namespaces to provide security at two
levels. We investigated this new approach in chapter 5 and found that our
prior defences, when combined, can protect an enterprise at both the host
and network levels.
While investigating the feasibility of our combined approaches to secu-
rity, we also noted a side-effect which provides some degree of client privacy.
We noted that each client session was distributed over multiple topologically
distinct paths with an ephemeral destination namespace which itself changes
for the next session from the same client. Thereby making it difficult for an
on-path privacy attacker to trace the client session. This is only possible if
control signalling in the defence is encrypted §5.3.
1.4 Moving Target Defence (MTD) Mechanism for
Attacker Entropy
Moving Target Defence (MTD) is an adaptive security mechanism which ob-
fuscates or intelligently randomizes information elements within hosts and
networks to maintain operational integrity of systems [Zhuang et al., 2013].
Such information elements can be derived from hosts and network config-
urations. MTD tries to achieve randomness and chaos for an attacker but
without disrupting end-to-end connectivity for end-hosts.
In our research, we will randomize ILNPv6-based namespaces only for
achieving MTD behaviour. The operational integrity of Transport Control
Protocol (TCP) connection initiation, path selection, and data communica-
tions will be achieved through coupling of MTD and DNS capabilities (de-
fined shortly) with the help of ILNPv6’s crisp separation of transport and
network layer semantics [Atkinson & Bhatti, 2012a] along with its seamless
mobility mechanism [Atkinson et al., 2009a], [Phoomikiattisak, 2016].
1.5 DNS Capabilities Mechanism for Host/Net-
work Access Authorization
A capability is an authorization token which is given by a destination to an
end-host for a short period of time to reach its network or services running
on it.
In our research, we have used ILNPv6 namespaces, i.e., NID64 and L64
values as capabilities. The capabilities which use NID values only are termed
NID64-based Capabilities (NC64). Each unique NC64 value contains an
ephemeral destination identifier and a fixed destination locator (see chap-
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ter 3). The capabilities which use L64 values only are termed as L64-based
Capabilities (LC64). A unique LC64 value contains an ephemeral destina-
tion locator value and a fixed destination identifier (see chapter 4). Similarly,
we form a third type of capabilities, termed as L64-NID64-based capabilities
(LNC64), which use an ephemeral identifier and an ephemeral locator (see
chapter 5). Together, these are called DNS capabilities because DNS is used
for their distribution to clients. All of our approaches to DoS defence make
use of DNS to distribute ILNP capabilities.
1.6 DNS Fast Flux Mechanism For Agility
DNS fast flux is a network based camouflage mechanism to transition the
same domain name from one IP address or ILNP namespace to another
within a small duration. DNS host entries are updated frequently to hide
the actual attack source.
This is similar to Frequency Hopping Spread Sprectrum (FHSS) [Scholtz,
1982] in radio signal transmission in mobile network access technologies
where a signal frequently switches a carrier frequency among multiple fre-
quency channels. Anyone who is listening on limited number of carrier
frequencies cannot construct the complete transmission.
DNS fast flux is mainly used by hackers to hide harmful activities such
as, phishing, malware delivery, covert communications, web proxying etc
[Nazario & Holz, 2008]. DNS fast flux can also be used to mitigate volu-
metric DoS attacks where a particular destination address/namespace of a
victim is used. Once an enterprise notices that it is being attacked us-
ing a particular destination address/namespace, it can quickly move to
other addresses/namespaces. In IPv6, this is not possible unless an en-
terprise deploys Mobile-IP version 6 (MIPv6) extensions. In IPv4, we re-
quire use of NAT [Shue et al., 2012], but it has its own short-comings (see
§2.4.2.1). It is possible in ILNP as it provides mobility as a first class
service [Phoomikiattisak, 2016]. The differences in semantics between IP
addresses and ILNP namespaces enable our solutions to independently deal
with individual clients and a server’s topological connectivity. Our solu-
tions tie a client’s session to an ephemeral destination identifier of the server
and/or to ephemeral locator of the server at different intervals either using
DNS at the start of the session or through ILNP-specific locator update
messages during the session.
In our research, we will take DNS fast flux and ILNP namespaces to
achieve DoS mitigation. Each ILNP capability, within each defence, will
switch frequently in a short period while maintaining MTD objectives such
as, connection continuity. The frequent switching of capabilities is one of
the MTD requirements (see §2.4.1.1).
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1.7 Thesis Outline
1.7.1 Research Motivation and Approach
ILNP’s architecture allows its namespaces to be flexible in their use in the
network stack and it allows an MTD-based DoS defence solutions to be
orchestrated. ILNP’s first-class mobility and connection-continuity allows
us to use ILNP namespaces as DNS capabilities and DNS fast flux in a way
which has not been used before. We used this motivation and approach
to create defence solutions that will be empirically evaluated in Chapters 3
to 5.
1.7.2 Research Questions
Based on our rationale and motivation, we formed the following research
questions.
1. How can the approaches of MTD, DNS fast flux, and the concept of
capabilities be used with ILNP namespaces to mitigate low-bandwidth
SYN floods and bandwidth-exhaustive volumetric attacks?
2. Do ILNP’s identifier-based DNS capabilities provide a defence solution
against SYN flood attacks that can be used as an alternative to the
existing SYN Cookies-based defence?
3. Do ILNP’s locator-based DNS capabilities provide a defence solution
against volumetric DoS attacks which is not possible with the first-
class features of IPv6?
4. Is it possible to combine ILNP’s identifier-based capabilities and locator-
based capabilities to simultaneously mitigate low-rate SYN floods and
bandwidth-exhaustive volumetric attacks on an enterprise host and its
network?
Although SYN Cookies can be used with both IPv6 and ILNP, there is
a possibility of eliminating SYN Cookies through native features of ILNP.
There are drawbacks (see §3.1) associated with SYN Cookies, whereas ILNP
provides an opportunity to eliminate these drawbacks (since it does not
modify TCP SYN-ACK packets used in the connection establishment).
We will investigate ILNP’s locator-based DNS capabilities which might
not be possible with the first class features of IPv6. Our discussion sees
these defences in the scope of IPv6 but our defences are entirely based on
ILNP. We chose IPv6 because of its increased adoption in real networks and
due to the fact that engineering of ILNP can also be done through IPv6.
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1.8 Thesis Structure
Chapter 1 covered relevant concepts of this research including security chal-
lenges faced by enterprises (i.e., host and network security in general) and
importance of DoS defence through the use of ILNP and DNS. It is also
accompanied by motivation, research questions, and thesis structure.
Chapter 2 covers background knowledge on DoS, ILNP, and DNS. It pro-
vides state of the art in enterprise DoS defence, classifies some common at-
tacks and provides advantages and disadvantages of their mitigations. The
chapter 2 also consolidates the importance of MTD approaches and empha-
sises on simplicity of using already established DNS infrastructure for MTD
approaches.
Chapter 3 shows how ILNP-based node identifiers can be used as ephemeral
DNS capabilities to mitigate SYN flood attacks. It shows the conceptual
mechanism for defence, the new network elements used, and their interac-
tions with existing systems. It also shows a real world implementation of
the approach and technologies used behind them. It provides information on
what security benefits we can achieve using identifier-based approach. The
chapter explains the experiment design, the testing, the empirical results
obtained, and the chapter summary. The research question 2 is addressed
in this chapter.
Chapter 4 shows how ILNP-based topologically significant node locator val-
ues can be used as ephemeral DNS capabilities to mitigate traffic based
volumetric UDP and SYN flood attacks. The chapter shows what benefits
we can achieve by using only locator values. Similar to chapter 3, it provides
the information about the entities involved, their interactions, the experi-
ment design, the testing, the empirical results and the chapter summary.
The research question 3 is addressed in this chapter.
Chapter 5 presents how ILNP-based identifier and locator values can be
used together to provide multi-layered security. It also shows the concep-
tual mechanism, the network elements involved, their interactions, the ex-
periment design, the testing, the empirical results obtained, and the chapter
summary. The research question 4 will be addressed in this chapter.
Chapter 6 provides the conclusion, the list of contributions made in this
work, and the discussion of defences’ specifications chapters showcased in
this dissertation. It then moves on to future works that this research can
entail.
Appendix A provides implementation details of extra network message spec-
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ifications used in ILNP’s identifier-based capabilities.
The research question 1 will be a common theme in all chapters.
Chapter 2
ILNP, DNS, And DoS
Attacks
This chapter describes the ILNP protocol along with its specific functional-
ities which can be used to defend against DoS attacks. It then describes the
DNS infrastructure, its relationship with ILNP, and its usability to defend
against the DoS attacks.
The state of the art of the DoS attacks along with its classification,
challenges, and defences will also be described. The security paradigms for
effective DoS mitigations will also be covered, along with their viability when
used in the context of ILNP and DNS.
We show the problem space we address with our contributions within the
current systems landscape by a critical analysis of the current approaches
to DoS defence.
2.1 Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP)
When this research was started in October 2014, IPv6 was deployed in
∼ 4.65%1 of the Internet. As of this writing, ∼ 25% of the Internet has been
deployed with IPv6 i.e. it is now capable to handle IPv6 traffic. Apart from
its adoption, there has been an increased interest in the development of DoS
defences which are based on IPv6. Due to these reasons, our research will
only consider ILNP which is a superset of IPv6. It will provide qualitative
comparison among these protocols where necessary.
IPv6 resolved the problem of address depletion in Internet Protocol ver-
sion 4 (IPv4), and provided extensions-based solutions to mobility, e.g.,
MIPv6 [Johnson et al., 2004], multihoming [Nagami et al., 2007], and secu-
rity, e.g., Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [Kent & Atkinson, 1998]. The
IPv6 extensions have complex architectures and implementations. Apart
1https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html
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from protocol extensions, lack of support for inter-domain traffic engineer-
ing, scalability, multihoming, and TCP connection continuity are some of
the most important challenges faced by IPv6. We explore recommended [Li,
2011] ILNP architecture whose specific advantages in these areas are being
critically researched. Some of its promising advantages include:
• First class (native to the protocol and not extension-based features)
and scalable host/network mobility [Phoomikiattisak, 2016].
• Decoupling of host/network identity and location [Atkinson & Bhatti,
2012a].
• Traffic engineering through the use of naming [Atkinson et al., 2009b].
• Harmonized integration of multihoming and mobility [Atkinson et al.,
2009a].
In this section, we provide a comprehensive description of ILNP concepts,
and its operations along with its specific well-researched and peer reviewed
mechanisms which we employed in our research.
It should be noted that the ILNP has two engineering instances, ILNPv4
for IPv4 inter-operability, and ILNPv6 for IPv6 inter-operability. In terms
of architecture, we will refer to it as ILNP and we will use the version-specific
suffix where necessary.
2.1.1 ILNP Architecture
ILNP provides two distinct namespaces which eliminate the need for an IP
address. These namespaces are used to name different objects within the
Internet. An object might be a physical or virtual node. A node is an
entity that can be named, e.g., a (physical or virtual) server or a (physical
or virtual) network. It also supports composition of multiple physical nodes
into a virtual object.
2.1.1.1 Node Identifier (NID) Namespace
A Node Identifier is a set of bits that uniquely identify a node but not its
network topological location. The NID values are used at the transport layer
of the network stack, and they are invariant during topological changes in
connectivity of the node within the same ILNP session. An ILNP session is
a session where both end hosts use the ILNP protocol. NID values are not
visible below the transport layer, so they are not used for routing network
packets. Similarly, they cannot be used to name the (physical or virtual)
network interface.
A node can have more than one NID value that can be active simul-
taneously, with each NID value used for a unique ILNP session. A node
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that starts an ILNP communication session can learn the NID values of the
correspondent node through DNS or any other name resolution mechanism.
An ILNP-enabled respondent node can learn the source NID value of the
node that starts an ILNP session from the received ILNP packet.
NID values are not strongly bound to network interfaces. Instead, they
can have dynamic bindings with one or more interfaces in the same ILNP
session. This dynamic binding is used to ensure TCP connection continuity
during changes in a node’s network connectivity, as ILNP mandates the use
of NID values at the Transport layer only.
2.1.1.2 Locator (L) Namespace
A Locator (L) value is a set of bits that can be used for packet routing, hence
they are topologically significant names. They are similar to IP network
routing prefixes supporting longest-prefix match routing. Locator values
are only used at the Network layer, but they are not visible above it.
Locator values can change within the same ILNP session, i.e., a single
NID value can have more than one active L values. When a node can change
its L value(s) within the same ILNP session, it enables harmonized mobility
and multihoming (cf. §2.1.3).
A communicating-node, whether client or server, informs the correspon-
dent node about changes in its network connectivity through a control mes-
sage called Locator Update (LU) within the ILNP session. An LU message
contains new network information, e.g., one or more Locator values, and en-
ables the respondent ILNP nodes to modify their dynamic bindings. Once
corresponding dynamic bindings are updated, the respondent node can send
an LU ACK (Acknowledgement) message back to the correspondent node.
2.1.1.3 Solving Address Entanglement In IP Network Stack
The use of namespaces and addressing information in the ILNP and the
Internet Protocol (IP) is shown in Table 2.1. In the IP architecture, an IP
address is used at the transport, the network, and the physical layers. A
change in the IP address, in any layer, will disrupt the IP session unless some
IP extension is used to manage this disruption. In IP, the application layer
can use IP addresses and Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) in soft-
ware configurations. On the contrary, ILNP mandates that the NID and L
values should only be used at the transport and network layers, respectively.
It is recommended that FQDNs should only be used at the application layer.
The NID values are dynamically bound to the L values (in many-to-many
fashion) while the physical layer must use L64 to network interface dynamic
bindings. This allows a crisp separation of concerns in the network stack.
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Protocol Layer ILNP IP (v4 & v6)
Application FQDN FQDN, IP address
Transport Identifier, NID IP address
Network Locator IP address
(Interface) dynamic binding IP address
Table 2.1: Use of namespaces and addressing information in ILNP &
IP [Atkinson & Bhatti, 2012a]
2.1.2 ILNPv6 — An Engineering Instantiation of ILNP
ILNPv6 is a superset of IPv6 [Atkinson & Bhatti, 2012a] because it has
native support for all the native functionalities of IPv6 and important IPv6
extensions, e.g., mobility and multihoming. It also provides features not
possible with native IPv6 such as, inter-domain scalability of the Internet
core network [Li, 2011]. It is also inter-operable with the IPv6 infrastruc-
ture, hence incrementally deployable. In addition, it also solves the issue of
TCPv6 connection continuity during changes in the network connectivity.
ILNPv6 namespaces are derived from an IPv6 128-bit address by split-
ting it in half. The upper 64-bits of the IPv6 address are used to create an
ILNP node locator namespace (L64), while the lower 64-bits of the same ad-
dress are used to create an ILNP node identifier namespace (NID64). Figure
2.1 shows encodings of ILNPv6 namespaces and IPv6 address.
Figure 2.1: IPv6 address space and ILNPv6 namespaces [Atkinson &
Bhatti, 2012b]
L64 values have the same syntax and semantics as IPv6 unicast rout-
ing prefixes, whereas NID64 values have the same syntax as IPv6 Interface
Identifiers but different semantics. ILNPv6 namespaces are encoded into
the same 128-bits of an IPv6 address. To identify an ILNPv6 packet, IL-
NPv6 specifies a 96-bit nonce value in the optional IPv6 destination header.
Locator Update and respective Acknowledgement control messages, which
enable harmonized ILNP mobility and multihoming, are encoded in the In-
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ternet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6). ILNP permits the
use of any other transport mechanism for locator updates. Our research
recommends the use of a secure transport mechanism for locator updates.
Apart from the addition of a nonce value in the optional IPv6 destina-
tion headers, there are no modifications in IPv6 headers, so the network will
perceive an ILNPv6 packet as an IPv6 packet. This approach enables incre-
mental deployment of ILNPv6 in the current Internet, and makes ILNPv6
a host based protocol.
For deployment purposes, ILNPv6 is implemented by modifying the IPv6
codebase. ILNPv6 prototypes are available for Linux [Phoomikiattisak,
2016] and FreeBSD [Simpson, 2016], and our research uses the modified
Linux kernel version 4.9.38, which was ported by myself from the modified
Linux kernel version 3.9.0 implementation developed by Dr. D. Phoomiki-
attisak.
2.1.2.1 Identifier-Locator Communication Cache (ILCC)
Each ILNP node maintains the required information for an ILNP operation
in the Identifier-Locator Communication Cache (ILCC). In our ILNPv6 ker-
nel implementation, it is implemented as a linked list data structure con-
taining the following information:
• NID64 and L64 values of the node, and their dynamic bindings.
• Dynamic bindings between namespaces of source and destination nodes
for each ILNP session.
• Dynamic bindings between L64 values and network interfaces.
In current ILNPv6 kernel variants, these bindings are modified based on
router advertisements, Locator Update messages, domain name resolution
responses, and ILNPv6 connection requests. In the future, the bindings in
the ILCC can be modified based on the traffic engineering requirements of
new host/network functionalities.
2.1.3 ILNP Mobility
ILNP natively supports node mobility through a crisp separation of NID64
and L64 values in the network stack, where a node can be a (physical or
virtual) host or a (physical or virtual) network. ILNP also supports session
continuity in a mobile node within another mobile node, e.g., a mobile device
within a mobile vehicular network.
ILNP mobility requires a node handoff mechanism and dynamic DNS
updates of the L and I records (see §2.2.3). A handoff mechanism mandates
any kind of operation through which existing sessions are shifted to a new
network path. ILNP enables handoff using Locator Updates.
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ILNP enables mobility through dynamic updates in an ILCC cache via
Locator Update control messages, and in client/server environments through
dynamic DNS Resource Record (RR) updates [Atkinson et al., 2012] (also
see §2.2.3).
Our research mitigates DoS attacks with the help of ILNP mobility by
using the handoff mechanism and dynamic DNS updates of the L and I
values.
2.1.3.1 Host Mobility
Host mobility occurs when an individual host changes its network connec-
tivity (i.e., the point of attachment), which can be done through the handoff
mechanism. There are two types of handoffs, hard handoff and soft handoff.
In a hard handoff, a host completely breaks its connectivity with the cur-
rently attached network before attaching itself to a different network. In a
soft handoff, a host maintains connectivity with the current network until it
attaches itself to a different network. A soft handoff entails minimum packet
loss [Phoomikiattisak, 2016]. ILNP supports both types of handoffs.
If a host performing handoff between two same underlying technologies
(e.g. WIFI) performs a horizontal handoff. If the underlying technologies
are different (e.g., WIFI and 3G/4G) then it performs a vertical handoff.
ILNP supports both kinds of handoffs.
Figure 2.2 shows ILNP host mobility with handoff.
Figure 2.2: ILNP based host mobility using handoff
The mobile host MHILNP is first connected to the site network A. It
is using IH as an identifier and LA as a locator. LA is provided by the
site network A. Once it moves to an overlapping region where it has an
access to both network A and network B, then it updates its ILCC entries to
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reflect new reachability information, i.e., its IH identifier is now dynamically
bound to LA and LB locators. Now it can use any locator value to reach
correspondent nodes. Once it moves to network B, it updates its bindings
by removing the dynamic bindings between IH and LA.
In the network overlap region of Figure 2.2, MHILNP sends locator
update messages to the correspondent nodes so that all communications can
use new and/or old network information. MHILNP also sends a dynamic
DNS update message with new network information so that new incoming
connections can reach it using either information. Once it has moved to
network B, all communications take place using the LB locator.
2.1.3.2 Site Mobility
ILNP supports site mobility where an entire site may be mobile. A site can
be in hard or soft handoff mode which can itself be a horizontal or vertical
handoff. Figure 2.3 shows ILNP based site mobility using handoff.
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Figure 2.3: ILNP based network mobility using handoff
Before handoff, the mobile site is connected to ISPA through the Site
Border Router (SBR). The SBR is using the LA locator provided by ISPA.
It advertises this locator to the network devices. So, each host in the mobile
network is communicating with correspondent nodes using ISPA.
Once the mobile site moves to an overlap region where it is connected
to both ISPA and ISPB, each host within the mobile network has the
corresponding dynamic bindings, i.e., their identifiers are dynamically bound
to both upstream providers (ISPs) through LA and LB. If the device uses
both locators at the same time, then it is in soft handoff mode. If it is only
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using the new one then it is in the hard handoff mode. After the handoff,
all communication happens solely using LB through ISPB.
During a handoff, nodes within the mobile network send locator updates
to correspondent nodes with existing connections. If these nodes are publicly
accessible servers, then they send corresponding dynamic DNS updates for
incoming connections. Each host within the mobile network behaves as if it
is also mobile even though it might actually be fixed.
Our work makes use of site mobility to provide site network defence
against DoS attacks that target whole site availability (see chapters 4 and 5).
Our work does not prefer any type of handover over another. But we em-
ployed soft handoff to minimize packet loss while our defences are in place
and to check control message packet loss in congested links.
2.1.4 ILNP And Security
Current ILNP specifications address end-to-end support for IP security dur-
ing mobility, nonce-based authentication of ILNP packets, and forged Iden-
tifier attacks. These specifications do not address the use of namespaces
as a DoS defence mechanism. This research fills this gap by using ILNP
namespaces, and ILNP mobility in a novel way (see chapters 3 to 5).
Current ILNP specifications address the following solutions for end-to-
end security. We also present a side-by-side comparison with our research:
• IPsec is supported in ILNP by removing the strong bindings between
IP addresses and IPsec Security Associations (IPsec SAs). ILNP man-
dates the use of Identifiers in these associations rather than IP ad-
dresses in current IP security operations. IPsec SAs for IPv6 break
when a node moves from one network to another. IP security for ILNP
allows a node to maintain its security associations during changes in
connectivity. Our research does not make use of IPsec to provide DoS
defence, but recommends the use of IPsec in enterprise networks and
their communications with the Internet.
• ILNP mandates the authentication of ICMP messages which enable
mobility. This is achieved through the introduction of nonce value
within control messages. Our research recommends to use encryption
of such messages as well.
• ILNP provides support for defence against off-path attacks to ILNP
sessions by having a unique nonce value in ILNP packets, and by
having the same unique nonce value in ICMP control messages, as
mentioned above. Our research does not break this principle, i.e., it
makes use of mobility without modification to nonce values associated
with an ILNP session.
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• ILNP recommends the use of secure DNS dynamic update [Welling-
ton, 2000] for nodes which are listening for new ILNP sessions (also
see §2.2.3). Our research introduces a new backend processor which
controls updates to the DNS. For further security of the backend pro-
cessor, we make use of a TLS-enabled secure channel between DNS
and the backend processor to carry compact messages that contain
new DNS Resource Records (RRs). These messages are used by API
interfaces available in one of the market-leading DNS software. This
is only possible in enterprise environments which make use of their
public-facing DNS (within a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)) by allowing
DNS to connect to its backend processor. Our research also recom-
mends the use of secure DNS dynamic updates by the backend pro-
cessor.
We believe that ILNP mobility can be utilized to enable DoS defence by
fast transitioning of the ILNP sessions to secure and topologically-significant
attack-free paths while an attack is happening on a compromised path. Sim-
ilarly, the use of Identifiers per client and its authorization over nonce-based
packet authentication can enable defence against particular types of DoS
attacks along with off-path attacks.
2.2 Domain Name System (DNS)
Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed network which provides name
resolution services for the Internet. Internet nodes have numerically for-
matted addresses through which they can be identified and located. DNS
makes their conversion between human-readable domain names and numeric
counterparts possible [Mockapetris, 1983], [Mockapetris, 1987].
2.2.1 DNS Architecture
The DNS architecture is a scalable and highly available architecture that has
a hierarchical and distributed global database containing Resource Records
(RRs). These RRs can be IP addresses, application service names, security
data points, and hostnames, i.e., Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs).
These RRs are contained within zone files in each DNS server (termed as
DNS nameserver). Two important types of nodes in DNS are the root name-
servers and the resolvers (domain nameservers).
A FQDN contains hierarchical information which is used by each layer
in the DNS hierarchy. For example, cs.st-andrews.ac.uk. contains complete
information as stored in the DNS tree/hierarchy. For the representation of
a root name, a dot symbol is used at the end of the domain name which
completes the FQDN syntax. Two examples along with supplementary in-
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formation on the FQDN structure in the context of DNS hierarchy is shown
in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) in the context of DNS
hierarchy
2.2.2 DNS Engineering
There are 132 root nameservers which store, cache, and provide resource
records of Top Level Domain (TLD) nameservers. There are multiple types
of TLDs, e.g., country code TLD (ccTLD) and generic TLD (gTLD); for
example .uk and .mil are examples of ccTLD and gTLD, respectively. Each
root and TLD nameserver is globally replicated in different countries for
high availability. Each nameserver regularly synchronizes its local copies
with the distributed infrastructure.
ISPs, government institutions, and enterprise networks contain DNS re-
solver nodes which resolve domain names to corresponding resource records
on behalf of clients. Similarly, there are local software agents which act as
resolvers as well (stub-resolvers) within web browsers or operating systems.
Resolvers can be implemented as recursive or iterative (see §2.2.2.1). The
responsibility of stub-resolvers is to check system files for resource records
either cached or stored (e.g. in /etc/hosts file in Linux), or to query ISP-
operated DNS resolvers. An example implementation of a stub-resolver is
available in glibc3, which is part of most Linux operating systems. In our
research, we modified glibc to work with ILNP-specific RRs within DNS.
Nameservers maintain two kinds of information. The first kind contains
authoritative information about a domain name, and the second kind con-
tains cached resource records from previous DNS database synchronization
2https://www.iana.org/domains/root/servers
3https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
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events. Node-specific resolvers also cache resource records based on a spe-
cial value in a DNS protocol message data structure called Time To Live
(TTL). We would take the opportunity to emphasise that, for our research,
we recommend TTL values (start of the TTL counter) to be one second or
less in the resolvers, because our DoS defences rely on regular updates to
resource records in nameservers.
2.2.2.1 Resolver Implementations
Recursive and iterative implementations of resolvers use different steps for
name resolution. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show both implementations. In a
recursive implementation, a stub-resolver delegates the end-to-end name
resolution to the ISP’s nameserver, whereas, in an iterative implementation,
the stub-resolver takes responsibility of end-to-end name resolution.
We take the opportunity to show the placement of our backend processor
in both implementations using the following figures. It can be noted that
placement of the backend processor is independent of resolver implementa-
tion. However, we recommend the use of an iterative approach because it
provides more client information to the backend processor.
Recursive DNS:
Let us take an example of DNS name resolution for the verisign.com domain.
A client enters verisign.com in the browser, which contacts the stub-resolver
within the client operating system. Then, the following ordered steps are
performed by an end-to-end recursive resolution process.
1. The stub-resolver makes a DNS client query for verisign.com to an ISP
nameserver whose address information is stored in its configuration.
2. The ISP resolver/nameserver makes a DNS query to the root name-
server for the .com TLD domain (if ISP is not aware of such informa-
tion).
3. The root nameserver sends a response to the ISP nameserver with
address information of the .com TLD nameserver.
4. The ISP nameserver sends a DNS request for verisign.com to the TLD
nameserver.
5. The TLD nameserver returns the address information of the name-
server responsible for having authoritative information about verisign.com.
6. The ISP nameserver sends a DNS request to the authoritative name-
server.
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7. The authoritative nameserver sends address information about verisign.com
server to the ISP nameserver.
8. The ISP nameserver sends a DNS response containing versign.com
server address information back to the client.
After these steps have completed, a client can initiate a connection to the
versign.com server by using the address information from the DNS response.
Once the connection is successful, the verisign.com website is loaded within
the browser.
Our solutions can be impacted if the ISPs employ caching of records. We
recommend that the TTL values should be small enough so as to discourage
caching. The low TTL values will help end-users to have an updated identity
and network access information about the servers.
Figure 2.5: End-to-end Recursive DNS name resolution
Iterative DNS:
In an iterative DNS, every step that was performed by the ISP nameserver
is performed by the client resolver. An ISP nameserver provides address
information about the root nameserver to the client resolver. The following
ordered steps are performed after a client enters verisign.com in the browser
bar:
1. The client resolver makes a DNS query for verisign.com to an ISP
nameserver whose address information is stored in its configuration.
2. The ISP nameserver sends a DNS response containing address infor-
mation of the root nameserver.
3. The client resolver sends a DNS query to the root nameserver for the
.com domain resolution.
4. The root nameserver sends a response to the client resolver with ad-
dress information of the .com TLD nameserver.
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5. The client resolver sends a DNS query for the verisign.com domain to
the TLD nameserver.
6. The TLD nameserver returns the address information of the DNS
nameserver responsible for having authoritative information about the
verisign.com.
7. The client resolver sends a DNS query to the authoritative nameserver.
8. The authoritative nameserver sends address information about verisign.com
server to the client resolver.
After these steps have completed, the client resolver gives this informa-
tion to the browser which can initiate a connection to a versign.com server by
using the address information from the DNS response. Once the connection
is successful, the verisign.com website is loaded within the browser.
In our research, our backend processor modifies the DNS response in
step 8 that was sent by the authoritative DNS server.
Figure 2.6: Iterative DNS name resolution
2.2.2.2 DNS Transport Protocols And Security
End-to-end DNS queries and responses can be carried out using any Trans-
port layer protocol. The query can be an update to the DNS information in
zone files, using dynamic DNS update [Vixie et al., 1997]. Our DoS defence
protocols do not mandate use of any particular Transport protocol, but we
recommend end-to-end security of DNS transactions.
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2.2.3 DNS And ILNP
2.2.3.1 New DNS Resource Records (RRs) for ILNP
As ILNP deprecates the use of IP addresses, AAAA and A RR types are
not supported. AAAA RR type is used with IPv6, whereas A RR type
is used with IPv4. For nodes which expect incoming network connections,
ILNP introduces the following new RRs in DNS [Atkinson et al., 2012], and
they can only be used by ILNP-aware nodes (nodes that implement and use
ILNP):
NID Resource Records
A NID is an address class independent Node Identifier (NID) RR with an
RR type value of 104 in DNS packets. It is a 64-bit field with a 16-bit
Preference field. A Preference field can be used by a domain owner for
relative preference among more than one NID RRs. A domain name can
have zero or more NID RRs, but there must be at least one NID RR which
can be used by ILNP sessions, where each end-to-end ILNP session is only
tied to a single NID. A DNS administrator can choose any TTL value for
the NID RR.
Our DoS defences do not use Preference fields, and do not have require-
ments for specific TTL values for NIDs. Our DoS defences do require a NID
field of the NID RR.
L32 Resource Records
A L32 RR is an address class independent Locator value with a RR type
value of 105 in DNS packets. A L32 RR is a 32-bit Locator for ILNPv4-
capable ILNP node. ILNPv4 is an engineering instantiation of ILNP which
is inter-operable with IPv4. For details, please see RFC 6742 Section 2.2.
Our research does not require a L32 RR, and has no requirements for its
TTL and Preference values.
L64 Resource Records
A L64 RR is an address class independent ILNP node Locator value with
an RR type value of 106 in DNS packets. L64 RR contains a 64-bit Locator,
with a 16-bit Preference value, to be used with ILNPv6-capable nodes. Its
Preference field has the same usability as a NID Preference field, and is used
to prioritize L64 RRs. There is a TTL field associated with L64 RR that
can be of any value chosen by the domain administrator. A domain name
can have zero or more L64 RRs, but there should be at least one L64 RR
active for each ILNP session, where each end-to-end ILNP session can use
more than one L64 values if available.
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Our DoS defences require L64 RR, but have no requirements for its
Preference field, and we recommend the TTL value to be as low as zero
seconds (so that the clients always get the fresh information as our defences
produce reachability information after a very short interval).
LP Resource Records
A LP RR is an address class independent ILNP node Locator Pointer with
an RR type value of 107 in DNS packets. A LP RR encoding is a variable
length FQDN field and a 16-bit Preference field. Its FQDN is used to resolve
L32/L64 RRs for a domain name, i.e., it points to a subnetwork of the
ILNP node. Its Preference field has the same usability as the NID/L64/L32
Preference field, where an administrator can assign priorities to multiple
LP records. A domain name can have zero or more LP RRs. DNS name
compression is forbidden for LP RRs [Atkinson et al., 2012]. There is a
TTL field associated with the LP RR that can be of any value chosen by
the domain administrator.
Our research does not require LP RR, and has no requirement for its
TTL and Preference values.
Table 2.2 shows information on presentation formats and examples of
DNS resource records for IP and ILNPv6.
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Term DNS Record Definition Presentation Format in DNS Zone file Example(s) (one per line)
IPv6
Address
AAAA
128-bit value to represent node
location and identity in IP network
<owner-name>IN AAAA <IPv6-address> host1.example.com. IN AAAA 2001:0DB8:1140:1000:0014:4fff:ff20:ee64
ILNPv6 Node
Identifier
NID
64-bit value to represent node
identity in ILNPv6 network
<owner-name>IN NID <Preference><NodeID> host1.example.com. IN NID 10 0014:4fff:ff20:ee64
ILNPv6
Locator
L64
64-bit value to represent node
location in ILNPv6 network
<owner-name>IN L64 <Preference><Locator64>
host1.example.com. IN L64 10 2001:0DB8:1140:1000
l64-subnet1.example.com. IN L64 10 2001:0DB8:1140:1000
Locator
Pointer
LP
Variable length FQDN character string
providing L64 indirection
<owner-name>IN LP <Preference><FQDN> host1.example.com. IN LP 10 l64-subnet1.example.com.
Table 2.2: DNS Resource Records of IP and ILNPv6 along with their definitions, zone file presentation formats, and
examples.
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2.2.3.2 Modifications In The Client Side DNS APIs For ILNP
When a client makes a DNS query for a name resolution, it encodes a ques-
tion in a DNS request packet for a specific resource record, e.g., AAAA
or A. In ILNP, an ILNP node can request an ILNP-specific DNS record
for another ILNP node/network. There are many client side libraries for
DNS name resolution but we will cover glibc4 because it is supported in
most Linux-based operating systems with diverse instruction-set architec-
tures (ARM5, PowerPC6, SPARC7 etc).
In our research, we modified the getaddrinfo API to honour API calls
from applications which are not ILNP-aware, i.e., do not make NID, L64,
or LP queries, but require AAAA queries to enable communications. This
modification allowed us to run common applications e.g. curl8, iperf39,
dig10, and ping611.
We made the following modifications for ILNP client nodes which want
to establish a connection with another ILNP node through DNS name res-
olution:
1. When a client application makes a DNS name resolution function call
for an AAAA record through getaddrinfo, the modified glibc intercepts
the DNS response.
2. The modified glibc splits the IPv6 address from the DNS response in
half, and stores the lower 64 bits as the NID, and the upper 64 bits as
the L64 value.
3. The modified glibc adds the ILCC bindings (see §2.1.2.1) between the
NID and L64 values of the client with the NID and L64 values of the
remote node.
4. The modified glibc then returns the IPv6 address to the client appli-
cation.
Once these steps have been carried out, our required legacy client appli-
cations work with the ILNP kernel implementation. The above mentioned
modifications were done by myself for glibc version 2.23.
4https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
5https://developer.arm.com/products/architecture
6https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/systems/library/es-archguide-v2.html
7http://sparc.org/technical-documents/
8https://curl.haxx.se
9https://iperf.fr
10https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/cur/9.10/doc/arm/man.dig.html
11https://linux.die.net/man/8/ping6
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2.3 DoS Attacks
Extortion, rivalry, rogue business competition, intention to punish, political
enmity, and sometimes fun are some of the motivational factors contributing
to DoS attacks. Anti-state and state-sponsored groups routinely launch
offensives on critical infrastructure of other governments. They employ a
DoS mechanism which is one of the attack tools used in cyber-warfare.
In order to plan a DoS attack, attackers make use of information gath-
ered through hacking and systems vulnerability testing, e.g., port scanning.
They use impersonation, compromised network machines, and physical ag-
gression to yield successful DoS. After getting enough information to launch
an attack, attackers employ either low-rate, specially-crafted data packets
to exhaust the enterprise systems’ resources, or high data-rate packets to
congest links going towards the enterprise network.
In this research, we will propose and evaluate solutions which defend an
enterprise against both low and high data-rate packets to protect both the
enterprise systems and its network.
It should be noted that our research does not deal with attack detection
but with mitigation. Reduction in penetration or vulnerability testing done
by an attacker and the provisioning of client privacy are two of the side effects
of our defences. In regards to deployment of these defences, an enterprise
has the option to either execute them after it has detected an attack, or it
can use them any time in order to benefit from the side effects as well.
2.3.1 History of DoS Attacks
The aim of this section is to extensively cover the history of DoS attacks from
their inception to present times. We have formed a time-line view by epochs,
because they represent periods around which new network functionalities
either enhanced or limited DoS attacks. Each section mentions that aspect
with emphasis.
2.3.1.1 1974-2000
This epoch saw a wide adoption of computing systems and networks for
business and personal use. Operational knowledge of computers and in-
tentions to circumvent Cyber systems was an attractive crime due to the
limited legislation for cybercrime.
In 1974, a teenage student named David Dennis launched and reported
the first DoS attack at the Computer-based Education Research Laboratory
(CERL) [Radware, 2017]. He executed code which forced 31 computers in
CERL to be turned off. Since then, DoS attacks have increased in frequency
and complexity to cripple the availability of global enterprise networks and
hosts running in them.
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In 1986 [Hughes, 1992], a court hearing proceeded for a case in which
the defendant erased software from a plastic circuit card in a computerized
saw. This incident rendered the saw inoperable. This incident was termed
as damage to property.
The most devastating incident occurred in 1988, when a student Robert
Morris crippled access to more than 6,000 Internet connected systems used
by academia, industry, and the government [Dierks, 1993]. The damages
amounted to $150, 000 in the official documents, but they were reported to
be about $97 million in the un-official popular press.
In 1991, the Joint Academic Network (JANET) systems were accessed by
an unauthorized attacker. The attacker gained the role of Systems Manager
using malicious activities, and changed passwords of authorized users. This
crippled the access to these systems [Hughes, 1992].
In 1992, a software contractor (Richard Goulden), after having a pay-
ment dispute with a host company, entered the enterprise premises and
configured systems’ passwords that were only known to him. This attack
was classified as Denial of Access [Computer Weekly, 1992].
In 1997, the control tower of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
the emergency services of the Worcester Airport, and the Rutland commu-
nity were denied services for approximately six hours. It was done by a
teenage computer hacker named ‘Jester’. It compromised the ‘loop carrier
system’ (that integrated voice and data communications) of NYNEX (New
England telephone company) [Conklin et al., 2018].
On February 7, 2000, Mafiaboy [Radware, 2003] made use of a dis-
tributed DoS attack to cripple the availability of Fifa.com, CNN.com, Dell,
Amazon.com, eBay, and Yahoo. In the same year, Mafiaboy also launched
attacks on nine of the 13 DNS root nameservers. This series of attacks were
termed as NET JAM. Mafiaboy used Tribe Flood Network (TFN2) [Carnegie
Mellon University, 1999] tools to launch the attack. TFN2 is a distributed
set of tools that is used to launch coordinated and volumetric SYN flood,
UDP flood, and ICMP flood.
2.3.1.2 2001-2003
Rootkits, worms, and DNS reflection [Al-Dalky et al., 2018] based (D)DoS
attacks became more common during this period. Distributed Reflection-
based Denial of Service (DRDoS), Code Red [eEye Digital Security, 2001],
and Mydoom [Wong et al., 2004] collectively used UDP, TCP, and the Bor-
der Gateway Protocol (BGP) protocols through globally connected infected
machines to successfully cripple a victim’s availability. Rootkits provided
unauthorized access, thereby enabling an attacker to execute software pro-
grams such as, worms, which endemically penetrated into other network
machine. Once infected, attackers used the machines to launch attacks. A
DNS reflection-based mechanisms go even further where an impersonation of
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a victim’s source addresses is used to launch an attack. Such an assault uses
spoofing, whereby an attacker uses the fake source address (or the victim’s
source addresses in the case of DNS reflection) to send data packets.
Microsoft web pages, Register.com, the White House, DNS Root Servers,
and the Irish Department of Finance were some of the victims in this period.
In this research, we will address attacks which make use of spoofing.
2.3.1.3 2004-2008
In 2004, a junk mail worm named Mydoom infected more than one million
computers, and used these infected machines to launch a Distributed DoS
(DDoS) offensive.
In May 2006, a DDoS hit an anti-spam firm named Blue Security which
re-directed its attacked-location to Six Apart Ltd. This in turn crippled ac-
cess (around 8 hours of downtime) to Six Apart’s ∼1.8 million blog sites
including 10 million plus registered users of LiveJournal, Typepad, and
MoveableType12.
In 2007, the cyber-warfare was started by a DDoS incident on Estonian
public and private sites when Estonia disagreed with Russia on a World War
II memorial relocation. Ping floods and botnet-assisted DDoS attacks were
used in this cyber attack.
The SCO Group, Microsoft web pages, online game servers, DNS root
nameservers, the Church of Scientology, Six Apart Limited, and institutional
sites of Georgia, South Korea, and Estonia were victims of this period. In
this research, we will address DDoS mitigation in Chapter 4, but we will not
provide solutions for mitigation of malicious software distribution.
2.3.1.4 2009-2013
Cloud computing became mainstream after 2005, and small-to-medium en-
terprises started hosting their services on public, private, or hybrid Cloud
architectures. In retrospect, the industry saw a rise in DoS attacks due to
financially cheap computing resources enabled by cloud technologies. Since
many organizations started to move their workloads to public clouds, cloud
providers themselves started to see massive DDoS attacks. The attacks got
more intensive in part due to an increase in Internet bandwidth as well.
In 2010, Arbor Networks reported a ∼49 Gbps traffic based attack on a
single enterprise victim [Arbor Networks, 2010]. In 2013, Cloudflare re-
ported [Cloudflare, 2013] that a particular Tier 1 operator saw a ∼300 Gbps
volumetric attack targeted towards spamhaus.org.
Due to open source development and the mass provisioning of attack
tools, it became easy for novice attackers to get hold of such malicious
software. Code hosting sites with collaborative coding such as, GitHub,
12https://movabletype.com/
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made it possible to help develop the type of software which can be potentially
exploited to do rogue activities by novice to expert offenders.
There was an increase in attacks on the application layer. Low date-rate
network traffic with carefully crafted HTTP packets were used to knock
out services running on application and database servers. Arbor Networks
reported usage of the Hyper Text Transport Protocol (HTTP), DNS, Sim-
ple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)/Voice
over IP (VoIP), and HTTP Secure (HTTPS) protocol based DoS attacks
between 2010 and 2011.
Cloud computing provider GoGrid, DNS hosting company UltraDNS,
domain registrar Register.com, web hosting firm The Planet, The Pirate Bay
(pirated content torrent indexer), Iran’s government websites, the U.S.A.
Department of Transportation, the U.S.A. Federal Trade Commission, The
Washington Post, the New York Stock Exchange, Twitter, Google, and Face-
book were some of the victims in this period.
The main concerns for the lack of security controls were attributed to
the lack of skilled security experts in building and maintaining effective
solutions. The use of the application layer to execute DDoS attacks and the
discovery of new system vulnerabilities increased the gap between having a
skilled workforce to thwart these attacks and protecting the enterprise.
Most of the attacks used IPv4 as the underlying protocol whose design
did not account for the DDoS challenges that came later. DDoS attackers
manipulate packet headers for which there are no security mechanisms avail-
able for authentication. Most of the enterprise security controls were based
on firewalls, gateways, and ISP-managed security appliances which did not
incorporate attacks which used advanced techniques at the Transport and
Application layers. Unfortunately, it is still the case.
We took these considerations into account and designed our solutions by
selecting ILNP as the underlying protocol that has a mechanism to control
traffic at the network level. We also chose DNS capabilities and Moving
Target Defence (MTD) as a paradigm through which we can achieve protocol
level authentication of packets and live migration of services to topologically
accessible links.
2.3.1.5 2014-2018
In 2014, independent media enterprises in Hong Kong saw a ∼500 Gbps
DDoS attack. On Christmas day of 2014, PlayStation and Xbox Live ser-
vices were rendered oﬄine for several days by a DDoS assault. It was termed
as a marketing gig from hackers to capture new DDoS customers.
In 2015, 19,000 French websites were attacked for a week in the wake of
the Charlie Hebdo controversy. In the same year, Anonymous conducted a
∼40 Gbps Root DNS attack on Turkish servers [Karat, 2016].
Arbor networks recorded ∼124,000 DDoS attacks in 2016. In the same
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year, Dyn DNS was also attacked using the Mirai botnet [Dyn, 2016] (with
∼100,000 infected IoT devices). This attack affected sites like GitHub, Etsy,
Twitter, and Spotify.
Peak attack traffic was intensified in comparison to previous years. In
2016, the information security blog named Brian Krebs13 was hit by a ∼620
Gbps traffic based attack [Krebs, 2016].
In 2017, Brazil saw a peak of a 641 Gbps assault. In 2018, GitHub was
rendered unavailable in a ∼1.3 Tbps DDoS attack [The Hacker News, 2018].
Later that year, Arbor networks reported an intensity of ∼1.7 Tbps on a
major U.S. service provider.
Russian Banks, Turkish sites, security service providers, Rio Olympics’
sites, Clinton and Trump campaign sites, the Brian Krebs site, DynDNS,
DreamHost, Melbourne IT, the U.K. National Lottery, and Boston Globe
were some of the major victims.
The majority of the attacks launched during this period were UDP
floods, SYN floods, ICMP floods, and DNS reflection.
Table 2.3 summarises the DoS history presented in this section.
13https://krebsonsecurity.com/
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Year Range Type of Attacks Affects and/or Affected Parties
1974-2000
Remote Server Lockdown (CERL, 1974),
Software erasure from plastic circuit card (Cox v. Riley, 1986),
System crash (Internet crash – Robert Morris (Attacker), 1988),
Remote Control via SYSMAN impersonation (JANET – R. v. Whitely, 1991)
Password Reset (R. v. Goulden, 1992),
Series of remote commands to control ’loop carrier system’ (NYNEX, Worcester Airport, and Jester, 1997),
Distributed DoS – SYN, UDP, and ICMP floods (NET JAM, 2000)
31 servers (CERL),
Inoperable computerized saw (Cox v. Riley),
Over 6,000 Internet machines (Robert Morris),
Main control workstation (R. v. Gouden),
Unauthorized admin access to approx. all systems (JANET),
6 hour disruption (Worcester Airport and Jester),
Several hours disruption (NET JAM)
2001-2003
Distributed Reflection-based DoS,
Code Red (2001),
UDP floods, TCP SYN floods, BGP protocol based attacks
Downtime for Microsoft, Register.com, White House (U.S.A.),
DNS Root Servers, Irish Department of Finance
2004-2008
Mydoom infected 1 million machines – DDoS (2004),
DDoS using packet floods (Blue Security and Six Apart Ltd., 2006),
First DDoS based Cyber-warfare attack with ping floods (Estonia, 2007)
Approx. 8 hours downtime (Blue Security and Six Apart Ltd.),
The SCO Group, Microsoft, online video games, DNS Root Servers,
Church of Scientology, Estonia government, South Korea
2009-2013
DDoS aided by Cloud Computing resources,
Application Layer DoS,
SMTP, SIP, VoIP, HTTPS,
Volumetric DDoS with approx. 49 Gbps attack (2010),
Volumetric DDoS with approx. 300 Gbps (2013)
Cloud Providers,
Tier 1 Operator with approx. 300 Gbps (2013),
GoGrid, UltraDNS, Register.com, The Planet,
U.S.A. Department of Transportation, Twitter, Google,
Facebook
2014-2018
Volumetric DDoS with approx. 500 Gbps attack (Hong Kong, 2014),
Volumetric DDoS with approx. 40 Gbps (Turkey, 2015),
Approx. 124,000 Volumetric DDoS attacks (2016),
Mirai Botnet based attack (2016),
Volumetric DDoS with approx. 620 Gbps (2016),
Volumetric DDoS with approx. 641 Gbps and 1.7 Tbps(2017),
UDP, SYN, ICMP floods, and DNS reflection based attacks
Media enterprises in Hong Kong (2014),
PlayStation, Xbox Live,
French websites, Turkish Servers, Dyn DNS,
GitHub, Etsy, Twitter, Spotify,
Brazilian websites, Russian banks, Rio Olympics’ Sites,
Brian Krebs site, U.K. National Lottery, Boston Globe
Table 2.3: Summary of some of the DoS attacks from year 1974 to 2018
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2.3.2 Attack Vectors And Classification Of DoS Attacks
DoS attack vectors are a means to launch DoS attacks and their variants. A
multi-vector attack employs more than one vector and comprises more than
80% of the attacks on hosts and networks [Imperva, 2015]. DoS attacks
use network/host resource exhaustion by using various communication or
application protocols [M. Handley, 2006] (also see §1.1). They might target
either different Internet layers of enterprise hosts or legitimate client access
to the victim site itself.
A DoS attack can be classified based on different attack vectors [Zargar
et al., 2013]. Its classification can also be in the context of wireless infrastruc-
ture environments [Geng et al., 2002], sensor networks [Wood & Stankovic,
2004], dynamic spectrum access systems [Zargar et al., 2009], VoIP and IP
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) services [Sisalem et al., 2009], and collabora-
tive environments (e.g. space research and military applications) [Arun &
Selvakumar, 2009]. In this section we classify them in a general, which is
applicable to enterprises with diverse environments.
The following are some of the attack vectors:
2.3.2.1 Low Data-Rate Transport Layer Attacks
Low data-rate DoS attacks make a victim process fake packets. During
processing, the victim host might be unable to service either some or all
of its legitimate clients. Some attacks target the protocol data structures
within the victim kernel, e.g., an attacker might send TCP SYN messages
to circumvent the server’s connection establishment behaviour.
Low data-rate SYN flood targets a TCP data structure called the TCP
Transmission Control Block (TCB) in the victim’s kernel allocated memory.
A TCP connection handshake allows a client to send the first packet con-
taining a SYN message. In response to this, the victim acknowledges with
a SYN ACK message. During this period, the victim puts this half-open
connection in TCB [Eddy, 2007]. The TCB is of limited memory (usually
1300 Bytes in Linux) and there is a configurable limit to how many TCBs
can be created, i.e., how many parallel connections are acceptable. Usually,
in Linux, there is a concept of a backlog which can be set by the listen()
system call in the kernel. Even though a server might have a large Random
Access Memory (RAM), it would have a limited backlog set by the applica-
tion which is listening for connections. An attacker is only concerned about
exhausting this backlog, and once this gets exhausted, a server starts send-
ing RSTs to any new clients. The attacker uses IP spoofing to send SYN
packets, so a server’s SYN ACK messages are never honoured by spoofed
sources. Chapter 3 provides an evaluation of an ILNP-based defence which
can protect a victim against low-rate SYN floods.
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2.3.2.2 Volumetric Attacks
Volumetric attacks target the bandwidth of an enterprise access network.
A flood of fake network packets is sent to a victim that render the victim
unavailable to legitimate clients. These attacks are normally mounted using
network or transport layer packets such as, UDP floods, ICMP floods, SYN
floods, etc [Wang et al., 2015]. Chapters 4 and 5 present evaluations of
defences for UDP and TCP SYN-based volumetric attacks.
2.3.2.3 Packet Fragmentation Attacks
In this type of attacks, an attacker exploits the IP datagram fragmenta-
tion mechanism. Every network imposes a limit on the datagram size called
the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). Any datagram larger than this
size will be fragmented and transmitted separately. IP fragmentation is a
procedure to break larger IP packets into smaller packets. These smaller
packets then get reassembled at the destination. The indication to reassem-
ble the smaller packets is indicated by the source using reassembly flags
in the packet. An attacker sends UDP or ICMP packets which are larger
than the allowed MTU. These packets are unable to be reassembled because
there is no tracking of reassembly flags set in the victim, so the victim’s
resources get exhausted. [Atlasis, 2012] covers attack possibilities on IPv6
implementations using fragmentation. [Gont, 2013] covers implications of
IPv6 Neighbour Discovery attacks using IPv6 fragmentation.
Our research did not propose or evaluate any ILNP-based defences against
fragmentation based attacks but it can be done as part of future research.
2.3.2.4 Application Layer Attacks [Ranjan et al., 2009]
Application layer attacks exploit application layer software vulnerabilities
found in victim systems to achieve DoS. These attacks are sophisticated,
hard to launch and detect. A few examples are basic HTTP floods, ran-
domized HTTP floods, cache-bypass HTTP floods, WordPress eXtensible
Markup Language - Remote Procedure Call (XMLRPC) floods [Durcekova
et al., 2012], SQL search attacks, Mass Content Request attacks, etc [Yang
et al., 2013].
In the majority of cases, HTTP GET/POST requests are generated so
as to exhaust the application server resources. The victim processes such
messages and then responds, which further exhausts the victim’s resources
and the attached channel bandwidth. The attacker uses compromised clients
(rather than spoofing) since, in HTTP, it is a requirement to have some
connection state before the execution of an HTTP request.
In this research, we do not evaluate mitigations against application layer
attacks but we recommend a future investigation.
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2.3.3 Vulnerability Testing And Penetration Testing
Vulnerability testing is a process to identify and quantify vulnerabilities in
a system. The TCP Control Block (TCB) overflow problem is one such
example of a vulnerability.
In DoS, it is important to gather knowledge about a victim that can be
used to find different attack vectors for launching a successful DoS attack.
To gain such knowledge, an attacker uses vulnerability testing. Vulnerability
testing may include port-scanning and network probing, where port scanning
finds open ports in the network, and network probing might include enlisting
active namespaces/addresses in the network.
Penetration testing is a process used by enterprises themselves to gain
knowledge about the vulnerabilities present in their systems.
Our research does not directly influence vulnerability testing or penetra-
tion testing. But it discourages an attacker or an enterprise from performing
such actions. It is important to investigate how our approaches can work to
discourage external entities from vulnerability testing while allowing enter-
prises to perform penetration testing without hassle.
2.3.4 DoS Detection
There might be different detection schemes for individual attack vectors. An
attacker either uses compromised clients or IP spoofing for attacks. Attack
diagnosis is a primary requirement for any defence. In compromised clients,
an attacker first installs a piece of malware (malicious software) on the
systems and then controls them to direct an attack. It should be noted that
there is a difference between detecting an attacker’s identity and detecting
the type of an attack. In this research, we cover mitigation rather than
any form of detection. We assume that an enterprise has detected either
a spoofing-based low-rate SYN flood, or a spoofing-based volumetric UDP
flood or SYN flood (as we are only dealing with these types of attacks).
There are many detection techniques available, e.g., [Jyothi et al., 2016],
[Marnerides & Mauthe, 2016], [An & Weber, 2016], [Nezhad et al., 2016],
[Cheng et al., 2016], [Liu et al., 2016] etc. We do not prefer any one type of
detection over another as a pre-condition to the usability of our solutions.
2.3.5 DoS Mitigation
An enterprise might use DoS prevention proactively by eliminating vic-
tim application vulnerabilities, by having ingress filtering of known attack
sources, or by deploying redundant infrastructure. It is a challenging task
to have a mechanism which always fixes application vulnerabilities as they
happen.
Given the increase in intensity and complexity of DoS attacks (see §2.3.1),
having redundant resources is expensive. Similarly, an enterprise has to
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have complete information about the attack source in order to do successful
ingress filtering. Some of the proactive approaches in literature are proactive
specification-based fuzzing in Next Generation Networks (NGN) [T. Rontti,
2012], route-based filtering [Park, 2003], SYN Cookies [cert.org, 1996], and
test-based differentiation techniques [Shevtekar & Ansari, 2007].
An enterprise can also decide to implement a reactive strategy which
requires an enterprise to have DoS detection systems in place to trigger
a defence mechanism. Some reactive approaches direct traffic to security
providers (e.g., Cloudflare14) which have traffic scrubbing based mitigations
in place [Zilberman et al., 2017]. Other defences shift all traffic from one
link to redundant links, or to black-holing all traffic.
In our research, we evaluated defences which neither detect an attack nor
identify an attacker but they can be used either proactively or reactively in
the face of an imminent or on-going attack.
2.3.6 Existing Mitigations Against Low Data Rate SYN Floods
2.3.6.1 SYN Cookies
Using SYN Cookies [D. J. Bernstein, ], [Eddy, 2007], a victim host does not
allocate any state for a new SYN packet in its kernel’s TCB data structure.
Instead, it encodes information required by the TCB for a half-open connec-
tion in a sequence number of a SYN-ACK. If a SYN initiator is a legitimate
client, then this client will send an ACK (with a sequence number of one
greater than the received sequence number in the SYN-ACK) after the vic-
tim’s SYN-ACK packet. This ACK message from the client will give the
necessary information to construct a complete TCB at the victim.
The sequence number is a 32 bit value. According to TCP specification,
a server can send any sequence number value. SYN Cookies make use of
this feature and encode certain information in the 32 bits such as, Maximum
Segment Size (MSS), server’s IP address and port number, client’s IP address
and port number, etc. If the server receives the same sequence number in
the ACK then it can re-construct the same information which is required to
build the TCB.
SYN Cookies are implemented in Linux and FreeBSD, as configurable
options.
SYN Cookies are not compatible with TCP options. They also create
problems in unidirectional data flow when Selective ACKs are in use. SYN
Cookies do not support application data piggybacking on the SYN packets.
We will further cover problems of SYN Cookies and the rationale to use our
approach in §3.1.
14https://www.cloudflare.com
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2.3.6.2 SYN Caches
In [Lemon, 2002], Jonathan Lemon demonstrated that a linear chain of
incomplete connections can be replaced with global hashtables in operating
systems instead of a per-socket data structure, i.e., TCB, hence minimizing
the initial connection state. It delays complete TCB allocation until the
connection is completed. Host-specific secret bits are hashed with source and
application service information. This hash value is used to tally a hashtable
for incomplete TCBs. The oldest entry in the hashtable is purged after a
specific bucket limit is exceeded.
An attacker has to know the number of secret bits in order to overflow
the hashtable. These secret bits, along with the hashtable tally-mechanism
makes SYN Caches an effective technique. In Lemon’s evaluation, a legit-
imate connection took ∼15% longer (which contributed to high latency)
during an attack as compared to absence of an attack. SYN Caches do not
support data piggybacking in SYN packets which is also not supported in
SYN Cookies.
Since our research covers SYN flood mitigation, §3.1 provides a rationale
and evaluation for our alternative to SYN Cookies. We do not provide any
comparison to SYN Caches, but our defences do allow data piggybacking in
the connection establishment phase. We chose SYN Cookies instead of SYN
Caches because SYN Cookies are widely adopted in systems rather than
SYN Caches (mostly supported in FreeBSD). We propose a comparative
analysis of our approach and SYN Caches as future work.
2.3.7 Existing Mitigations Against Volumetric DoS Attacks
Two of the common DDoS defence mechanisms are filter-based, and capa-
bilities based [Zargar et al., 2013]. Each mechanism can be used to mitigate
volumetric DDoS attacks. This section will provide a discussion about de-
fence methods that can be from either mechanism, with or without the use
of DNS.
2.3.7.1 Round Robin DNS (RRDNS)
Round-Robin DNS (RRDNS) is a traditional way of load balancing [Brisco,
1995] and load distribution [Kwan et al., 1995] but can also be used for DoS
mitigation. In this mechanism, multiple IP addresses of the victim are used
by DNS. A different IP address is returned in the DNS response after every
new DNS request.
The DNS cycles through the list of IP addresses in a round-robin fashion.
So, this technique might effectively distribute the attack traffic. A victim
service runs on a distributed set of servers therefore a DoS attacker has to
mount an attack on all the servers in order to entirely disrupt the service.
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The round robin approach also uses low Time To Live (TTL) values so
that the clients always get a randomized list of addresses.
Some of the problems associated with RRDNS are
• It does not work well with dynamic web content and state-full ser-
vices since servers are required to work in synchronization to serve
client sessions. A single server under attack will severely affect such
synchronization.
• If any one or more servers are down, then clients will still get old
DNS records unless there is a mechanism to drive DNS with new lists
dynamically.
• An attacker can reach any server at any time without going through
name-resolution, i.e., there is no destination-controlled client autho-
rization.
• It requires multiple physical/virtual servers to back the victim service.
Some of the servers will be busy handling clients and few of them
might be idle, hence resources are expected to be wasted.
In our research, we borrowed the concept of per-session round robin
allocation of IP addresses, and applied it to ILNP NID64 namespaces in
chapter 3. Our solution does not suffer from the above-mentioned issues
due to the use of unique properties of ILNP, DNS capabilities, and the
MTD (see §2.4.1) paradigm.
2.3.7.2 Reverse Proxy Through A Cloud Provider
In this technique, attack traffic is diverted to a DoS protection provider
which employs distributed scrubbing data centres for DoS mitigation, e.g.,
[Zilberman et al., 2017].
Scrubbing is a mechanism to separate legitimate client traffic and at-
tack traffic through Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), Access Control List
(ACL)s, client puzzles, etc. Scrubbing is done at a dedicated scrubbing
centre through external security providers. Proxy agents in scrubbing cen-
tres send the legitimate traffic to the victim and block the attack traffic. It
is a commercial service provided by leading cloud service providers such as,
Akamai15.
Scrubbing requires a redirection of traffic to the cloud scrubbing centre
which is nearest to the attack source. This redirection can be done through
DNS or Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
15https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/products/cloud-security/ddos-protection-
service.jsp
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In the BGP-based method, BGP prefix announcements are used. This
technique requires the control of Autonomous System (AS) by the customer,
since it is the customer who has to announce this prefix. The customer
normally delegates this to the DoS protection provider. That prefix range
holds the scrubbing agent’s addresses.
Deployment of this defence mechanism is at the network aggregation
points, e.g., a peering edge link under the supervision of the Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP) [Fayaz et al., 2015]. Scrubbing mechanisms sometimes
involve the inspection of Application layer data as well, which means that
the provider has complete access to the customers’ data. This is an open
attack vector to the privacy of the said data. Even TLS keys might be avail-
able to the security service provider, if it is a requirement for the cleansing
mechanism.
Processing overhead of scrubbing centres is mainly due to firewalls, In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDSs), in-line filtering, and complex multi-level
IP traceback methods [Savage et al., 2001]. Similarly, these are proprietary
defence mechanisms provided by ISPs and cloud providers. This makes them
highly expensive. One such example is a report from the General Services
Administration (GSA) Schedule which states that a DoS defence appliance
that can defend at most 10 Gbps attack has a price tag of ∼$128,000 [GSA
Store, ].
Some of the problems associated with this approach are:
• If a victim is attacked often, then cloud-based solutions become finan-
cially expensive.
• An Enterprise has to trust an external entity with its data in transit.
It also has to spend extra resources on security of data in motion apart
from costs incurred through a cloud provider. We present ILNP-based
solutions where an enterprise does not need to trust external entities.
• It requires traffic redirection, which introduces further latency.
A cloud-based security provider can also distribute incoming traffic across
multiple regions where each region contains replication of the same protected
service. Cloud providers make use of anycast IP addresses to achieve this
scenario where an attacker using the destination anycast IP of the victim
does not know which paths the attack traffic will take.
The cloud based security against DDoS attack is termed as DDoS pro-
tection as a service. The enterprise clients do not concern themselves about
how they are being protected as long as the Service Level Objectives (SLOs)
are being met by the DDoS security provider.
Using our defences, an enterprise has complete control over its own traf-
fic, and they do not require an enterprise to trust an external security
provider. We made use of DNS instead of BGP, where DNS is also part
of the enterprise network.
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2.3.7.3 In-line Filtering
This defence can use an appliance that is deployed between a server and
the Internet. This appliance can inspect the packets for correct fragmen-
tation flags, TCP/IP headers, etc. It drops the packets which violate cer-
tain security restrictions and it can also make decisions based on machine
learning enabled bloom filters [Tseung et al., 2017], packet marking assisted
filters [Zhang et al., 2009], Artificial Neural Network (ANN) assisted fil-
ters [Perakovic´ et al., 2016] etc.
Some of the problems associated with this approach are:
• If DoS traffic exceeds the capacity of the link connected to an in-line
filtering appliance, then this technique becomes ineffective.
• An enterprise might need to deploy multiple expensive appliances at its
edge network that might require subscriptions, licences, and software
updates/patches.
In this research, we evaluated defences which require a backend proces-
sor. This backend processor is an off-the-shelf Linux machine with individual
components made from opensource software, and it is deployed between the
DNS server and the victim hosts or the victim access routers.
Our backend processor is not a filtration appliance but it does require a
packet filter at the victim host or a secure access to enterprise edge routers
and its DNS. Our two (see chapters 3 and 5) out of three defences require
a host-based firewall with stateless packet inspection, i.e., it does not track
client session states. This host-based packet filter compares client naming
information with allocated DNS capability and drops or accepts traffic ac-
cordingly.
It should be noted that this research does not provide financial cost
analysis of our defences against market leading appliances.
2.3.7.4 Reputation Based Approaches
Reputation-based approaches apply a reputation metric to the network traf-
fic and make decisions on acceptance or rejection of traffic flows based on
good or bad reputation of these flows. TrustGuard [Liu et al., 2011] is an
example of such a system in which a credit metric is accumulated over time
for traffic that shows low packet-size distribution diversity [Du & Abe, 2008].
Traffic with low diversity, e.g., DoS, gets dropped due to a low credit score.
Reputation-based approaches might also be used in the context of an
overlay network where they allow the detection of DoS attacks in a de-
centralized and distributed manner. One such approach is EigenTrust [Rao
et al., 2010]. Typical issues in these systems are data pollution, client/server
privacy, and trust [Al-Qudah et al., 2016]. Approaches similar to EigenTrust
are not efficient in some decentralized networks as well [Lua et al., 2014].
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In our DNS capabilities based system, a victim host gives a capability
to legitimate clients through our backend for DNS, but our defence does not
decide if a client, which has requested a capability, is either legitimate or
malicious. It should be emphasised that our defence works in the context of
spoofing-based DoS attacks.
We recommend the use of approaches such as, TrustGuard as a source of
client information, in order to provide or deny DNS capability through our
backend processor. It is a future work in which our backend processor can
make use of an ACL that can be generated by a reputation-based system.
In return, our backend processor can also provide feedback on well-behaving
connections.
2.3.8 Lack Of Flexible And Elastic DoS Defences
It has been observed that appliances that are used for defence against DoS
are mostly monolithic. These devices provide security for the worst case,
i.e., if they are designed to handle the DoS attack of 10Gbps then it will cost
the same no matter if one gets a total of 0.5Gbps throughout the attack in
the lifetime of the service [Fayaz et al., 2015].
In our research, a flexible approach is taken by introducing three (see
chapters 3 to 5) different mechanisms (multi-layered security) to provide
security against DoS attacks. Two of these defences defend, individually,
against TCP SYN flooding and UDP flooding-based attacks. The third
defence simultaneously defends the victim against both TCP SYN flooding
and UDP flooding-based attacks. If any one or two of the defences fail, then
victim nodes have still the option of using a third one.
2.4 Security Paradigms
This section discusses two paradigms related to our research. These are
Moving Target Defence (MTD) and DNS capabilities.
2.4.1 Moving Target Defence (MTD)
Communication systems with fixed IP addresses or system configurations
with no access authorization are accessible by attackers. MTD allows a
system to change such configurations as a function of time to make it difficult
for an attacker to plan and launch an attack. The goal of the MTD paradigm
is to increase the complexity and uncertainty for attackers while maintaining
legitimate client access and end-to-end connectivity.
Chapter 1 (see §1.4) defines MTD as an adaptive security mechanism for
maintaining operational integrity and the resilience of systems by random-
izing information available in host/network configurations. This informa-
tion can be IP addresses, TCP/IP port numbers, network topologies, ILNP
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namespaces, Autonomous System (AS) numbers, network identifiers, com-
puter instruction sets etc. Our defences make use of ILNP namespaces as a
randomized information resource.
Through our approach to security, we introduce an unpredictable, and
short-lived attack surface to the attacker with the help of MTD. An attack
surface is one or more accessible vulnerabilities in a communication system.
A DoS attacker can utilize an attack surface to successfully launch an attack.
A static IP address, or a namespace, presents an attack surface for an at-
tacker. Our research introduces complexity and uncertainty of host/network
access for an attacker by dynamically changing this attack surface.
The MTD paradigm introduces system property metrics which every
MTD compliant defence has to employ. In the next sub-sections, we discuss
these metrics and their applicability to our defences.
2.4.1.1 Moving Property
Any property of a communications system which can change over time is
a moving property. For example, if the address or namespace of a node is
changed frequently then it would seem as if the node is either mobile or has
been changed into a different node, even though its physical location or its
application services might be fixed.
A moving property metric alone does not provide any benefit unless it
is coupled with some other properties that will be discussed in the next
two sub-sections. This property has the tendency to reduce vulnerability
testing and random probing by the attacker because the attacker might not
know the active duration of some attack surface. Vulnerability testing and
random probing are two methods to profile a communications system for
understanding its behaviour, and attack surface.
We will use the term transient or ephemeral for an unpredictable and
frequently-changed configuration metric.
The following are the requirements for a moving property metric:
Unpredictable Future Value Of The Transient Metric:
The attacker should not be able to calculate or find the next value of the
system configuration being randomized. In our defences, we chose one or
two 64-bit ILNP namespace values using random seed values controlled by
victim host/site. Our defences-generated random namespace values are com-
municated through the updates in the DNS data (for new clients) or through
ILNP-specifc control messages (cf. §2.1.1.2) during the communication ses-
sion.
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Sufficient Set-Size Of Transient Metric Values:
The value-space of this metric should be large enough so that any attacker
would have to exhaust their resources to successfully predict and use a single
transient value. A victim node can also choose a random value of the time-
interval after which a new transient value can be used. In this specific case,
a victim node will use two system configuration metrics (see §2.4.1.1). In our
defences, we use two 64-bit ILNPv6 namespaces which provide a sufficiently
large transient value-space (a pool of 264 = 18, 446, 744, 073, 709, 551, 616 for
at least one namespace).
Periodicity Of Active Transient Metric:
The victim should effectively choose the periodicity of the transient config-
uration metric. The time between two distinct values of the transient con-
figuration metric should be small enough so that the previous value should
not be used effectively by an attacker.
In the evaluation of our defences, we used values equal to or less than
20 seconds. We chose an arbitrary small value because we tested our so-
lutions on 25 client sessions, each one of at least 160 seconds under six
different network conditions. This gave us enough periodicity to evaluate
the feasibility of our defences. It should be noted that it is a management
decision to choose the periodicity of this metric based on management re-
quirements without affecting the MTD requirements. If an attacker can
launch an attack during the 20 seconds duration, then we recommended re-
ducing this further. Our defences make use of mechanism in which it allows
very little duration (the overhead has been evaluated in earlier researches,
i.e., [Phoomikiattisak, 2016], and §§3.4 and 4.2.4).
As mentioned previously, our solutions employ the NID64 and 64-bit
Locator (L64) namespaces as transient configuration metrics, either indi-
vidually or combined. In our research, when two metrics are combined, we
get a new transient metric which promises strong node security and the
possibility of enhanced client privacy as a positive side effect.
2.4.1.2 Authorization Property
The authorization property specifies that only an authorized client should be
allowed to access the victim node, while the victim host or any network that
is aware of this authorization can drop unauthorized packets. A mapping
system can be placed in the network to map a specific moving property
with a specific authorized client. If an unauthorized client accesses the
victim node then a decision to accept or reject the client connection request
can be made based on the available mapping. In our research, our backend
processor creates a mapping and installs it either in the victim network or
the victim host.
CHAPTER 2. ILNP, DNS, AND DOS ATTACKS 48
Sharing Transient Values With The Attacker:
An authorized client should not share the transient value of the MTD con-
figuration metric (an IP address, a NID64 value, or an L64 value) with an
attacker, otherwise an attacker can use spoofed sources to gain access to
victim node.
In our defence for host security (see chapters 3 and 5), we used a mapping
system which maps a specific client with a specific transient value of NID64,
or NID64-L64 combination, to reduce the effects of information sharing.
Any client which is not in the map will be disallowed by the firewall placed
in the victim host. But, if an authorized client shares our granted transient
value, then our defence cannot defend the victim spoofing based attack.
But, we recommend that once it is detected that a given transient value was
shared, then the backend processor should make the mapping void. It is
also recommended to log this as a security breach incident.
In our defence for network security (see chapters 4 and 5), we change
the transient value within the client session. It should be noted that our
research mandates the use of strong authentication for authorization, but
does not mandate the use of a particular authentication mechanism over
another. Our research also does not provide any authentication mechanism,
but it grants a transient value to an already authenticated client.
2.4.2 Domain Name System (DNS) Capabilities
A DNS capability is a set of bits, distributed through DNS, that allows
its holder to access another domain owner for a limited time. A domain
owner name in DNS zone files is specified as a Fully Qualified Domain
Name (FQDN) where the domain owner can be a host or a network. In
DNS capabilities, a client can only get a capability through DNS. A DNS
server can decide whether to give a specific capability to a client or not based
on multiple factors which might be the presence/absence of the client in an
Access Control List (ACL) or other authentication processes. We emphasise
that the authentication process is a precursor to an allotment of a capability.
All of our three (D)DoS defences use DNS capabilities. The decision
to allocate a specific capability is not part of our research, so we do not
provide or use any authentication process. We recommend use of strong
authentication processes before a DNS capability allocation, as mentioned
earlier.
Our backend processor is essentially a backend for DNS that calculates
DNS capability values, maps them to firewalls, controls access router in-
terfaces based on them, and enforces them end-to-end. We use the term
end-to-end with caution and in a specific context because clients are not
aware of our backend processor, they cannot get DNS capabilities unless the
backend processor allocates them. Once the backend processor has allocated
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a capability, it forwards it to the DNS server which carries them to the client
through DNS response messages/packets. We use DNS as a distributor for
capabilities because of its wide use in the current Internet. Since we use
enterprise-controlled DNS, our backend processor and the enterprise hosts
are not exposed to external entities.
2.4.2.1 Examples Of DNS Capabilities-Based Defences
This section provides examples of DNS capabilities-based systems along with
their comparison to our approach to security.
Inexpensive Network Capabilities By Shue et al. [Shue et al., 2012]
Shue et al. proposed a method which makes use of DNS to distribute a
set of temporary time-dependent IP addresses. At the victim node, there
is a Network Address Translation (NAT) installation which translates the
temporary IP addresses to the host-specific ones. Any client that has a
temporary IP address distributed through the DNS can connect to the target
through the NAT device. The term inexpensive only entails that it uses the
DNS for the distribution of the capabilities.
In our approach, we use this mechanism with temporary ILNP names-
paces rather than temporary IP addresses. We do not use NAT since there
is no requirement for doing so in ILNP and the functionality is available as a
dynamic namespace binding feature. We believe that the term inexpensive
can also be applied to our defences, as they not only use DNS (as done by
Shue et al.) but also eliminate the need for NAT. It should be noted that
neither Shue et al., nor we, have done financial cost analysis of our defences.
The following are some of the issues associated with the method proposed
by Shue et al.:
• It uses two tables in NAT. One table maps temporary IP addresses to
an internal IP address. And the second table tracks established con-
nections. The coordination between NAT tables breaks connections in
some routers such as, Linksys WRT54Gv2. In our locator-based de-
fence (see chapter 4), we do not use a firewall. In two of our defences,
we use a host-based firewall with only one map to tally (see chapters 3
and 5).
• As some web browsers do not honour DNS TTL values, they might
use expired temporary IP addresses. Our approaches which use ILNP’s
NID namespace do suffer from the same issue. But our defence mech-
anisms that use L64 namespaces do not suffer from this issue.
• It is primarily used and tested with IPv4. Its working with IPv6
is proposed. It does not protect the network unless there is an IP
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extension mechanism (e.g., Network Mobility (NEMO) Extensions for
Mobile IPv4, IPv6 Mobility, etc). Our approaches which use an ILNP’s
L64 namespace can protect the victim network as well as it natively
support host/network mobility.
Shue et al.’s mechanism takes 13 milliseconds to update an entry in
the DNS server and 4 milliseconds to add a NAT rule. There is no publicly
available implementation of the Shue et al. mechanism, so we were unable to
perform any kind of empirical evaluation that compares ILNP capabilities.
We should emphasise that there was no need for us to compare ILNP based
capabilities against IPv6 based mechanism from Shue et al. because our
objective was to compare our approach to SYN Cookies. We recommend a
future evaluation where ILNP based mechanism should be compared with a
wide variety of IPv6 based capabilities.
Evasive Internet Protocol (EIP) [Al-Qudah et al., 2016]
In this approach, DNS is used to distribute capabilities. It emphasises that
the DNS infrastructure should uses EIP as well. It also mandates that
only the root DNS servers may not be using the Evasive Internet Protocol
(EIP) because DNS root servers are already highly distributed, replicated,
and accessed through anycast addresses. Our defences do not require DNS
servers to be updated but they are used as forwarders.
EIP requires support from the The Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) to bootstrap certificates attesting the own-
ership of IP addresses. Similarly, it requires support from DNS root servers
to offer EIP protection to secondary-level domain nameservers. It uses the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure Framework (RPKI) to secure capabil-
ities distribution. Its DNS capabilities are based on the transient IP ad-
dresses, capability validity constraints, and capability issuance timestamps.
The validity constraints make use of two aspects, the capability lifetime,
and the allowed number of bytes that can be sent within this lifetime. Any
packet that does not conform to these validity constraints gets dropped by
the EIP-supported devices which can be on-path routers, or the destination
network or a host.
2.4.2.2 Non-DNS Based Capabilities
Secure Architecture for the Networked Enterprise (SANE) [Casado et al.,
2006]
Secure Architecture for the Networked Enterprise (SANE) uses network se-
curity policies to generate switch-level source routes to act as capabilities.
These source routes are encrypted at each switch level using keys for each
switch. This information is carried in the SANE header that resides in the
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Ethernet frame and thus works at the link layer. These security policies are
topology-independent.
SANE uses a protection layer which is used for the communication among
end hosts and the protected hosts. This protection layer is similar to a
mapping layer. The main component of the protection layer is the Domain
Controller (DC). The DC authenticates the users as well as the hosts. It
also advertises the services that are offered by the protected network. It
also decides who can connect to these services. It uses symmetric keys to
distinguish users and hosts. The information about addressing and reacha-
bility is contained in the DC itself using a Network Service Directory. This
eliminates the use of DNS for service discovery.
NetFence [Liu et al., 2010]
NetFence uses a secure congestion policing feedback in the network routers,
which stamp the packets for feedback mechanism, to control the congestion
channels. They police the links so that these links can be monitored and
acted upon in the face of an attack. Routers update the feedback in the
packet headers. The end systems use the aforementioned feedback informa-
tion in the packet headers as a form of capability token to control traffic.
The same system is used for rate-limiting at the router level as well.
The following are two important issues with this defence:
• Malicious on-path routers can drop the feedback packets and can dam-
age the end-to-end token states used by the victims.
• It requires the routers at the congested links and the access routers
to be modified. Our approach does not require any modification in
the external networks, but it does require victim access routers to be
controlled by our backend processor.
Traffic Validation Architecture (TVA) [Yang et al., 2005] [Yang et al., 2008]
The Traffic Validation Architecture (TVA) uses an approach in which the
packets contain capability information given to them by the victim. On-
path routers are modified so that they can inspect capabilities, and if the
capability does not match the path it is traversing, then they are dropped
at the access level.
In this approach, each packet carries this information. The capabili-
ties are granted through piggybacking the TCP SYN/ACK packets with
capabilities. Each edge router stamps the capability request packets with
a 16-bit unique tag. This tag is only used to identify upstream providers.
A path identifier is built using these tags by appending them together at
every upstream level. The routers maintain queues with path identifiers and
compare them to each packet that contains a path identifier.
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TVA is vulnerable to attack by an attacker who uses fake path identifiers
and tries to congest the routers’ queues.
2.4.3 Denial Of Capabilities Attacks
Denial of Capabilities attack a target’s capability request channel [Argyraki
& Cheriton, 2005a]. Capability request packets do not carry capabilities
so they are allowed to reach the capability distribution node. This form of
attack can cripple any capabilities-based defence.
Our research does not provide solutions for Denial of Capabilities at-
tacks, but since our backend processor is within the protected enterprise
network and its location is a secret, there is less possibility, unless an attack
is launched from within the enterprise, of such an attack on the backend
processor. The enterprise DNS is still vulnerable to DoS attacks, so indi-
rectly our capability request channel is compromised in such attacks. We
recommend that an enterprise uses a redundant DNS infrastructure with
multiple points of entry to secure the capability request channel.
2.4.3.1 Defence Against Denial Of Capabilities Attacks
Some of the proposals to deal with this problem are given below:
Distributed Cryptographic Client Puzzles:
In this solution, the client who is requesting the capability is asked to per-
form a computationally-intensive cryptographic puzzle. The calculation is
derived in such a manner that the effort required by the victim to check the
results is far less than the effort required by the client to generate a valid
result. Portcullis [Parno et al., 2007] uses client puzzles.
Client puzzles are used to differentiate among good and bad hosts. Cur-
rent DoS attack tools do not employ any technique to inform a victim about
its usage in malicious activities. Each rejected client is asked to solve a
higher difficulty level puzzle. The capability channel is unreachable to those
clients which fail to perform the puzzle.
Rate Limiting The Capability Channel
In this approach, there are multiple ways to reach the capability distributor.
If there is a rate limiting on each entry point to the distributor then, if there
is an attack on one link, all other clients on the other links will get the
capability, and those accessing this congested channel will shift to other low
congestion channels. To do a successful attack, the attacker then has to
attack all the links that lead to the distributor.
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Using The DNS Infrastructure:
EIP (see §2.4.2.1) uses the DNS infrastructure to help protect the capability
distribution channel. The DNS is also used for capability distribution and
it also uses the EIP protocol. The scope is now narrowed to the root DNS
servers. Since the root DNS infrastructure is highly distributed, the attacker
has to expend a lot of effort to dismantle the capability distribution service.
2.5 Naming Based Protocols And DoS Defence
Naming based protocols semantically separate a node’s identity and its lo-
cation. This is not the case with IPv6 where the node identity and its
location are tied to the same 128-bit IP address. Some of the naming-based
solutions are ILNP, Evolution [Khare et al., 2010], Renumbering [Carpen-
ter et al., 2010], Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) [Farinacci et al.,
2013], Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [Moskowitz & Nikander, 2006], Routing
Architecture for the Next Generation Internet (RANGI) [Xiaohu Xu, 2010],
Name Overlay (NOL) [Wang et al., 2010], etc. We will only cover LISP, and
HIP as we have found DoS defences using them in the literature.
2.5.1 LISP And DDoS Defence
[Luo et al., 2013] argues that LISP can be used as a DDoS defence mecha-
nism. An identifier-to-locator mapping approach is proposed. This approach
makes it difficult for the attackers to control the botnets, hence controlling
the DDoS attack itself.
It argues that the same approach can be used to detect a DDoS attacks.
The main idea for DDoS detection is that, since each victim server’s locator
is queried from the DNS through the victim server’s identifier, if we count
the frequency of these requests then we can make a metric which shows that
a DDoS attack is in progress.
The trace-back also becomes easy since the Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR)
and Egress Tunnel Router (ETR) know each other when a packet arrives at
their location.
The DDoS attack can be prevented through knowing that if the attacker
wants to send the command and control messages to the zombie, then it has
to know the locator of that zombie. If the zombie is a non-server, then ITR
will not reply with a locator value. This way the zombie will be unreachable.
If the zombie is a server, then the attacker can get the locator value and pass
on the commands. Since the number of servers in the Internet is a fraction
of the number of non-server systems, the LISP-based mechanism is able to
control the flow of commands from the attacker.
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2.5.2 HIP And DDoS Defence
[Liyanage et al., 2015] shows how HIP can be used to create a secure
environment in software-defined mobile networks. It utilizes both HIP and
IPSec. The basis for such approach is the HIP RFC 7401 [Moskowitz et al.,
2015] which specifically designs the protocol with DDoS in consideration.
The authors of [Liyanage et al., 2015] use HIP to form secure tunnels between
the Data Plane switches and the controller.
2.5.3 ILNP And DoS Defence
ILNP provides identifier and locator namespaces for the node identification
and its location. A single host can have multiple locators with the same
identifier, meaning that a transport layer session can use multiple locators
without disrupting communications.
The capability-based solutions demand that there should be one or more
network properties/configurations/components of the system which should
continuously change. Since ILNP has two crisply separated namespaces that
can act as transient properties/configurations/components which identify a
node on a specific location in a network, we can employ these namespaces
to further study their effectiveness in a DoS defence solution. This work is
the first of its kind that investigates the feasibility of ILNP namespaces to
be used in a DoS defence.
2.6 Security Challenges And Solutions Matrix
Security from malicious network-based on-path or off-path attacks is a re-
quirement in modern times, because we rely on the Internet for every aspect
of our lives from acquiring knowledge and doing business, to making financial
transactions, etc. It also entails that those businesses which provide these
services to Internet users should have online services running and available
at the time when they are required to run and facilitate. For these reasons,
DoS attacks are quite common and new network functionality should also
provide solutions to this dire problem.
2.6.1 Network Reconnaissance Attacks
These are monitoring-based attacks which gather information about a vic-
tim. This monitoring leads to planning and execution of certain attacks on
node/site availability. Network reconnaissance is one such aspect of per-
vasive monitoring, whereas pervasive monitoring itself is perceived as an
attack [Farrell & Tschofenig, 2014].
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) recommends that the de-
sign of new protocols should cater for solutions to pervasive monitoring.
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Pervasive monitoring often yield private information and can also lead to
breach of security. The challenge is that the design of the solution should
ensure that the attacker should have a hard time to mount a successful re-
connaissance attack. It should be expensive and infeasible for the attacker.
DDoS have become quite common, and easy to mount. There are many
solutions to this but most of them are complex in nature and require con-
siderable effort. In this research, we make an effort to mitigate such attacks.
2.6.2 ILNP-based Security Solutions
The solutions provided in literature lack the use of naming, and in-fact
there is no single evaluated DoS defence solution that is based on ILNP.
Since ILNP uses two different namespaces for addressing and most of the
IPv6-based solutions are based on the addressing, it is feasible to test the
ILNP-based naming to come up with better solutions than are provided
through IPv6.
2.6.3 The Role Of DoS Fail-over
The DoS fail-over is a process of applying a mechanism which effectively
takes a victim out of the disruption caused by DoS attack. Ideally the
sessions should be maintained after the fail-over and the data-rate should be
improved as well. The sessions can be maintained in ILNP (but not possible
in IPv6) case due to its dependence on NID namespace which is only used
a the transport layer. In case of a reduced data-rate due to disruption, the
fail-over should improve the data-rate that should satisfy the Service Level
Objectives (SLOs) of the enterprise. This fail-over has to be quick, and is
one of the most important parts of certain attack mitigations.
We are going to use this fail-over to create a mechanism which hides the
identity and/or location of a victim. Since the identity and/or location of
the victim will be unknown to the attacker, it would be hard for the attacker
to mount a successful attack.
ILNP provides a mechanism which can be used as a network/node fail-over
in the context of a DoS attack. ILNP, natively, does not prevent the attack,
but it does provide semantically-unique naming which makes a fail-over
possible with minimal session disruption. Our mechanism will not affect the
native services provided by ILNP.
2.7 Summary
This chapter presented evidence of the problem domain while also covering
the state of the art of DoS attacks. DoS attacks are classified in terms of the
attack vectors which can be used to launch an attack. We mainly covered
low-rate TCP SYN flooding and traffic-based volumetric attack types.
CHAPTER 2. ILNP, DNS, AND DOS ATTACKS 56
The architecture of ILNP and its required functionality that can be used
to mitigate DoS attacks was also covered. An ILNP’s mobility mechanism,
which has been extensively evaluated in early researches, is used to mitigate
volumetric traffic-based attacks. ILNP provides a crisp (loose-coupling) sep-
aration of identity and location of a node. This feature can be used to form
defences which are not possible in the native functionality of IPv6. Our
main focus is to mitigate DoS attacks and not to empirically compare ILNP
features with those of IPv6.
The DNS infrastructure element which we used in all of our defences has
also been described along with operational details, support for ILNP names-
paces as resource records, and its relevance to support enterprise security.
This chapter also covered the state-of-the-art security paradigms, i.e.,
DNS capabilities, Moving Target Defence (MTD), and DNS fast flux. All
of our defences make use of these paradigms, DNS, and ILNP to support
enterprise security both at a host-level (§1.3.1) and a network-level (§1.3.2).
Chapter 3
Protecting Enterprise Hosts
From Transport Layer DoS
Attacks
An enterprise runs diverse mission critical applications whose availability
at a required times is of importance to its business goals. Enterprises have
to ensure that their systems are available when external clients need them.
SYN floods attack the availability of such systems §2.3.2.1.
Our goal, in this chapter, is to propose and evaluate a defence against
transport layer SYN flood attacks. SYN floods affect enterprises of all levels
by exploiting TCP connection establishment.
We present an evaluation of how ILNP and DNS can be used to mitigate
SYN flood attacks. We created a solution which is expected to mitigate such
attacks by comparing it to SYN Cookies §2.3.6.1.
This chapter covers the following three parts:
• Establishing a rationale for investigating an ILNP-based solution against
TCP SYN flood attacks. §2.3.2.1 gave a thorough description of what
TCP SYN floods are, and §2.3.6 provided current mitigations. In
this chapter, we will also present shortcomings of current mitigations.
Definitions of new concepts, and relevant conditions/limitations in the
applicability of these concepts will also be presented.
• An empirical comparison of ILNP-based defence and SYN Cookies
using a set of experiments in varying network conditions. Each condi-
tional evaluation will be referenced against a baseline which consists
of client communication during an attack but without any solution.
• Empirically evaluating the performance of end-to-end DNS request/re-
sponse signalling in the presence and absence of ILNP-based defence.
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3.1 Rationale
RFC-4987 (TCP SYN flooding attacks and common mitigations) [Eddy,
2007] documents some problems with TCP SYN Cookies which are widely
deployed in current Internet. In the following, we document the shortcom-
ings and disadvantages of SYN Cookies:
• SYN Cookies introduce disruptions in unidirectional data flow if Se-
lective ACK (SACK) blocks are used. So the SACK block usage is
discouraged with SYN Cookies, whereas SACKs enhance TCP perfor-
mance.
• Generating SYN Cookies is problematic. Solutions for such problems
are only implemented in FreeBSD.
• SYN Cookies are incompatible with application data piggybacking
over TCP SYN packets.
• SYN Cookies introduce packet loss in application data when the data
originates from a passive host, e.g., from Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP) application servers.
• SYN Cookies are not recommended to be used in current and future
TCP extensions.
• SYN Cookies are incompatible with TCP options.
• SYN Cookies hamper correct error reporting in Linux kernels as doc-
umented in Linux Kernel Driver DataBase (LKDDB) [LKDDB, 2018].
• SYN Cookies introduce inconsistency problems in IPv6 Flow Label
across a single IPv6 session [McGann & Malone, 2006].
• SYN Cookies introduce Application layer packet loss which is empiri-
cally evaluated in [Cole, 2018].
We introduce a new network-based solution to SYN flood DoS attacks
using ILNP’s NID64 namespace and DNS. Our defence does not suffer from
any of the problems mentioned above, because a SYN flood cannot reach the
victim host network stack while our defence is running, thereby eliminating
the need for SYN Cookies.
3.2 NID64 Capabilities (NC64)
We introduce the concept of NC64 defence. The new components in en-
terprise hosts and network that are required to enable NC64 are shown in
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Figure 3.1. NC64 defence only runs within an enterprise network. A NC64
defence is enabled using NC64 capabilities. A NC64 capability is a specific
form of a 64-bit identity of a publicly accessible victim host which is given
to an authorized external client of an enterprise for a short duration. Any
unauthorized external client can also reach the victim network, but it cannot
reach services running on the victim host.
Figure 3.1: Required modifications in enterprise network for NC64 defence
3.2.1 New Network Components In NC64 Defence
There are three new components in Figure 3.1. Definitions, responsibilities,
and implementation details of these components are given below:
3.2.1.1 Capabilities Management Server (CMS)
CMS is our custom C implementation of the backend processor for DNS.
It gets capability requests from MODCMS which is a DNS module (see
§3.2.1.2), calculates capabilities, installs them on the publicly accessible vic-
tim host, and then returns capability responses back to the DNS module.
CMS is protected by the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) of the enterprise
network, i.e., it runs in the protected network. Identity and location of the
CMS is a secret (it cannot be found by scanning from the external network
of the enterprise) shared only with the enterprise-managed DNS module and
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publicly accessible victim hosts. CMS can run on IPv6 or ILNP kernel with
off-the-shelf server hardware. We run the CMS on Ubuntu Server 16.04.
3.2.1.2 CMS Module For DNS (MODCMS)
MODCMS is a DNS server software module which can be in a separate ma-
chine than the machine running the DNS software, but we have collocated
it with DNS software. MODCMS is implemented in C by us, and we run
it on Ubuntu Server 16.04 with off-the-shelf server hardware. It gets DNS
requests from DNS software, extracts client addresses, creates a TLS en-
crypted capability request message, and sends it to CMS over the secure
channel. Upon reception of capability response from the CMS, MODCMS
creates a DNS response message and forwards it to the DNS software which
later can forward the DNS response to the client.
MODCMS does not communicate with any other entity but the CMS
and DNS. Its identity and location are secret shared between DNS software
and CMS software.
3.2.1.3 CMS Victim Daemon (CMSVD)
CMSVD is our custom C implementation which only communicates with
CMS on a TLS encrypted channel. It receives instructions from the CMS
to create firewall rules for each NC64 capability, and returns acknowledge-
ments to CMS. It can run on off-the-shelf server hardware. The CMSVD
daemon is independent from other software applications running on the vic-
tim host. We are running it on an Ubuntu Server 16.04 with off-the-shelf
server hardware.
It has a direct link with the CMS, and it does not interfere with appli-
cations running on the victim.
3.2.2 Properties Of A NC64 Capability
The binary value of a capability and its lifetime is a management decision. In
our proposed design, CMS acts as an enforcer of such management decisions.
NC64 is returned to the client by CMS, through DNS, on behalf of the
victim server. It authorizes the client to initiate a connection with the victim
for a short duration owing to its ephemeral nature.
In ILNP, each NC64 capability has a fixed L64 value but the NID64
might change for each DNS request. It is a management decision to either
make use of a different NC64 capability per DNS request per client or only
use a single NC64 capability for a particular client who is making multiple
DNS requests.
It is recommended to use a unique NC64 capability for well-behaved
clients for an extended duration. A well-behaved client is a client who is not
a security or privacy threat to a victim. An enterprise can make a decision
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on who is a well-behaved client based on past traffic patterns of the client,
or lack of authentication.
Clients that do not own a NC64 capability are not allowed to start an
ILNP session with a victim host at the physical layer, though they can reach
a victim network since the value of the L64 namespace is fixed. We will show
in chapter 4 that even the network path is restricted to unauthorized clients
by using L64-based capabilities.
A NC64 capability will not change for the duration of a TCP Connection.
The client is allowed to initiate multiple TCP connections using the same
NC64 capability. Although our solution is flexible to have mappings (see
§3.2.3) with port numbers as another decision point for a different NC64
allocation, meaning each service can have its own NC64 capability or a set
of NC64 capabilities per service.
A NC64 capability cannot be shared among other clients, which means
that any DoS attack will become ineffective even if the attacker shares unau-
thorized identities among diverse entities. This case is only valid if the MAP
contains information about the originating network of the client. If an at-
tacker is in non-originating networks, it will not be able to affect the victim’s
services since the spoofed address is tied to a different network within the
MAP.
3.2.3 NC64 Defence Capability Mappings
We introduce the concept of an NC64 mapping, hereby termed as a MAP.
A MAP is a pairing of an ephemeral NC64 value and naming information of
the client. For example, a MAP can be formed using a client’s identifier/lo-
cator namespace and the victim’s ephemeral NC64. Similarly, a service port
number, a client’s originating AS number, etc. can be attached to a MAP.
The more client information we attach to a MAP, the more powerful a de-
fence we can achieve. Terms like MAP, mapping, and pairing(as noun) are
interchangeable.
A MAP is sent from CMS to CMSVD which implements it in the firewall
of the victim host. If the firewall rule installation is successful, then a
MAP acknowledgement message is returned from the CMSVD to the CMS.
Otherwise, CMSVD will send an error condition to the CMS. The CMS logs
this event. The client can make further DNS requests to get hold of a new
capability.
3.2.4 Design For A NC64 Defence Implementation
We required a component which could calculate NC64 values and assign
them to victims. For this component we designed CMS. Similarly, the re-
quirement of having a communication between DNS and CMS, we needed
to have a component to do so, as DNS software itself is not designed to com-
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municate apart from the client. For this reason, we created MODCMS as a
component which interfaces with the DNS and CMS. Similarly, we required
a component within the victim host which should be able to understand the
mappings dictated by the CMS. We termed this component as CMSVD.
For performance reasons, we collocated MODCMS with the DNS, and
CMSVD with the victim host. To show that CMS can act as a middleman
between DNS infrastructure and victim hosts, independent of the number
of DNS servers and victim hosts, we put it as a separate machine.
The design honours the ILNP specification using mappings that ensure
that a single client has a unique ephemeral destination address that remains
same for the duration of the TCP session (for session continuity purposes).
This state is held at the CMS and victim host (using the CMSVD and
firewall).
3.2.5 Finite State Machines (FSMs) Of NC64 Defence Com-
ponents
3.2.5.1 FSM for CMS
A Finite State Machine (FSM) for the CMS software daemon is shown in
Figure 3.2
Figure 3.2: The Finite State Machine (FSM) for the CMS software
Where
• LISTENING is a state where CMS is listening for NC64 requests from
MODCMS.
• MAP CREATION is a state where CMS creates a new NC64 capabil-
ity.
• SENDING MAP is a state which is executed after a new NC64 capa-
bility is created. In this state, it sends the new MAP to CMSVD.
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• If CMS receives an ERROR condition from CMSVD, it goes to the
SENDING NXDOMAIN state where it sends the NXDOMAIN mes-
sage to MODCMS which in turn delegates the NXDOMAIN response
to DNS. Then DNS can send an NXDOMAIN DNS response back
to the client. Once the NXDOMAIN message has been sent to the
MODCMS, the CMS goes to the DELETING MAP state.
• In the DELETING MAP state, the CMS deletes its local MAP. Once
it has deleted the local MAP, it then goes to the LISTEN state again.
• If CMS receives a MAP acknowledgement from CMSVD, it goes into
the SENDING NC64 RESPONSE state where it sends the capability
response message to MODCMS.
• Once a capability response has been sent to the MODCMS, the CMS
goes to the LISTEN state again.
and,
• NC64 REQUEST is a transition when a NC64 capability request comes
from MODCMS.
• MAP CREATED is a transition when the CMS successfully creates a
MAP.
• ACK RECEIVED is a transition where the CMS receives an acknowl-
edgement from CMSVD that a MAP has been successfully installed
in a firewall of a victim host.
• ERROR is a transition where CMS receives an error message from
CMSVD that there was a problem in firewall rule installation.
• NXDOMAIN SENT is a transition where CMS successfully sends an
NXDOMAIN message to MODCMS.
• NC64 RESPONSE is a transition where a NC64 capability response
message has been successfully sent to MODCMS.
3.2.5.2 FSM for MODCMS
The Finite State Machine (FSM) for the MODCMS software daemon is
shown in Figure 3.3
Figure 3.3: The Finite State Machine (FSM) for the MODCMS software
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where,
• The LISTENING FOR DNS state listens to DNS requests.
• After receiving a DNS domain resolution request, it goes to the CRE-
ATING CAP REQUEST state where it extracts client information,
creates an NC64 capability request, and securely sends it to a CMS.
• Once a NC64 capability request has been sent to a CMS, it goes to
the WAITING FOR RESPONSE state.
• After receiving the NC64 capability response from a CMS, it goes
into the FORWARDING TO DNS state where it extracts the NC64
capability and the client address/identifier/locator, and forwards it to
the DNS server which responds to the client with a DNS reply.
and,
• DNS REQUEST is a transition when MODCMS receives a forwarded
DNS request from DNS.
• CAP REQUEST is a transition when a NC64 capability response has
been sent to the CMS.
• CAP RESPONSE is a transition when a MODCMS receives a valid
capability response containing a valid NC64 capability and a client
address/namespaces.
• DNS RESPONSE is a transition when a MODCMS successfully for-
wards a DNS response message to a DNS.
3.2.5.3 FSM for CMSVD
The Finite State Machine (FSM) for the CMSVD software daemon is shown
in Figure 3.4
Figure 3.4: The Finite State Machine (FSM) for the CMSVD software
where,
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• The LISTENING FOR CMS state listens to MAP installation requests
from CMS.
• After receiving a MAP from the CMS, CMSVD goes to the CONFIG-
URING FIREWALL STATE where it adds the MAP to a firewall.
• If CMSVD encounters some error during the installation of the firewall
rule for the MAP, then CMSVD sends an error message containing
the reason. The error condition might be either that the MAP is
malformed or the firewall is busy.
• After configuring the firewall, the CMSVD sends an acknowledgement
message to the CMS confirming MAP installation. Once it has suc-
cessfully sent an acknowledgement message, it goes back to the LIS-
TENING FOR CMS state.
and,
• MAP RECEIVED is a transition when the CMSVD receives a MAP
installation request from CMS.
• ERROR is a transition when a NC64 MAP installation was unsuccess-
ful.
• ACK SENT is a transition when MODCMS successfully sends a MAP
acknowledgement to CMS.
3.2.6 Defence Protocol
The following ordered steps are involved in an NC64 defence protocol:
1. A client sends a DNS name resolution request to a DNS forwarding
server (DNS-F).
2. The DNS-F forwards the client request to a MODCMS.
3. The MODCMS extracts the client address/namespaces, creates a NC64
capability request, and sends it to a CMS.
4. The CMS creates a MAP and sends it to a victim server as a MAP
installation request.
5. The victim server installs the MAP in its firewall, and then sends out
a MAP acknowledgement message to the CMS.
6. Once mapping is acknowledged from the victim, the CMS sends the
currently valid ephemeral NC64 capability as a NC64 capability re-
sponse message to MODCMS.
CHAPTER 3. ENTERPRISE HOST DEFENCE 66
7. MODCMS creates a DNS response message using new NC64 capabil-
ity, and sends it to DNS.
8. The DNS sends a DNS response packet to the client containing an
ephemeral NID64 value and a fixed L64 value.
9. The client can now initiate a data communication session with the
victim using the ephemeral (or temporary) capability and the fixed
L64 value.
Figure 3.5 shows a sequence diagram for the steps mentioned above.
Figure 3.5: NC64 Defence Protocol Sequence Diagram
3.3 Empirical And Comparative Evaluation Of NC64
And SYN Cookies
3.3.1 Methodology And Experiment Design
There has been empirically extensive research on ILNP’s mobility, and multi-
homing features [Phoomikiattisak & Bhatti, 2015], [Bhatti & Atkinson,
2011], [Bhatti et al., 2016], [Phoomikiattisak, 2016], [Simpson, 2016], but
there is a lack of empirical evidence that it can be used with DNS against
SYN flood attacks. We designed our experiment by taking into consideration
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the requirements, limitations, assumptions, tooling, testing, and statistical
significance. Our null hypothesis for the NC64 defence evaluation is:
• NC64 defence against SYN flood DoS attacks performs similar (in
terms of allowing and maintaining a number of TCP connections) to
SYN Cookies.
We will test the aforementioned null hypothesis for LAN, MAN, and
WAN environments, where MAN and WAN environments are emulated by
introducing 25ms and 210ms end-to-end delays in the transmission path. We
also chose 5% and 10% packet loss (using non-uniform normal distribution)
in each direction to check how individual defences perform in the face of an
extreme network congestion. Such delays and packet losses can also give us
information on the behaviour of our backend.
The following are the three sub-experiments for a comprehensive eval-
uation (investigation of each by examining the respective client to server
traffic):
1. Client to server communication during an attack with SYN Cookies
and NC64 disabled
2. Client to server communication during an attack with SYN Cookies
enabled
3. Client to server communication during an attack with SYN Cookies
disabled but NC64 enabled
Each sub-experiment was run 25 times, with an individual runs of 5
minutes. The number of runs was chosen based on statistical power analysis
which showed that at-least 21 runs would be enough to get data which can
be used to extract further statistical insights. We chose 5 minutes per run
because it would be enough to cater for TCP’s slow start mechanisms [Sikdar
et al., 2001], stable rates of attack traffic and minimization of system level
affects.
Tcpdump1 was used to capture packets and analysis was done using
wireshark and R2 scripts.
Figure 3.6 shows the logical diagram of the emulated enterprise network
along with all the required entities for this experiment.
1https://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump man.html
2https://www.r-project.org/
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Figure 3.6: Logical network diagram for NC64 defence against SYN flood
attacks. CMS identity and location is a secret to the DNS and victim
servers, so it is shown as a part of the protected network. The DNS and
victim server is accessible by external networks, so they are shown in the
DMZ. Network emulation is done at the routers which attach the enterprise
network to the client and attacker networks. There are 2,000 clients (see
§3.3.1) so we show them as stacked boxes within the client network.
Baselines
SYN flood mitigation through SYN Cookies is the baseline for NC64 based
defences, and defence-less client communication is the baseline for SYN
Cookies. Our purpose is not to reject any alternative approach (SYN Cook-
ies) but to establish a new approach that does not suffer from the shortcom-
ings of SYN Cookies.
Testbed
The testbed consists of a DNS forwarding server, a victim machine running
an ILNP kernel, a CMS server, an attacker machine, and 2,000 virtual clients
(hosted by a single dedicated client machine running an ILNP kernel).
The setup consists of a control virtual Local Area Network (vLAN) and
a data vLAN. The control vLAN is used to administer the execution and col-
lection of results. The data vLAN is used for running the actual experiment.
Figure 3.7 shows our testbed.
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Figure 3.7: A testbed for NC64 based defence against SYN flood attacks.
Each entity that is attached to a router is part of a separate network. Each
router is an unmodified Linux box with packet forwarding enabled. Each
router can add packet delay to emulate MAN and WAN environments
based on the needs of an individual sub-experiment. This topology is
chosen so as to model a real world enterprise network. Each router is
creating a separate network (external or internal). R4 and R5 act as edge
routers.
The server machines and the routers, in the testbed, run Ubuntu Server
16.04.
Each router is directly connected to an Extreme R© Switch x45a-48t with
an isolated port, using 1 Gbps full-duplex Ethernet links. Each machine,
apart from the switch, in the testbed is a Gateway R© GR380 F1 machine
with 64-bit Intel R© Xeon R© 8-core CPU (2.27 GHz base frequency)3.
Experiment Configurations
Knotdns, v2.4.1 is used as a DNS server software which runs the modcms,
as a Knotdns module extension, to communicate with the CMS. The victim
machine runs a CMSVD daemon which derives firewall rules in the Linux
kernel using a nftables4 firewall. A CMS daemon runs on a separate Linux
3https://ark.intel.com/products/40200/Intel-Xeon-Processor-E5520-8M-Cache-2 26-
GHz-5 86-GTs-Intel-QPI
4https://wiki.debian.org/nftables
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machine.
MAPs are communicated between the CMS and the victim server through
the use of a binary serialization format-based protocol called colfer5. All
communications are also encrypted using TLS [Dierks & Allen, 1999].
CMS, modcms, and victim daemons are programmed in C by myself,
through the supervision and guidance of my supervisor.
The victim runs stable NGINX version 1.15.1 6 HTTP server. It serves a
small static page which fits in a single HTTP 200-OK packet. The client uses
curl7 software to make HTTP requests. Multiple virtual clients are created
using secondary interface addresses, c-ares8, and curl. These virtual clients
were configured to send client traffic as fast as possible so as to congest
the 1 Gbps link with client traffic. This translates to have full utilization
of the server access link, i.e., the enterprise service by the virtual clients.
The attacker uses thcsyn6 9 software, which is an industry tested tool used
heavily in Kali10 Linux to launch a SYN flood attack. Tcpdump11 is used to
collect data at the client side. Since we are concerned about HTTP 200-OK
packets which show that TCP connections were made (a predictor of the
victim’s engagement), we can collect this information on any other system
other than the victim. We chose the client, but another on-path machine
can be chosen.
The victim runs an ILNP kernel version 4.9.38 for the sub-experiment
that employs the NC64 defence. It runs an IPv6 kernel version 4.9.38 for
the sub-experiment that employs only SYN Cookies defence. It is important
to note that we are not comparing SYN Cookies performance under two
different kernels but we are comparing IPv6-based SYN Cookies defence
and ILNP-based non-SYN Cookies defence. It should also be noted that
SYN Cookies can be enabled in either an IPv6 or an ILNP kernel without
modification.
Performance Metric For Evaluation (Testing)
The number of HTTP 200-OK responses from the victim server to the client
is the metric that is used to measure NC64 defence effectiveness. Here,
the notion of effectiveness has two meanings. One implies that each client
should get the expected response for each request that it made, and the other
implies that the victim was able to work properly (serve TCP connections
in the face of an attack) even when SYN Cookies were disabled.
5https://github.com/pascaldekloe/colfer
6https://nginx.org
7https://curl.haxx.se
8https://c-ares.haxx.se
9https://tools.kali.org/information-gathering/thc-ipv6
10https://www.kali.org/
11https://www.tcpdump.org/
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• HTTP 200-OK messages: This metric conveys information about the
successful responses that are delivered at the client. As we are seeing it
from a client’s perspective, we have measured it at the client machine.
Here, the distinction about measurement location is important. If
we were to measure the RTT of individual responses then we would
have measured it in the path between client and victim; otherwise
it suffices to measure 200 OK messages at the client machine itself.
This metric conveys complete information that the client was able to
initiate, establish, and tear-down (or terminate) a TCP connection.
From the victim’s perspective, it means that the victim was protected
from the SYN flood.
Limitations And Validations
Our designed testbed does employ real world technologies but only in the
laboratory environment. While it is also important that this solution should
work in a non laboratory environments, we did an emulation of such an
environment. So, to satisfy such cases, we used loss and delay parameters
for LAN, MAN, and WAN scenarios. The emulation is done using the
netem12 emulator which is well tested software to approximate production
environments.
While it is important to know whether NC64 defence scales or not (as
a SYN Cookies-based solution does), we did not try to scale it above 2000
virtual clients as we have a limited number of machines in the laboratory.
We chose 2,000 clients as it was the maximum that can be achieved on the
machine that was available in the testbed, without affecting victim func-
tions. For reasons of our performance metrics as mentioned earlier, it was
reasonable to use virtual clients rather than physical clients because we are
measuring HTTP 200-OK responses and not the RTT characteristics of such
responses.
We also validated our research using two paths within the testbed. One
path runs control traffic and the other path runs data traffic as mentioned
in all of our experiments. This makes sure that we achieve separation of
concerns and do not introduce bias in results. Given these controlled envi-
ronments we were able to reproduce experimental results, 25 times.
3.3.2 Results
3.3.2.1 LAN Environment
Figure 3.8 shows the results for SYN Cookies showing an average of ∼24,000
HTTP 200-OK responses per 5 minutes run. This is ∼4.8 times more than
the NC64 performance (∼5,000). We saw no 200-OK HTTP responses when
12https://wiki.linuxfoundation.org/networking/netem
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the client was defenceless, i.e, the SYN flood attack traffic was 100% success-
ful in breaching the availability of the victim. This shows the importance of
SYN Cookies or NC64 defence during a SYN flood.
The evaluated performance of NC64 defence in LAN environments was
expected for the following reasons.
1. MODCMS, CMS, and CMSVD daemons were not optimized for per-
formance.
2. Communications among MODCMS, CMS, and CMSVD are secured
by TLS whose layering on top of TCP connection introduces delays.
3. The network paths among DNS, CMS, and CMSVD introduce further
latency for each capability request.
In lossy environments of 10% and 20%, we saw a similar performance
of NC64 and SYN Cookies (under ∼1000 200-OK packets per 5 minutes
run). We chose these extreme lossy environments because enterprise net-
works might get extreme network congestion in the face of a DoS attack or
TCB overflow throttling.
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Figure 3.8: Performance evaluation of client-victim communication comparing lack of defence, SYN Cookies, and NC64
mechanisms. The diamond symbol in the figure shows the mean value.
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3.3.2.2 MAN Environment
The Figure 3.9 shows results for a MAN environment with varying packet
loss scenarios. It shows improvement in results for NC64 as compared to
SYN Cookies LAN environment. SYN Cookies showed a throughput of
∼3,000, and NC64 showed a throughput of∼1,700 in lossless conditions(∼1.7
times better than NC64). If we compare it with lossy scenarios, NC64 is
similar throughput as compared to SYN Cookies. In all lossy conditions in
MAN, throughput is nearly zero for cases with defenceless victim. It should
be noted that increasing the delay decreases the attack intensity but attack
traffic relative to the client/server traffic has similar impact.
In terms of scientific and architectural aspects NC64 shows a successful
proof of concept. In terms of engineering its performance can be optimized
to give a better throughput.
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Figure 3.9: Performance evaluation of client-victim communication comparing lack of defence, SYN Cookies, and NC64
mechanisms. The diamond symbol shows the mean value.
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3.3.2.3 WAN Environment
The Figure 3.10 shows the WAN based results. NC64 throughput is ∼370
200-OK packets per 5 minutes run as compared to SYN Cookies which has
∼390. The throughput of SYN Cookies is ∼1.054 times better than NC64
but if we consider error bars then NC64 performed similar to SYN Cookies.
There is a similar performance between the two in lossy conditions of
10% and 20%. We chose such extreme lossy conditions because an enterprise
network might get extreme network congestion in the face of a DoS attack.
Again, for defenceless victim, the client got less than ∼10 200-OK packets,
which shows the worst performance in 5 minutes duration.
It should be noted that increasing the delay decreases the attack intensity
but attack traffic relative to the client/server traffic has similar impact, as
has been noted in MAN environment.
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Figure 3.10: Performance evaluation of client-victim communication comparing lack of defence, SYN Cookies, and NC64
mechanisms. The diamond symbol shows the mean value.
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3.3.3 Statistical Analysis
From the boxplots in Figures 3.8 to 3.10, we notice that statistical means
and respective medians are similar (quantile-quantile plots show the same)
which implies a normal distribution of the results. We are able to perform
Welch’s two-sample t-test significance testing on our results. Tables 3.1
to 3.3 show the statistical significance analysis of our null hypotheses (see
§3.3.1).
We will reject the null hypothesis if NC64 defence did not perform similar
to SYN Cookies ,i.e, if p-value is less than 0.05. If the p-value is equal to
0.05 then we can neither reject nor accept the null hypothesis. And, if the
p-value is greater than 0.05 then we will accept the null hypothesis.
3.3.3.1 LAN Analysis
LAN Setup With
No Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) 18621.92 to 19772.08 4865.33 to 5400.19 23820.64 to 24838.88
Mean Values (ppr) 24329.76 and 5132.76 5132.76 and 0.00 24329.76 and 0.00
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
WEAK STRONG STRONG
LAN Setup With
10% Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value 0.95 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) -24.39 to 23.27 387.57 to 433.47 403.561 to 416.36
Mean Values (ppr) 409.96 and 410.52 410.52 and 0.00 409.96 and 0.00
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
STRONG STRONG STRONG
LAN Setup With
20% Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value 0.05 (or 0.05166) <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) -4.97 to 33.85 169.84 to 181.68 171.71 to 208.69
Mean Values (ppr) 190.48 and 176.04 176.04 and 0.28 190.48 and 0.28
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
NEITHER STRONG
NOR
WEAK
STRONG STRONG
Table 3.1: Significance testing using Welch’s two-sample t-test
examinations of normally distributed results for three test cases within the
LAN environment with varying packet loss conditions. Confidence
intervals are at 99% level. ppr is packets per run.
The null hypothesis (see §3.3.1) can be rejected for no packet loss condi-
tions. It can be accepted for 10% packet loss conditions. And it can neither
be rejected nor accepted in 20% loss conditions. In lossy conditions, NC64
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performs better because the traffic control daemons are able to serve the
control traffic due to manageable capability request rate (a concurrent re-
quest handler for MODCMS can help further improve the request/response
behaviour).
If we compare the NC64 performance with the performance of a defence-
less victim, we see a strong evidence that the NC64 defence is better than
having no defence (valid proof of concept). Similarly, if we compare the
SYN Cookies performance with that of a defenceless victim, we see a strong
evidence that the SYN Cookies defence is better than having no defence.
No Packet Loss Conditions:
The true statistical mean of the SYN Cookies performance is ∼4.74 times
more than NC64 for no packet loss conditions. Please see items 1 to 3 in
§3.3.2.1 for reasons of such performance of NC64 defence which show that
it is an engineering issue rather than scientific.
By comparing NC64 defence with a defenceless system, it can be said
that the scientific nature of NC64 defence against SYN floods is established.
Significant p-values of less than 0.05 and a large difference in respective
means (i.e, means of the NC64 defence scenario and SYN Cookies only
scenario) attribute to the aforementioned scientific contribution. So, an
enterprise is encouraged to deploy NC64 defence if SYN Cookies is either
not an option (see §§2.3.6.1 and 3.1) or if NC64 defence performance is
increased using better engineering.
10% Packet Loss Conditions:
The true statistical mean of the SYN Cookies performance is ∼1.0013 times
more than NC64 for the 10% packet loss conditions, which implies that
NC64 defence performs similar, on average, in lossy environments. But if
we consider the p-value, then NC64 defence is better than SYN Cookies.
The p-value of 0.95 is far more than 0.05 that implies that the SYN Cookies
did not perform better in comparison to NC64.
NC64 defence performs better than having no SYN flood security in 10%
packet loss conditions. The p-value is significantly less than 0.05, and the
mean ratio is large, contributing to a better confidence interval. The same
can be said about SYN Cookies and the defenceless system.
20% Packet Loss Conditions:
True statistical mean of the SYN Cookies performance is ∼0.92 times more
than the NC64 performance for the 20% packet loss conditions. In terms of
mean values, NC64 performs better than SYN Cookies but if we consider
p-value (∼0.05) then there is no evidence that one is better than the other.
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The NC64 defence performs better than having no SYN flood security
in 20% packet loss conditions. The p-value is significantly less than 0.05,
and the mean ratio is large contributing to a better confidence interval.
The network packet loss does reduce the magnitude of the attack traffic
but the overall impact of the attack traffic has similar affect on the normal
traffic, i.e., we still have attack SYN packets which overflow the TCP’s TCB.
3.3.3.2 MAN Analysis
MAN Setup With
No Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) -1449.08 to -1228.44 1572.65 to 1777.75 2973.29 to 3054.63
Mean Values (ppr) 1675.20 and 3013.96 1675.20 and 0.00 3013.96 and 0.00
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
WEAK STRONG STRONG
MAN Setup With
10% Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) -134.47 to -96.81 301.99 to 327.06 416.12 to 444.20
Mean Values (ppr) 314.52 and 430.16 314.52 and 0.00 430.16 and 0.00
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
WEAK STRONG STRONG
MAN Setup With
20% Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value 0.00 (or 0.0001833) <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) -25.32 to -5.16 158.08 to 171.04 172.08 to 187.52
Mean Values (ppr) 164.56 and 179.80 164.56 and 0.00 179.80 and 0.00
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
WEAK STRONG STRONG
Table 3.2: Significance testing using Welch’s two-sample t-test
examinations of normally distributed results for three test cases within the
MAN environment with varying packet loss conditions. Confidence
intervals are at 99% level. ppr is packets per run.
The null hypothesis (see §3.3.1) can be rejected for 0%, 10%, and 20% packet
loss conditions in MAN environments. Even though the null hypothesis is
rejected, we can say that NC64 defence is a valid proof of concept in emulated
MAN environments, since they mitigated SYN attacks. Such performance
of NC64 defence is expected due to latency issues by having extra network
elements, and the unoptimized software implementations.
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No Packet Loss Conditions:
True statistical mean of the SYN Cookies performance is ∼1.80 times more
than NC64 for no packet loss conditions, in a MAN environment. If com-
pared with LAN, we have a reduction in ∼3 times of the corresponding
multiplication factor. According to the p-value, we can say that NC64 is
not a better solution than SYN Cookies in terms of the performance of the
200-OK throughput metric. NC64 defence can increase its performance with
better engineering.
By comparing the NC64 defence with the defenceless system, the NC64
defence performed better. The SYN Cookies also performed better than the
defenceless system.
10% Packet Loss Conditions:
The true statistical mean of the SYN Cookies performance is ∼1.37 times
more than NC64 for 10% packet loss conditions. This shows that NC64
performs similar, in terms of means, to SYN Cookies in MAN based lossy
environments. The difference in the two multiplication factors (∼ 0.37), as
compared to a LAN, signifies that packet losses in low data rate networks like
MAN contribute more in degradation (although minimal) of NC64 defence
rather than SYN Cookies. It is an odd observation for NC64 defence in
MAN with 10% packet loss which demands further investigation into NC64
implementation details. If we compare it with a no-loss MAN environment,
then it performs better. One reason for this is that during MAN-based
delays and lossy conditions, CMS software is less loaded with capability
requests than in no loss MAN or LAN environments.
NC64 defence performs better than having no SYN flood security in 10%
packet loss conditions in MAN. The p-value is significantly less than 0.05,
and the mean ratio is large contributing to a better confidence interval.
20% Packet Loss Conditions:
The true statistical mean of the SYN Cookies performance is ∼1.09 times
more than NC64 for 20% packet loss conditions. In terms of mean val-
ues NC64 performs similar to SYN Cookies but if we consider the p-value
(∼0.00) then SYN Cookies is better than NC64 defence.
NC64 defence performs much better than having no SYN flood security
in 20% packet loss conditions in MAN. The p-value is significantly less than
0.05, and the mean ratio is large, contributing to a better confidence interval.
The same can be said about the comparison of the SYN Cookies with the
defenceless system.
CHAPTER 3. ENTERPRISE HOST DEFENCE 82
3.3.3.3 WAN Analysis
WAN Setup With
No Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value 0.00 (or 0.005458) <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) -29.21 to -1.19 369.80 to 374.85 373.74 to 401.30
Mean Values (ppr) 372.52 and 387.72 372.52 and 0.20 387.72 and 0.20
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
WEAK STRONG STRONG
WAN Setup With
10% Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value 4.36e-10 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) -43.32 to -21.16 172.24 to 192.32 209.78 to 219.25
Mean Values (ppr) 182.88 and 215.12 182.88 and 0.60 215.12 and 0.60
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
WEAK STRONG STRONG
WAN Setup With
20% Packet Loss
NC64
vs
SYN Cookies
NC64
vs
No Solutions
SYN Cookies
vs
No Solutions
p-value 6.39e-05 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence Interval (99%) -20.51 to -4.93 128.40 to 136.08 138.08 to 151.83
Mean Values (ppr) 132.96 and 145.68 132.96 and 0.72 145.68 and 0.72
Evidence For Acceptance
(Similar True Means)
WEAK STRONG STRONG
Table 3.3: Significance testing using Welch’s two-sample t-test
examinations of normally distributed results for three test cases within the
WAN environment with varying packet loss conditions. Confidence
intervals are at 99% level. ppr is packets per run.
The null hypothesis (see §3.3.1) can be rejected for 0%, 10%, and 20% packet
loss conditions. Even though the null hypothesis is rejected, we can say that
NC64 defence is a valid proof of concept in a WAN environment as well (as
is the case in LAN and MAN), as it mitigated the SYN flood attack.
No Packet Loss Conditions:
The true statistical mean of SYN Cookies performance is ∼1.04 times more
than NC64 for no packet loss conditions in WAN environment. If compared
with the LAN based analysis, we have a reduction of ∼4.8 times of the
corresponding multiplication factor. In terms of the p-value, we can say
that NC64 is not a better defence than SYN Cookies. The reduction in the
multiplication factor is a better result, but the p-value clearly shows that the
NC64 implementation requires better engineering and low backend latency.
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NC64 did perform similar to SYN Cookies if we look at the width of the
confidence interval, and the difference in means.
The NC64 defence and the SYN Cookies defence performed better than
the defenceless system.
10% Packet Loss Conditions:
The true statistical mean of the SYN Cookies performance is ∼1.17 times
more than NC64 for 10% packet loss conditions. The difference in two
multiplication factors, as compared to LAN, is minimal in 10% packet loss
case, meaning it performed similar to LAN in such conditions.
NC64 defence performs better than having no SYN flood security in 10%
packet loss conditions in WAN. The p-value is significantly less than 0.05,
and the mean ratio is large contributing to a better confidence interval. The
same can be said about the SYN Cookies versus no defence.
20% Packet Loss Conditions:
The true statistical mean of the SYN Cookies performance is ∼1.10 times
more than the NC64 performance for the 20% packet loss conditions in the
WAN environment as well in comparison to the MAN environment. Even
though from the outset it looks like a similar result, if we consider the p-
value (∼6.39e-05), we need to say that the alternative hypothesis of our null
hypothesis (see §3.3.1) will take preference.
The NC64 defence performs better than having no SYN flood security in
the 20% packet loss conditions in the WAN environment as well. The p-value
is significantly less than 0.05, and the mean ratio is large contributing to a
better confidence interval. The same can be said about the SYN Cookies
only versus no defence.
3.3.4 NC64 And SYN Cookies — Performance Similarity
And Overall Benefits
Given tables 3.1 to 3.3, we notice that the overall performance of NC64 is
not better than SYN Cookies. NC64 performance can be increased through
better engineering (which is a future work). Poor NC64 performance can be
reconciled by using its other benefits which can not be obtained from SYN
Cookies.
NC64 supports data piggybacking on initial TCP packets, which are
not supported by SYN Cookies. NC64 supports TCP options, but SYN
Cookies are not compatible with TCP options. NC64 have no problems
with unidirectional data flow when Selective ACK (SACK) packets are in
use, whereas SYN Cookies have problems with them. Please see §§2.3.6.1
and 3.1 for problems associated with SYN Cookies. As NC64 does not
utilize mechanisms associated with modifications of TCP protocol stack and
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TCP implementation within the Linux kernel, it does not suffer from such
shortcomings.
3.4 Evaluating Performance Of NC64 Distribution
In NC64, the capability distribution mechanism requires having a CMS back-
end. It is important to see performance of the CMS backed DNS responses
and compare it with the performance of DNS only responses to clients.
For such purposes we ran an experiment with Local Area Network (LAN),
Metropoliton Area Network (MAN) (emulated), and Wide Area Network
(WAN) (emulated) environments.
3.4.1 Experiment Design
Figure 3.11 shows a logical diagram of this experiment with a reference
enterprise network. The CMS is contained in the enterprise’s protected
network behind the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). As the DMZ is the entry
point of any external traffic, we have put DNS and the publicly accessible
victim in it. The DNS and the CMS are connected through an internal
router and there is a link between the CMS and the victim to derive firewall
rules. We have emulated different network conditions between the client and
the enterprise network.
Figure 3.11: Logical diagram for the performance comparison of NC64
capability-backed DNS response distribution and DNS only response
distribution to clients
The experiment has two parts. The first part used a DNS response
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mechanism without CMS, and second part did the same experiment with
CMS in place. There were 25 iterations done for each part, and performance
measurements were taken using average response times. Each iteration con-
tained 100 DNS requests. After each iteration, the average response time
was calculated and stored as a single value which is representative of the
respective iteration.
3.4.2 Testing
The main requirement for testing was to generate client requests and to
collect response times for each response for DNS with and without CMS
scenarios. The client used the dig13 software, which is natively available in
Linux distributions, to launch a series of DNS requests. A custom script
was created to generate 100 requests per iteration for each scenario. A
monitoring agent was running at the client to collect actual response times.
Emulated packet loss of 0%, 5%, and 10% was used in the LAN, MAN, and
WAN environments, respectively, in each direction between the client and
the DNS. We chose lossy environments of 5% and 10% in each direction to
measure performance when there is extreme network congestion during a
DoS attack. We get an aggregate of 10% and 20% packet loss between client
and DNS.
Similarly, we introduced an emulated delay of 12.5ms, and 105ms in each
direction between the client and the DNS for the MAN and the WAN cases,
respectively. So, in aggregate, we get a delay of 25ms and 210ms between
the client and the DNS for the MAN and the WAN environments. For the
LAN case, we use the usual network conditions in the testbed without net-
work emulation. We chose these delay figures after doing some repeated
measurements of actual MAN, and WAN environments, e.g., using dig to
measure the response time of University’s services and geographically dis-
tributed public servers. We picked the average values and used them in the
experiment for emulation.
We used netem14 software, which is widely accepted as a network emu-
lation software for the generation of loss and delay.
All systems in the testbed run Ubuntu server 16.04. The client is running
an ILNP kernel version 4.9.38. The DNS and the CMS run on an IPv6 kernel
version 4.9.38 because there is no requirement on being used as an ILNP
machine.
Each router is directly connected to an Extreme R© Switch x45a-48t with
an isolated port, using 1 Gbps full-duplex Ethernet links. Each machine,
apart from the switch in the testbed is a Gateway R© GR380 F1 machine with
64-bit Intel R© Xeon R© 8-core CPU (2.27 GHz base frequency)15.
13ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/cur/9.10/doc/arm/man.dig.html
14http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/xenial/man8/tc-netem.8.html
15https://ark.intel.com/products/40200/Intel-Xeon-Processor-E5520-8M-Cache-2 26-
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3.4.3 Results
LAN Environment
Figure 3.12 shows the LAN-based results.
When we introduced no packet loss in the LAN, we saw a performance
of less than 50 milliseconds for each scenario. For the DNS only scenario,
we saw ∼16 ms of average response time, and for the DNS with a CMS
scenario we saw ∼42 ms of average response time. The DNS without CMS
case performed ∼2.625 times better than the DNS with CMS. ∼42 ms of
average response time for DNS with CMS is not good enough but the results
give us information on how much better we need to do.
In the case of 10% packet loss, we saw an average response time of ∼532
ms for the DNS only scenario, and ∼558 ms for the DNS with CMS scenario.
The DNS without CMS performed ∼1.049 times better than the DNS with
CMS.
Similarly, in the case of 20% packet loss, we saw an average response
time of ∼1194 ms for the DNS only scenario and ∼1116 ms for the DNS
with CMS scenario. The DNS with CMS performed ∼1.070 times better
than the DNS without CMS.
So, in lossy conditions, the DNS with CMS has similar performance with
the DNS without CMS. Whereas in lossless conditions, the DNS without
CMS is better than the DNS with CMS. The difference is due to an unop-
timized backend, use of TLS for all backend control signalling, and having
an extra latency due to new backend network components. Some of these
parameters can be controlled, e.g., if the CMS is behind the DMZ then the
enterprise can relax the TLS dependency. Similarly, if the participating soft-
wares, i.e., CMS, CMSVD and MODCMS, are designed and implemented
in such a way so as to deliver high performance (e.g. using concurrency
or parallelism), then we would be able to enhance the performance of the
scenario for DNS with CMS.
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Figure 3.12: Average response time measurements (milliseconds) taken for the LAN environment with a 0%, 10%, and 20%
emulated packet loss. The graph shows information about the scenarios of measuring DNS requests/responses with and
without CMS
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MAN Environment
Figure 3.13 shows MAN based results.
When we introduced no packet loss in the MAN, we saw a performance
of less than 100 milliseconds for each scenario. For the DNS only scenario
for the MAN, we saw ∼42 ms of average response time, and for the DNS
with CMS scenario, we saw ∼67 ms of an average response time when there
was no packet loss. The DNS without CMS performed ∼1.595 times better
than the DNS with CMS.
In the case of 10% packet loss, we saw an average response time of ∼551
ms for the DNS only scenario, and ∼603 ms for the DNS with CMS scenario.
The DNS without CMS performed ∼1.094 times better than the DNS with
CMS.
Similarly, in the case of 20% packet loss, we saw an average response
time of ∼1209 ms for the DNS only scenario and ∼1201 ms for the DNS
with CMS scenario. The DNS with CMS performed ∼1.007 times better
than the DNS without CMS.
So, in the lossless and lossy conditions, the DNS with CMS has similar
performance to the DNS without CMS. The difference is due to an un-
optimized backend, use of TLS for all the backend control signalling, and
having additional latency due to new backend network components. The im-
provement in the MAN environment comparison to the LAN environment
is due to network delays which allow the CMS software to perform better
while calculating/selecting the NC64 values and consuming/producing the
control messages from/to other systems.
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Figure 3.13: Average response time measurements (milliseconds) taken for the MAN environment with a 0%, 10%, and 20%
emulated packet loss. The graph shows information about the scenario of measuring DNS requests/responses with and
without CMS
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WAN Environment
Figure 3.14 shows WAN based results.
When we introduced no packet loss in the WAN environment, we saw a
performance of less than 250 milliseconds for each scenario. For the DNS
only scenario for the WAN, we saw ∼226 ms of an average response time, and
for the DNS with CMS scenario, we saw ∼254 ms of an average response
time when there was no packet loss. The DNS without CMS performed
∼1.124 times better than the DNS with CMS.
In the case of 10% packet loss, we saw an average response time of ∼792
ms for the DNS only scenario, and ∼810 ms for the DNS with CMS scenario.
The DNS without CMS performed ∼1.023 times better than the DNS with
CMS.
Similarly, in the case of 20% packet loss, we saw an average response
time of ∼1454 ms for the DNS only scenario and ∼1409 ms for the DNS
with CMS scenario. The DNS with CMS performed ∼1.032 times better
than the DNS without CMS.
So, in lossless and lossy conditions, the DNS with CMS has a similar
performance in comparison with the DNS without CMS. The improvement
in the WAN case in to the LAN is due to the network delays which allow the
CMS software to perform better while calculating/selecting the NC64 values
and consuming/producing the control messages from/to other systems.
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Figure 3.14: Average response time measurements (milliseconds) taken for the WAN environment with a 0%, 10%, and 20%
emulated packet loss. The graph shows information about the scenario of measuring DNS requests/replies with and without
CMS
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Table 3.4 summarizes the measurements reported in this section.
LAN Setup with Packet loss Average Response Time (DNS only) Average Response Time(DNS with CMS)
0% ∼16ms ∼42ms
10% ∼532ms ∼558ms
20% ∼1194ms ∼1116ms
MAN Setup with Packet loss Average Response Time (DNS only) Average Response Time(DNS with CMS)
0% ∼42ms ∼67ms
10% ∼551ms ∼603ms
20% ∼1209ms ∼1201ms
WAN Setup with Packet loss Average Response Time (DNS only) Average Response Time(DNS with CMS)
0% ∼226ms ∼254ms
10% ∼792ms ∼810ms
20% ∼1454ms ∼1409ms
Table 3.4: Summary of response time measurements taken for DNS-only
and DNS with CMS scenarios under different packet loss conditions
3.5 Summary
This chapter covered the ILNP identifier namespace-based DoS defence sys-
tem for an enterprise host security. It covered the rationale for the research
(see §3.1), implementation details (see §§3.2.1 and 3.2.6), the testing details
(see §3.3) and the results along with their statistical analysis (see §§3.3.2
and 3.3.3). We termed this defence as NID64-based capabilities (NC64).
These capabilities provide per-client authorization to allow a client to ac-
cess services running on enterprise hosts.
Mitigation against low-rate TCP SYN flood attacks is the main objective
of this defence. An evidence of ILNP-based defence feasibility and proof of
concept was supported empirically by comparing it with a widely deployed
non-ILNP defence, i.e., TCP SYN Cookies. The ILNP-based defence not
only provides security against TCP SYN flood attacks but it also curbs the
problems that arise when TCP SYN Cookies are in use (see §3.3.4).
This chapter also presented an empirical evaluation of the performance
of NC64 capability distribution to clients (see §3.4). We noticed that the
latency introduced in the distribution mechanism is mainly due to the un-
optimised implementation of the new software elements, and the extra net-
work infrastructure required for the control traffic for the defence (see §3.4.3).
Chapter 4
Protecting Sites from
Spoofing based Volumetric
DoS Attacks
Enterprises put multi-level anti-DoS (see §2.3.7) security controls in their
systems and networks. In this chapter, we will evaluate a defence mechanism
based on ILNP’s 64-bit locator namespace (L64) which is used as an IPv6
network prefix. L64-based defence is expected (using ILNP mobility and
MTD) to protect an enterprise site from volumetric DoS attacks.
This chapter presents the following parts:
• Establishing the rationale for investigating L64-based defence against
volumetric DoS attacks. We cover shortcomings of current mitiga-
tions against these assaults. Definitions of new concepts, and relevant
conditions/assumptions in their applicability will also be presented.
• Empirically comparing the L64-based defence mechanism to the case of
an unprotected site during an attack. Our baseline will be a defenceless
client-server communication. The effects of volumetric UDP floods
on client-server communication will be measured by comparing client
traffic during an attack, with and without our solution.
• Empirically evaluating the effects of L64-based defence on (volumetric)
SYN flood attacks. Here, our objective is to quantify how much band-
width coverage an attacker loses when our solution is in place. We
did not use client traffic in this evaluation, i.e., to assume that attack
is 100 percent successful before applying the solution. Our aim is to
mitigate DoS attack by increasing the effort required by the attacker.
• Measuring SYN flood attack traffic when an L64-based defence uses
network paths which include the path on which the attack is occurring.
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4.1 Rationale
Chapter 3 evaluated the NID64-based capabilities (NC64) that protected
enterprise servers from DoS. If an enterprise, only, deploys a NC64 defence,
then volumetric attack traffic will still be able to reach an enterprise site
because the NC64 defence uses different NID64 values at the victim host
while the topological path between it and the external network entities re-
mains the same. So, in NC64 defence, an enterprise network is able to see
all network packets but the victim host will not be able see the packets from
unauthorized sources. An enterprise requires a different defence against
unauthorized packets which can reach its network.
We propose a mechanism based on ILNP’s L64 namespace. It uses the
same methodology of MTD (see §1.4), capabilities (see §1.5), and DNS Fast
Flux (see §1.6) as has been used by the NC64 defence. We term this solution
as L64-based Capabilities (LC64).
In ILNP, NID64 and L64 values serve two different purposes (see §§2.1.1.1
and 2.1.1.2). Each namespace can be used dynamically (see §2.1.1) because
they are separately used in the transport and network layers. ILNP pro-
vides mechanisms to control dynamic bindings (see §2.1.2.1). The NID64
values can dynamically bind with any network interface during the same
communication session. NID64 values change their network/interface bind-
ings using Locator Updates (LUs) (see §2.1.3). We will use this dynamic
binding mechanism and the LU mechanism to form the LC64 defence.
In ILNP, continuity of a communication session is dependent on NID64
invariance but is independent from L64 variance. So, we can change L64
values (or topologically change network access) while maintaining existing
sessions. In relation to the MTD paradigm, we can use L64 values as a
moving property (see §2.4.1.1) with network access authorization enabled
through the capabilities paradigm.
In our solution, dynamically changing network topology requires multi-
ple upstream links (with unique paths) to the Internet. In case of IPv6, if
the target changes its location, then all TCP connections have to be broken
and re-established. But in the case of ILNP, existing TCP connections are
maintained when the victim changes its topological location [Atkinson &
Bhatti, 2012a]. We make use of these ILNP features which enable host/net-
work mobility without disrupting end-to-end communications.
For a description of ILNP mobility please see §2.1.3. It should be noted
that ILNP mobility has been built into the ILNP kernel (version 3.9.x and
4.9.38) and evaluated empirically in earlier research [Phoomikiattisak, 2016].
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4.1.1 Definitions And Assumptions
4.1.1.1 ILNP Locator-based Capabilities (LC64)
In LC64 defence, each ILNP locator (L) value is an ephemeral L64 names-
pace (MTD compliant) that gives network access to an authorized client for a
short duration. There must be more than one LC64 value, and it is a require-
ment to frequently change or rotate them within the same communication
session hence achieving a topologically disparate multi-path environment.
4.1.1.2 NC64 vs LC64
In §3.2, NID64 based Capabilities (NC64) were defined along with a required
MAP-based filtering at the victim server. But, LC64 does not use filtering,
hence no mappings. While IPv6 can implement IP-based capabilities, similar
to NC64, defence similar to LC64 is not possible with IPv6 unless mobility
extensions for IPv6 are in use. LC64 is purely an ILNP solution and it
requires that client and server must both support ILNP.
LC64 defence can only divert traffic, but if any traffic is leaked to the
network then it will reach applications running on the victim server. In NC64
defence, traffic has to acquire a LC64 capability which has a state in the
victim server’s local firewall, hence services are protected from unauthorized
sources.
Both NC64 and LC64 defences are solutions against spoofing-based DoS
attacks. NC64 defence can work with low data-rate and high data-rate SYN
floods but it is better suited for low-rate SYN floods. LC64 is intended
to work against volumetric i.e. high data-rate DoS attacks which can be
either UDP or TCP SYN floods. Here the notion of a flood is anything that
overwhelms a certain resource in the system, e.g., SYN flood (even though
it mostly comes with a low data rate) overwhelms the TCP’s TCB buffers.
LC64 defence requires a Capabilities Management System (CMS) as an
extra network element which has different functionality than the NC64 CMS.
What follows is a description of the extra network elements required for an
LC64 defence.
4.1.1.3 LC64 MODCMS: LC64 CMS Module Within DNS
LC64 MODCMS is a knotDNS1 module that is designed and built using C
by myself, under the supervision and guidance of my supervisor. It has the
same functionality as an NC64 MODCMS.
In this chapter, we will use the term MODCMS in the context of an
LC64 defence. Its responsibility is to extract client information from a DNS
name resolution request; and to create a secure LC64 capability request to
be sent to the LC64 CMS. Once it has received an LC64 response from the
1https://www.knot-dns.cz/
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LC64 CMS, it strips this information off and returns a valid DNS name
resolution response to the client via DNS. For a complete description of the
MODCMS please see §§3.2.1.2 and 3.2.5.2.
4.1.1.4 LC64 Capabilities Management System (LC64 CMS)
LC64 Capabilities Management System (LC64 CMS) is an enterprise pro-
tected network entity that controls LC64 creation, compliance, and temporal
allocation. It is connected to each enterprise-owned upstream access router
that provides a different network path through the Internet. An LC64 CMS
controls the interfaces on each access router. It can also configure paths in
the routing tables of these routers.
CMS, as an extra network element, is common to NC64 and LC64 de-
fences, but each CMS instance has a different responsibility. In NC64, a
CMS controls mappings in the victim server, whereas in LC64, it only con-
trols router interfaces/paths. An LC64 CMS does not interact with a victim
host.
4.1.1.5 Assumptions
In LC64 defence, we assume that
• an attacker is using IP spoofing to launch a UDP or a TCP SYN flood.
• an enterprise is connected to at-least two upstream links.
• LC64 values are changed in 20 seconds intervals. Since we are not
measuring network hand-off performance, we can choose any interval
as long as we have multiple changes in topological paths within a single
observable communication flow (to create a proof of concept).
• Location and identity of an LC64 CMS is only known to an enterprise.
• An LC64 CMS is protected by a DMZ, whereas a DNS is located
within a DMZ.
• Client and enterprise machines uses an ILNP kernel.
4.2 Empirical Evaluation Of LC64 Defence
4.2.1 Defence Protocol
The defence follows following steps in order:
1. An external correspondent node (CN), i.e., a client, sends a DNS name
resolution request to a DNS.
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2. The DNS sends capability request to an LC64 CMS.
3. The LC64 CMS picks up a currently active L64 value from a pool of
L64 values, and enables routing on the active link. It also, disables
the routing on all the inactive L64 uplinks.
4. The LC64 CMS sends the capability reply to the DNS.
5. The DNS sends the DNS name resolution response message to the CN
by embedding the new LC64 value.
6. The client can now connect to the victim using only this active capa-
bility, with a newly configured path.
7. During the client server data communication, the CMS shifts to other
locator values after some configurable interval while the ILNP protocol
maintains the session (see §2.1) .
Once the LC64 defence protocol is active, spoofed attack traffic will not
reach the enterprise network, unless the interface on which the attack is
launched is active as well.
Figure 4.1 shows an end-to-end sequence diagram for frequent L64 names-
pace reassignment using the LC64 defence. It showcases two LC64 names-
paces controlled by an enterprise LC64 CMS, and advertised by two routers
to an internal enterprise server. This server then uses ILNP mobility to shift
existing connections to a new topological path.
If a spoofing based attack traverses through router one, then legitimate
clients see an increase in bandwidth as soon as the LC64 defence shifts to a
different topology using router two. Each legitimate client is shifted to the
new topology using ILNP-based mobility mechanism which contains control
signalling that only legitimate clients can acknowledge. For a successful DoS,
an attacker has to increase its effort (see §4.3) by attacking on all available
upstream links of the enterprise.
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Figure 4.1: LC64 Defence Protocol Sequence Diagram
4.2.2 Enterprise Network Architecture With New Network
Components
Figure 4.2 shows the logical diagram of an example enterprise network, con-
nected to the Internet, with a proposed placement of DNS and LC64 CMS.
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The internetwork contains a client network, and a victim network that con-
tains DNS and publicly accessible servers in a DMZ along with LC64 CMS in
the protected network (i.e., behind DMZ). Two upstream links are available
through two access routers. The enterprise site is designed to maximize the
security of an LC64 CMS by putting it behind the DMZ. It is recommended
to have firewalls in the DMZ and the protected networks. The MODCMS
is shown as a collocated component within the DNS server. It should be
noted that there is no CMSVD as it was only required in the NC64 defence
(see chapter 3).
Figure 4.2: The reference inter-networked enterprise site for which an
LC64 defence is designed
Domain Name System (DNS)
An LC64 defence requires DNS server software. A client can use TCP, UDP,
DNSSEC or any other protocol that is supported by DNS server software.
An LC64 defence requires an interface (MODCMS §4.1.1.3) to DNS that
would generate L64 capability requests to the LC64 CMS and consuming
L64 capability responses from the LC64 CMS. This interface is between an
LC64 CMS and a DNS (MODCMS component within DNS) and it does not
communicate with a client.
LC64 MODCMS (LC64 CMS Module For DNS)
A LC64 MODCMS has the same functional architecture as a NC64 MOD-
CMS. For details, please see §4.1.1.3. Figure 4.3 shows the FSM of MOD-
CMS. We reproduce its FSM diagram here for completeness.
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Figure 4.3: MODCMS Finite state machine
LC64 CMS
LC64 CMS component is used to control the uplinks associated with an
enterprise. It controls which uplinks should be active or inactive at any
specific time.
A LC64 CMS has different functionality than an NC64 CMS. It main-
tains a list of route-able site-specific L64 namespaces whereas an NC64 CMS
maintained a list of host-specific NID64 values. An LC64 CMS connects to
all upstream routers and DNS through a secure (SSH in our case) protocol.
Each L64 namespace that it makes active (using dynamic router configu-
rations) becomes a capability for a short duration. This lifetime can be
controlled by enterprise management systems. The main responsibilities of
the LC64 CMS are:
• Selecting an active ephemeral LC64 value
• Activating paths on access routers with the active ephemeral LC64
value
• Deactivating paths on access routers with in-active LC64 values
• Responding to a MODCMS DNS module with an active LC64 value
once it receives an LC64 capability request from a MODCMS.
Figure 4.4 shows the finite state machine of an LC64 CMS.
Figure 4.4: LC64 CMS Finite state machine
Where
• A LISTENING is a state while a LC64 CMS is listening for LC64
requests from a MODCMS.
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• An LC64 CREATION/SELECTION is a state where a LC64 CMS
either creates a new ephemeral LC64 value based on the time-out
associated with the currently active LC64 value or picks a value which
is not yet timed out.
• A CONFIGURING ROUTERS is a state which is executed after a new
LC64 value is selected. In this phase, it performs two parallel tasks.
The first task runs a script on the active router to update the radvd
daemon configuration and configures the ingress path on the router’s
network interface using iptables2. The second parallel task runs a
script on a router whose L64 value is now inactive, to deactivate the
ingress path using iptables.
• In the WAITING/DWELLING state, the LC64 CMS waits for a time-
out after which the current ephemeral LC64 value becomes inactive.
• Once LC64 CMS is in a WAITING/DWELLING state, it sends out a
LC64 response message to a MODCMS.
• After the time-out of an active LC64 value, the LC64 CMS goes to an
LC64 CREATION/SELECTION state for reconfigurations.
and,
• An LC64 REQUEST is a transition when a LC64 capability request
comes from a MODCMS.
• A NEW LC64 is a transition when a new LC64 capability has been
successfully created/selected.
• A PATH ACTIVE transition triggers a WAITING/DWELLING state.
• An LC64 EXPIRED transition happens when a current LC64 value is
timed out.
• During the WAITING state, every LC64 request gets the currently
active LC64 value through a LC64 RESPONSE transition.
Enterprise Access Routers
These routers provide upstream access to different topologically significant
paths. Either a single router with multiple network interfaces can be con-
nected to different upstream links or independent routers with access to
individual upstream links can be used. Each topological path contains a
different network namespace which is used as a LC64 capability.
2http://ipset.netfilter.org/iptables.man.html
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4.2.3 LC64 Defence Methodology And Experiment Design
As LC64 defence is for the victim network to protect it from spoofing-based
DoS attack, we can do an assessment about what happens to client commu-
nication during an attack while the LC64 defence is in place. The victim
public servers represent the enterprise network so, we can do measurement
on it rather than at the client side. It is expected that client traffic should
be seen at the public victim servers with different destination L64 values.
The idea is to move the victim network to a different upstream link than
the one on which an attack is happening.
We form the following null hypothesis:
• An LC64 defence does not increase client bandwidth, during a spoofing-
based volumetric UDP flood attack, as compared to client bandwidth
with defenceless victim site.
In other words, there is no difference between true mean-bandwidth of client
traffic in both cases.
Scenarios
The following are the three scenarios which are used for the empirical eval-
uation of LC64 defence:
• Scenario one — Client to victim communication without an attack and
without a defence. This forms our baseline against which we compare
the following two scenarios.
• Scenario two — Client to victim communication with a spoofing-based
volumetric UDP flood attack in place.
• Scenario three — Client to victim communication with a spoofing-
based volumetric UDP flood attack and a LC64 defence in place.
Testbed
The testbed consists of a DNS server machine with a collocated LC64 MOD-
CMS, an LC64 CMS server machine, an enterprise server machine, a client
machine, and an attacker machine. The testbed also consists of two vLANs,
i.e., one data vLAN and one control vLAN. In the data vLAN we run the
actual experiment while in the control vLAN we control the execution of the
experiment and collect results.
The DNS server, client, attacker, LC64 CMS, and victim server have
their own networks through respective routers shown in the Figure 4.5. Here,
the operational assumption is that client and attacker are part of an external
network that can access the enterprise network through its uplink (edge)
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routers. The defence will work as long as there is a secret link between DNS
and CMS (even if the DNS is in a different network). This setup can be
generalized as long as all the client and attack traffic is coming from outside
the enterprise network.
Figure 4.5: The testbed for an LC64 defence
Each router is directly connected to an Extreme R© Switch x45a-48t with
an isolated port, using 1 Gbps full-duplex Ethernet links. Each machine,
apart from the switch in the testbed, is a Gateway R© GR380 F1 machine
with a 64-bit Intel R© Xeon R© 8-core CPU (2.27 GHz base frequency)3.
One of the interfaces in each router is part of the control vLAN. A
different interface is used for the data vLAN. The victim is connected to
two routers. These two routers act as upstream link providers with different
network prefixes. The LC64 CMS controls routers R1 and R2. Each router
is a Ubuntu 16.04 Linux box with packet forwarding turned on. The DNS
server, and the LC64 CMS also run on an Ubuntu 16.04 Linux box. The
victim and the client machines run an ILNP kernel.
We did not use any packet loss conditions because our defence depends
on ILNP-specific Locator Update messages whose performance in the face
of extreme network conditions has been extensively tested in [Phoomikiat-
tisak, 2016]. This referenced research shows that Locator Updates have less
overhead and packet loss than MIPv6 based solution.
3https://ark.intel.com/products/40200/Intel-Xeon-Processor-E5520-8M-Cache-2 26-
GHz-5 86-GTs-Intel-QPI
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Experiment Configurations
Knotdns v2.4.1 acts as a forwarding DNS server with LC64 MODCMS bun-
dled in as a module. The functionality of Knotdns to receive DNS requests
and respond with DNS replies is not modified. MODCMS is only used as an
interceptor of DNS requests. The victim and client machines run ILNPv6
kernel v4.9.38.
The routers R1 and R2 run an unmodified stable version 2.17 of radvd4.
The maximum time allowed between sending router advertisements from
radvd is set to 0.75 seconds in the radvd configuration. It should be noted
that it is the maximum time, so, it is expected that as soon as the router
sees change in its configuration it should send out an advertisement. ILNPv6
kernel sets the L64 namespace lifetime in the ILCC (see §2.1.2.1) cache to
be equal to the prefix lifetime advertised in the router advertisement. So,
as soon as one router stops sending Routing Advertisements (RAs), that
particular L64 namespace expires in the ILNPv6 kernel.
The victim runs iperf35 in server mode and the client runs iperf3 in
client mode. The LC64 CMS machine runs a LC64-specific CMS daemon
for capability management. The attacker machine uses iperf3 to generate
a maximum possible bandwidth (∼1 Gbps) of a continuous stream of UDP
packets as a form of an attack.
The data is collected on the victim machine using the tcpstat6 tool. The
tcpstat tool gives throughput measurements in bytes per second of client
traffic (which we require) among other statistics.
Performance Metric For Evaluation
We performed the following measurement to assess the effectiveness of the
LC64 defence. These measurements are independently taken for the three
scenarios mentioned in §4.2.3.
• Bytes per second: When there is no attack, we will see a particular data
rate in bytes per second of client traffic at the victim side. During an
attack, if this data-rate is reduced then, it means that the attack has
successfully reached a victim network through its router (the attacker’s
path is separate from the client path up until the access router of the
victim). During an attack, while the LC64 defence is in place, if we
see an increase in the data-rate of the client traffic compared to what
it was when there was no solution, then we would be able to measure
the effectiveness of the LC64 defence.
4http://www.litech.org/radvd/
5https://iperf.fr
6http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/tcpstat.1.html
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Testing
We ran 25 iterations of each scenario based on the statistical power analysis
to find the sample size (the number of individual non-overlapping measure-
ments each with an independent experiment with same configuration) in
order for the results to be significant. Each iteration was of 20 minutes du-
ration. We chose the 20 minutes for two reasons. Firstly, it will allow us to
diminish the affects of TCP slow start for client traffic. Secondly, most of
the DoS attacks are under a few hours duration (Kaspersky Labs Q1 2018
report [Kaspersky Labs, ]). The 20 minutes duration per run also gives us,
on average, a controlled data-rate of a UDP flood for each run. We used a
1 Gbps bandwidth for the iperf3 client using the UDP configuration. We
also use a guard of 5 minutes in the beginning and the end of the experi-
ment. This guard ensured that the start up and tear down phases of the
experiment had no effect on the actual measurements.
Limitations And Validations
Our objective is to evaluate whether a LC64 defence can mitigate spoofing-
based volumetric UDP DoS attack or not. It can be tempting that we test
this solution under MAN and WAN emulated environments as we tested it in
the case of NC64 defence but we show that it is enough to show an increase in
the client data rate using a LAN environment only. [Phoomikiattisak, 2016]
shows empirical evaluation of network mobility through the use of Locator
Updates (LUs) under different network conditions. Instead of repeating the
same experiment along with the same traffic profile (iperf3), we can show
that a LC64 CMS is able to transition the whole site to a different path
controlled by our backend. Once a network change occurs, any traffic will
always follow the network conditions since the LC64 CMS will have no other
role than to update the router interface from a separate path where there is
no attack/client traffic. This is a significant observation which allows us to
come to a conclusion using only a LAN environment.
The limitations and validations for the engineering of LC64 CMS and
MODCMS daemons are the same as those for NC64 (please see §3.3.1).
4.2.4 Results And Statistical Analysis
The Figure 4.6 shows results of the scenarios mentioned in §4.2.3. Our
objective is to regain client traffic once the LC64 defence is active.
In each iteration, we also took the mean of a client’s throughput data
as measured at the victim. Figure 4.6 shows throughput distribution in all
iterations with a diamond symbol indicating the mean.
As the mean and median values were similar, it was beneficial to carry
out further statistical analysis using a normal distribution. The 98th per-
centile was used to generate a qqnorm plot shown in Figure 4.7. The qqnorm
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plot also gives us a plausible visual assessment of the nature of the distribu-
tion of our data. Linear trends in qqnorm show that the data of the results
is normally distributed.
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Figure 4.6: Traffic comparison under DDoS with an LC64 defence is in place. The diamond symbol shows the mean of all
the iterations.
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Figure 4.7: Quantile-quantile plots for all sub-scenarios in the L64 based
defence
To calculate a p-value and to test the null hypothesis the Welch two-
sample t-test was used, because we have to compare the true means of the
client traffic during an attack but without a solution; and client traffic during
an attack but with a solution in place. We applied the two sample t-tests on
the effects of an attack on the client while comparing the baseline with an
attack scenario. Similarly, we applied the two sample t-tests on the effects
of the L64 defence on the attack scenarios with no defence.
Table 4.1 shows a p-value of < 2.2e-16 in the LC64 Solution vs Attack
column, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis (see initial part of
§4.2.3) and accept the alternate hypothesis.
Scenario/Statistics
Baseline
vs
Attack
LC64 Solution
vs
Attack
Mean (Client traffic) ∼127.14 MB/s and ∼56.42 MB/s ∼104.22 MB/s and ∼56.42 MB/s
p-value <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Confidence
Interval
(99th Percentile) - Client Traffic
∼68.56 MB/s to ∼72.89 MB/s ∼44.40 MB/s to ∼51.20 MB/s
Table 4.1: This table shows the comparison of baseline with an attack-only
scenario. It also shows comparison of the attack-only scenario with the
LC64 defence scenario. Each measurement is the client bandwidth in
Megabytes per second (MB/s) as measured at the victim host.
Given the above results, it is proven that a LC64 defence does, signif-
icantly, increase the client bandwidth during a spoofing-based UDP flood
attack.
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Locator Updates Performance And Overhead
Figure 4.8 shows the performance of L64 Locator Updates in terms of the
average Round Trip Time (RTT) and the average number of locator updates
per run.
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Figure 4.8: Locator Updates (LUs) performance and overhead
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On the left side plot of Figure 4.8, we have the average RTT values per
run/iteration of the experiment. There was a handoff every 20 seconds, so
each iteration/run had 60 handoffs in each 20 minutes period. The expected
RTT for a locator update includes a LU packet from the victim server and
an LU-ACK packet from the client. So the output shown on the left of
Figure 4.8 was an expected result.
On the right side plot of Figure 4.8, we have the average number of
locator updates per run/iteration, which, effectively, gives us the overhead
of locator updates. The average value of one implies that it took, on aver-
age, one LU message for the 60 handoffs in each 20 minutes period of each
run. This average is expected and ideal (less LU retransmissions imply less
overhead).
The blue horizontal lines, on the figure shows the mean values for all the
25 iterations.
4.3 Quantifying Attacker’s Effort Displacement
As a LC64 defence uses DNS fast fluxing (see §1.6) to become a moving
target for an attacker, it is important to measure reduction in the attack
traffic when the solution is applied. The reduction in the attack traffic data
rate is inversely proportional to an attacker’s effort, i.e., an attacker has to
generate more traffic on other downstream links, at the victim, to achieve
a successful DoS attack. We term this as the attacker’s effort displacement
after starting the LC64 defence in the face of an attack.
To quantify the attacker’s effort displacement, we designed another ex-
periment with SYN-based volumetric DoS. We could have equally used UDP
flood as well but for the sake of completeness, and to show that the solution
works for high data-rate SYN flood attacks as well, we chose the SYN flood
attack.
In this section our objectives are:
• Measure the change in attack traffic data-rate after the LC64 defence
is enabled.
• Compare the change in attack traffic distribution before and after the
LC64 defence is initiated/used.
• Analytically determine the effects of the LC64 defence’s scalability on
the attacker’s effort in terms of the requirements to increase the data-
rate to launch an effective DoS attack by the attacker.
4.3.1 Design Of The Experiment
The attacker’s effort displacement is quantified in terms of the reduction
of volumetric SYN flood traffic data-rate as seen at the victim network.
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If the SYN flood traffic is reduced at the victim side, then the attacker’s
current attack traffic profile would be ineffective so as to force the attacker
to increase the SYN flood traffic and attack on all the available locators
(on all disparate topologically significant paths traversing through multiple
regions of the Internet) to reach the same level of attack success when there
was no defence.
The goal of the attacker is to cripple the availability of the victim’s
services to the client. We have covered this aspect in §4.2, i.e., using the
LC64 defence to enhance availability of victim services to the client. Using
the LC64 defence, we ensure that not only clients receive services from the
victim but the attacker should be discouraged as well, in terms of the extra
requirements, to increase the data-rate of DoS attack traffic. It is the second
part which is the concern of this section’s experiment.
The following two sub-experiments were done, each with 25 iterations
(based on the statistical power analysis that gives us the number of iterations
to run in order for the results to be significant).
• SYN flood traffic measurements without an active LC64 defence.
• SYN flood traffic measurements with an active LC64 defence.
The bandwidth for the duration of each iteration will be calculated which
will give us 25 bandwidth measurements for each sub-experiment. Then,
we statistically analyse and discuss the traffic distribution of each sub-
experiment. We also, analytically, discuss the effects of LC64 scalability
on the attacker’s effort.
In our setup, the LC64 CMS used two L64 namespaces for DNS fast flux.
Each L64 namespace is connected to two topologically separate upstream
links. One L64 namespace, or ephemeral LC64 value, was active at one
particular time; and the LC64 CMS changed to active locator after every 20
seconds using ILNP’s host-based Locator Update (LU) path announcements.
4.3.2 Testing
The attacker generated volumetric SYN flood using the thcsyn6 7 daemon,
which generated ∼0.4 million Packets Per Second (PPS). To test whether
this affected the client traffic or not, we tested its affects on an iperf3 flow
from the client side. There was around 25 % reduction in client traffic.
We then moved on to carry this experiment using ∼0.4 million SYN PPS.
Since we used a full-duplex 1 Gbps Ethernet link, the victim’s access link
was saturated with ∼0.8 million PPS (∼0.4 million SYN + ∼0.4 million
SYN-ACK (with extra overhead of retransmissions) packets).
We again emphasise that we did not use client traffic in this experiment
because we wanted to see the traffic distribution of a DoS attack which was
7https://salsa.debian.org/pkg-security-team/thc-ipv6
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100% effective. The ILNP packet along with TCP segment size was 80 Bytes
in both directions, effectively giving us ∼64 MB/s.
The Ethernet channel capacity of our testbed was ∼125 MB/s in each
direction. We did not employ another attacker machine to reach this ca-
pacity because we wanted to achieve attack traffic stability (the same data
rate per iteration) in order to measure the effects of the LC64 defence on
the attack traffic distribution. The scenario where Ethernet capacity was
reached has already been tested when we measured the increase in client
traffic during the LC64 defence in our previous experiment in this chapter.
On the same note, Figure 4.8 showed the execution of ILNP’s control traffic
to counter DoS in the case where the channel capacity was exhausted.
tcpstat8 was used at the victim side to count SYN flood PPS before and
after enabling the LC64 defence.
Figure 4.9 shows the testbed for this experiment.
Figure 4.9: Testbed for LC64 defence to measure attacker’s effort while
doing fast flux on both the redundant link and the link under attack.
Each router is directly connected to an Extreme R© Switch x45a-48t with
an isolated port, using 1 Gbps full-duplex Ethernet links. Each machine,
apart from the switch in the testbed is a Gateway R© GR380 F1 machine with
64-bit Intel R© Xeon R© 8-core CPU (2.27 GHz base frequency)9.
8https://www.frenchfries.net/paul/tcpstat/
9https://ark.intel.com/products/40200/Intel-Xeon-Processor-E5520-8M-Cache-2 26-
GHz-5 86-GTs-Intel-QPI
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Figure 4.10 shows the sequence diagram of the host/network interac-
tions during fast fluxing among two locators including the path which is
under attack. We included the path under attack in the fast flux to show
attack traffic behaviour between locator transitions (we do not recommend
inclusion of the attacked path in the DNS fast flux procedure in real world
deployments).
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Figure 4.10: Sequence diagram for quantifying attacker’s effort. It shows
host/network interactions while the LC64 defence is in place. The LC64
CMS fast fluxes between the link under attack (Router 1) and the
redundant link (Router 2). RA is the Router Advertisement.
tx : x ∈ [0,∞] is the time instance.
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These interactions are:
• t0 to t2: In this duration, an attack reaches the victim network because
the upstream link on router 1 is still active. At t1, L64 CMS enables
the interface on router 2 which allows router 2 to send an RA to the
victim host. Between t1 and t2, the client and victim hosts would shift
their communications to a redundant link using the LU mechanism
(not shown since we are not using a client in this experiment). At t2,
the LC64 CMS disables the link on router 1 so the attack traffic stops
reaching the victim network.
• t2 to t3: After disabling the link on router 1, the LC64 CMS waits
for the duration of the respective active ephemeral LC64 capability.
It waits until t3. During this period, there is no attack traffic seen on
the victim host.
• t3 to t5: At t3, LC64 CMS transitions the network to the old link and
we start noticing the attack traffic at the victim host until t5 at which
point the LC64 CMS disables the link on router 1. Between t4 and t5,
the victim host can shift all the legitimate communications (if any) to
an active path.
• t5 onwards: We do not see any attack traffic at the victim side for the
duration of the active ephemeral LC64 capability. After the waiting
time (time duration of an active LC64 value), the LC64 CMS shifts
to the other link. This switching takes place until the enterprise man-
agement decides to deactivate the defence.
4.3.3 Results
Figure 4.11 shows results for each scenario in this experiment.
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Figure 4.11: Boxplot showing displacement in attacker effort
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SYN flood had a mean of ∼0.46 million SYN flood packets per second
before enabling the LC64 defence, and ∼0.27 million packets per second after
enabling the LC64 defence. This is ∼40 % reduction in SYN flood data rate.
Some of the attack traffic reached the victim during the soft-handoff period
(we set it to arbitrary 2 seconds to allow client connections to shift the
network), so instead of seeing a 50 % reduction we saw ∼40 % reduction.
Given this observation, an attacker has to attack on the redundant link, as
well, to achieve a successful attack on the whole site. This percentage can
be reduced to zero if the LC64 CMS does not come back to or re-activate
the link on which the attack is happening.
Equation (4.1) shows the change in attack data rate where Rb is the
attack data-rate after enabling the defence, and Ra is the attack data-rate
before enabling defence. β is a scaling factor greater than zero. In our
testbed, with two ephemeral LC64 values, β tends to be ∼ 0.40. If the LC64
CMS shifts traffic to the redundant links and disables the attacked link for
the duration of the attack, then β would be zero as the services would have
been shifted to the redundant links and they will never come back to the
attacked link unless the attack has disappeared.
Rb ' βRa : β ≥ 0 (4.1)
4.4 Measuring SYN Flood Packets During L64 Tran-
sitions
A L64 namespace transition allows a change in the topological path, and
it occurs when LC64 CMS sends interface/route configuration updates to
upstream routers.
It is important to measure the volumetric attack traffic during a transi-
tion of an enterprise network to the redundant link, because it will give us
information on how much attack traffic leakage occurs during this transition.
4.4.1 Design Of The Experiment
Figure 4.12 shows the topological diagram with a SYN attack coming from
access router 1. This attack will run on the same subnet/prefix for the
complete duration of the experiment. The duration of the experiment is
500 seconds with 20 seconds of guard at the beginning and the end. The
SYN flood attack runs for the full duration of the experiment. After 120
seconds, we activate the LC64 defence. Each L64 transition occurs after
every 20 seconds. We get a total of 17 transitions within the period from
the 120th to the 460th second. We chose 17 transitions at random because
it is already established that L64 transitions occur smoothly (see §4.2.4
and [Phoomikiattisak, 2016]).
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Figure 4.12: The logical diagram showing topological separation enabled
by two uplink routers. SYN flood traffic comes through access router 1.
The LC64 CMS controls the access routers using Interface Updates (IUs).
Figure 4.13 shows the experimental setup. Each router is directly con-
nected to an Extreme R© Switch x45a-48t with an isolated port using 1 Gbps
full-duplex Ethernet links. Each machine, apart from the switch in the
testbed, is a Gateway R© GR380 F1 machine with 64-bit Intel R© Xeon R© 8-
core CPU (2.27 GHz base frequency)10.
Figure 4.13: The testbed with topological separation
The victim machine runs the ILNP kernel version 4.9.38. The attacker,
the LC64 CMS, and the routers runs on an Ubuntu server 16.04. The LC64
10https://ark.intel.com/products/40200/Intel-Xeon-Processor-E5520-8M-Cache-2 26-
GHz-5 86-GTs-Intel-QPI
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CMS daemon is connected to the victim’s access routers (two in this case)
using SSH. Each network transition requires turning off the radvd daemon on
the inactive access link, and invalidates routes using iptables. The second
requirement during this switching is to enable radvd on an access router
whose locator is about to get active, and to enable routing using iptables on
that router. A script is used to perform the following steps in order:
1. Enable radvd and routing (using iptables) on the access router whose
locator value will be active.
2. Disable radvd and routing (using iptables) on the access router(s)
whose locator value(s) will be inactive.
We introduce a sleep of two seconds (just before disabling radvd and
routing) at the access router whose locator is about to get in-active. This
two second period can be reduced to the amount of time it takes for the
desired locator to get active (based on an enterprise’s own measurements
and needs). Normally we would want to set this time to double the RTT of
locator update, but for high packet loss environments it can be more than
two seconds. We set it to an arbitrary 2 second period to show the transition
and effects of incoming traffic while in soft handoff mode. A soft handoff
is enabled on the victim. It is not a requirement but soft handoff actually
enables us to have a large enough window for legitimate clients to receive a
Locator Update as there might be packet retransmissions while the attack
is still in place.
4.4.2 Testing
A SYN flood was generated with the same attack profile as described in
section 4.3.2. tcpstat was used at the victim side to count SYN flood traffic
in bytes per millisecond before and after enabling the solution. We chose
millisecond granularity in order to see what happens to the attack traffic
itself during a switch to another locator, i.e., while the LU mechanism is
changing the topological path.
4.4.3 Results
Figure 4.14 shows information about what happens to attack traffic as seen
at the victim. It is noted that the transition is abrupt just after a waiting
time of two seconds. The green vertical lines show transitions to the first
available locator (L64 1), and blue vertical lines show transitions to the
other available locator (L64 2). The attacker uses L64 1 for attack traffic,
and the victim is fast fluxing from one locator to another. We noticed that
the transition is smooth (sub-second), and it allows legitimate traffic to pass
through using locator updates (in our case, within two seconds).
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It takes 4-10 milliseconds to enable radvd and activate routes on the
active router. According to Figure 4.8, it takes, on average, 0.5 to 0.6
millisecond to do a successful locator update. We need to add these two
time measurements and the network delays (e.g., LAN/MAN/WAN delays)
to achieve a seamless transition. This shows that our two seconds interval
after the transition can be reduced to 1 second or less. In this experiment,
we only measured the delay of LC64 interface updates on routers and the
amount of attack traffic during a transition. An instantaneous drop in attack
traffic at the transition was expected as performing it only takes one LU and
one LU-ACK to transition the network (see §4.2.4).
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Figure 4.14: Time series showing fast flux between two locators and effects on SYN flood traffic
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4.5 Summary
This chapter covered a novel contribution to defend an enterprise network
against spoofing based volumetric DoS attacks (see §4.2). We used an ILNP
locator namespace (see §2.1.1.2) to form capabilities which allow enterprise
clients to shift their traffic from the attacked uplink to the safe uplinks. We
termed these capabilities as L64 based capabilities (LC64) (see §4.1.1.1).
ILNP’s first class feature of mobility (see §2.1.3), which is not supported
by native IPv6, is employed along with its interaction with DNS. We also
covered implementation details of the new infrastructure elements of the
backend in our defence (see §4.2.2).
Empirical evaluation of the LC64 defence protocol was presented as a
proof of concept. This chapter presented the design of the defence testbed,
baseline against which the defence protocol was tested, assumptions made,
limitations it had and their validations, its experiment configuration and
execution, and statistical analysis of its results (see §4.2.4). We noticed that
LC64 provides a viable solution to enterprise network security.
An important side-effect of the LC64 defence is that it allows an enter-
prise to restrict an attacker from vulnerability testing and probing of its
infrastructure. This aspect will be discussed in chapter 6.
We presented an empirical evaluation of the displacement in attacker
effort to launch a successful DoS attack (see §4.3). We noticed that after
enabling the LC64 defence, the attacker’s traffic was reduced to almost half
as the client traffic spent half of the time on the safe uplink. This shows
that an attacker has to attack all uplinks with more traffic than the amount
of traffic it used when there was no solution in place.
This chapter also presented an empirical evaluation of the amount of
attack traffic that leaks to the new uplink of the enterprise network when
there is a transition at the end of the capability lifetime and the start of the
lifetime of another capability (see §4.4). We noticed that the shift is almost
instantaneous and there is almost no leakage.
Chapter 5
Multi-layered Enterprise
Security And Client privacy
Through ILNP DNS
Capabilities
Chapters 3 and 4 evaluated DoS defences using the NID64 and L64 ILNP
namespaces. We termed those defences as NC64 and LC64. NC64 defence
protected the services running on an enterprise host while LC64 defence
protected an enterprise network itself. In this chapter, we will provide an
evaluation of a defence which is a combination of both approaches. We term
this defence as LNC64 (L64 and NID64 Capabilities).
Normally, enterprises use more than one defence mechanisms to thwart
DoS attacks. They might hire cloud scrubbing providers (see§2.3.7.2) or de-
ploy security appliances at their edge network for traffic filtration (see§2.3.7.3).
Multi vector attacks demand multi-layered security. We found that by com-
bining our previous defences we can simultaneously provide security to an
enterprise host and its site.
This chapter presents the following parts:
• Establishing a rationale for ILNP based LNC64 defence which can
simultaneously protect an enterprise from low rate TCP SYN floods
and volumetric UDP flood attacks. We should emphasise that the
detection of each mechanism is neither a part of the rationale not
evaluation.
• Empirically evaluating the LNC64 defence with more than two re-
dundant access links. As we have already evaluated NC64 and LC64
individually, we will only cover LNC64’s feasibility during an attack
along with its side affects. Our baseline will be defenceless client traffic
with no attack in place.
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• Presenting a novel concept of a prefix and subnet fast flux matrix
which provides distinct sets of topologically separate and transient
network paths for different enterprise hosts outside and/or within the
same enterprise network.
• Evaluating possibility of client-privacy which is a side effect of applying
ILNP-based defence along with the concept of a prefix and subnet fast
flux matrix
5.1 Rationale
In Chapter 3, we compared the performance of NC64 and SYN cookies (see
§3.3). We noted that NC64 performed similar to SYN cookies in MAN and
WAN environments (see §§3.3.2.2 and 3.3.2.3). While NC64 is an effective
solution for SYN flood defence, it is not effective for volumetric DoS attacks
when the attacker is able to manipulate a victim’s firewall.
LC64 protection against volumetric DoS attacks enabled the victim in
our testbed to move from one topological location to another without dis-
rupting the client session. We noted that LC64 defence allowed a client to
improve its bandwidth (see §4.2.4). If an attacker can dynamically redirect
its traffic to the victim’s new network access links, then it can achieve DoS
using a low-rate SYN flood as well. Otherwise, if it is using UDP flooding,
then it has an option to increase its attack traffic on all the network access
links (see §4.3).
If an enterprise wants to protect both its hosts and its network from
both TCP SYN flood and UDP flood, then it requires a different approach.
This chapter provides that approach.
L64 And NID64 Based Capabilities (LNC64)
A LNC64 defence provides ephemeral LNC64 values that contain a per-
client NID64 value and a continuously changing L64 value for all clients
within their respective sessions. If we have two clients and eight upstream
links then, by using the NC64 mechanism (see §3.2.6), we can give NC64 1
to client one and NC64 2 to client two while making the victim transition
from one LC64 value to another using the LC64 mechanism (see §4.2.1).
Figure 5.1 shows an ephemeral 128-bit LNC64 value formed using LC64
and NC64 values.
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Figure 5.1: A 128-bit LNC64 value formed using a 64-bit LC64 value and a
64-bit NC64 value
Prefix Hopping Matrix With Overlapping Sequences
An L64 namespace and an IPv6 prefix have the same syntax and both of
them can be used for routing using the longest-prefix matching [Trotter,
2001]. Given an LC64 defence can rotate among unique L64 namespaces, it
is possible that we assign a single unique sequence of upstream links with
separate paths to a single server within an enterprise. If we have eight
upstream links then we can assign 40,320 permutations of eight L64 values
to at most 40,320 servers within an enterprise. In such a case, the CMS
would have to be modified to provide a different L64 value for a unique
server through a DNS reply at one specific time and comply with a particular
sequence allocated for that server. For example, at time t1, server one might
have an L64 1 as its active locator while server two might have an L64 2 as
an active locator. This effectively will give a specific sequence of L64 values
to each enterprise server.
We can form a matrix of sequences where each cell contains a unique
permutation of x number of L64 values. If an enterprise utilizes such a ma-
trix, then we can make it difficult for an attacker to launch a successful DoS
attack by limiting its efforts in network probing and vulnerability testing.
Table 5.1 shows two servers with different L64 values being active at eight
different times, i.e., utilizing two elements (sequences) from the matrix.
Time t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8
Server One L64 2 L64 1 L64 8 L64 4 L64 7 L64 5 L64 3 L64 6
Server Two L64 8 L64 6 L64 1 L64 3 L64 4 L64 2 L64 7 L64 5
Table 5.1: Two servers are being allocated with two different sequences of
L64 values. CMS allows them to hop from one locator to another. Each
server might be using a different L64 value at one particular time.
Subnet Hopping Matrix
As L64 namespace and an IPv6 prefix have the same syntax and both of
them can be used for routing using a longest-prefix matching [Trotter, 2001],
an enterprise can use an ILNP subnetting mechanism [Atkinson & Bhatti,
2012b] to create different subnets among which individual victim hosts can
perform DNS fast flux (see §1.6). It should be noted that, if an enterprise
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has only one upstream link common to all subnets, then this approach does
not protect an enterprise against volumetric DoS attacks. If the enterprise is
using multiple topologically significant upstream links with disparate paths,
then doing DNS fast flux on the complete range of L64 values will protect
an enterprise from volumetric DoS attacks as well (see chapter 4). In any
case, an enterprise can provide client privacy using this approach, which is
a side effect of ILNP-based DNS fast flux mechanism (see §5.3).
Figure 5.2 (taken from RFC 6741) shows a locator subnet selector (L ss)
part which can be used to create multiple subnets within an enterprise.
Figure 5.2: An ILNPv6 Subnet Identification in Comparison to an IPv6
Subnet Identification - Source: RFC 6741 [Atkinson & Bhatti, 2012b]
If an enterprise has been allocated a global locator prefix part (L pp) or
IPv6 prefix of /58, e.g.,
2001:0db8:3c4d:0015:00ba:cf00::/58
then an enterprise would have an option to use the remaining 6 bits (L ss)
to create 26 = 64 locally-managed subnets. So, we make an 8 x 8 (“8 by 8”)
matrix where we assign 8 different subnets to 8 different victim hosts within
an enterprise. Figure 5.3 shows this matrix with an assignment of 16 locally-
managed subnets to two hosts (eight subnets each). These subnets can be
selected randomly or traffic engineering requirements of an enterprise.
Figure 5.3: A matrix showing 64 different hex values formed using 6-bits of
L ss. Each hex value represents a subnet. Victim one uses subnets coloured
as gold, and victim two uses the subnets shown in a dark grey colour.
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To provide a defence against volumetric DoS attacks, it is a requirement
for an enterprise to use one or more spare upstream links where the LC64
defence can shift all existing legitimate communications. If an enterprise
wants to employ only one upstream link, then it has the option to provide
client privacy through subnet hopping based on its business goals. In the
prior case, it has both options (i.e., DoS defence and the possibility of client
privacy).
Combining Prefix And Subnet Hopping Matrices
A prefix-hopping matrix allows an enterprise to have different but overlap-
ping sequences from a matrix of at most P (x, x) permutations, where x
is the number of upstream links. Similarly, if there are y subnet bits in
each upstream-provided L64 namespace/prefix (L pp), then an enterprise
can have 2y subnets. If we combine all these, then an enterprise can assign
a unique subnet to a server while performing rotations on upstream links
based on a particular sequence from the prefix-hopping matrix.
The methodology presented here with prefix and subnet-hopping matri-
ces can be used to introduce certain traffic engineering capabilities. Two of
the possibilities are the DoS mitigation and the possibility of client privacy
(see §5.3). It can be investigated further in future.
The following sections provide empirical evaluations of an LNC64 defence
to enable enterprise security against DoS attacks. We will also provide
an emulation to demonstrate that network layer client privacy is possible
through the security mechanism provided in the LC64 and LNC64 defences.
5.2 Empirical Evaluation Of LNC64 DoS Defence
Figure 5.4 provides a logical diagram of an enterprise network with the
required components for a LNC64 defence.
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Figure 5.4: A logical diagram of an enterprise with eight upstream links to
the Internet using eight routers, LNC64 CMS, CMSVD, MODCMS, DNS,
public victim servers, client network, and victim network.
An enterprise is connected to the Internet through eight upstream links
using eight routers but each link must be topologically significant and must
offer a path that is not part of the path being attacked by DoS. We note
that in real networks, enterprises have multiple links to the Internet so we
utilize this feature. The following components are used within the network
to enable a LNC64 defence.
DNS:
DNS is responsible for forwarding DNS name resolution requests from clients
to MODCMS (described below). In our evaluation, we used KnotDNS1 as
the DNS server software.
MODCMS:
MODCMS is a LNC64 DNS module which communicates with DNS and
the LNC64 CMS (described below). It takes a forwarded query from DNS,
extracts client information, e.g., source address, creates and sends a LNC64
capability request message to LNC64 CMS, receives LNC64 capability re-
sponses from the LNC64 CMS, and forwards a DNS response to the DNS
which, in turn, sends a DNS name resolution response to the client.
A comprehensive description along with finite state machine of MOD-
CMS can be found in §§3.2.1.2 and 3.2.5.2.
1https://www.knot-dns.cz
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LNC64 CMS And LNC64 Defence Modes:
The LNC64 CMS combines functionalities provided by the NC64 CMS and
the LC64 CMS. The LNC64 CMS communicates with the MODCMS, victim
host, and upstream routers, and it simultaneously operates in the following
two modes:
• NC64 mode: Upon reception of a LNC64 capability request from
MODCMS, it creates an ephemeral NID64 value, puts it inside a NC64
MAP (see §3.2.3 and appendix A for MAP description), and sends
this mapping to the victim host where the victim host can configure
its firewall. The victim sends a map acknowledgement message to the
LNC64 CMS which in turn sends a capability response to MODCMS
containing the ephemeral NID64 value.
• LC64 mode: Once the LNC64 CMS receives a map acknowledgement
from the victim host, it enables the LC64 mode. In the LC64 mode, it
communicates with the upstream routers by enabling/disabling routes
based on a schedule mandated by the enterprise management. In this
mode, it follows all the dynamics of a LC64 defence (see chapter 4).
We combine the FSMs of the NC64 and LC64 defences without changing
any previously defined custom messages among different parts of the sys-
tem. The interaction between these two modes is enabled whenever a MAP
acknowledgement is received from the victim. Upon this message a shift to
the LC64 defence occurs.
Figure 5.5 shows a simplified finite state machine of LNC64 CMS with
function names and respective input/output signalling flows.
Figure 5.5: The finite state machine of an LNC64 CMS.
Where,
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• LISTEN FOR MODCMS is a state where the CMS is listening for
LNC64 capability requests from MODCMS.
• MAP CREATION is a state where the CMS creates a new NC64
capability, and maps it to the client information.
• SENDING MAP TO VICTIM is a state which is executed after a new
NC64 capability is created. In this state, it sends the new MAP to the
CMSVD at the victim host.
• If LNC64 CMS receives an ERROR condition from CMSVD, it goes to
the SEND NXDOMAIN state where it sends the NXDOMAIN message
to MODCMS which in turn delegates the NXDOMAIN response to
DNS. Then, the DNS can send a NXDOMAIN DNS response back
to the client. Once the NXDOMAIN message has been sent to the
MODCMS, the LNC64 CMS goes to the DELETING MAP state.
• In the DELETING MAP state, the CMS deletes its local MAP. Once
it has deleted the local MAP, it then goes to the LISTEN FOR MOD-
CMS state again.
• If LNC64 CMS receives a MAP acknowledgement from CMSVD, it
goes into the LC64-VALUE SELECTION/CREATION state where it
selects/creates an active LC64 value.
• In the LC64-VALUE SELECTION/CREATION state, the CMS pro-
duces two messages. If it selects an active LNC64 capability, then that
value is sent to the client through the SENDING LNC64 RESPONSE
state. If it creates a new LC64 capability, then it will go into the CON-
FIGURING ROUTERS state where it enables the active path on one
router and disables the previously active path on the second router.
• Once the routers are configured, it goes into WAITING/DWELLING
state where it starts a timer for deactivation of the current active LC64
capability.
• Once the previous timer expires, it goes again into the LC64-VALUE
SELECTION/CREATION state.
and,
• LNC64 REQUEST is a transition when the LNC64 capability request
comes from MODCMS.
• MAP CREATED is a transition when the LNC64 CMS successfully
creates an NC64 MAP.
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• ACK RECEIVED is a transition where the LNC64 CMS receives an
acknowledgement from CMSVD that a NC64 MAP has been success-
fully installed in the firewall of the victim host.
• ERROR is a transition where the LNC64 CMS receives an error mes-
sage from the CMSVD that there was a problem in the firewall rule
installation.
• NXDOMAIN SENT is a transition where the LNC64 CMS successfully
sends an NXDOMAIN message to the MODCMS.
• LNC64 RESPONSE is a transition where a LNC64 capability response
message has been successfully sent to MODCMS.
• NEW LC64 is a transition where it selects a newly active LC64 capa-
bility.
• PATH ACTIVE is a transition where all the routers have been recon-
figured.
• LC64 EXPIRED is a transition where the timer associated with an
active LC64 capability ends.
CMSVD
CMSVD is a victim host daemon which communicates with the LNC64
CMS. It is responsible for receiving NC64 MAP requests, installing firewall
rules based on these requests, and sending acknowledgement/error messages
to the LNC64 CMS. It is the same software that was used in the NC64
defence (see chapter 3). A comprehensive description along with a finite
state machine of CMSVD can be found in §§3.2.1.3 and 3.2.5.3.
5.2.1 Experiment Design
We use a single access router whose nine interfaces are connected to nine
interfaces on the switch. It is also connected to a victim host using a single
link. Eight interfaces are used by the defence, and the ninth is used for a
client traffic only scenario (see §5.2.1). It is assumed that this ninth interface
will be attacked and the LNC64 defence will perform fast fluxing among the
other eight interfaces. Each interface emulates an upstream link to the
Internet, and is configured with a unique L64 value. Each link is an isolated
link and does not affect any of the traffic on other links.
The LNC64 CMS is directly connected to the DNS/MODCMS, the ac-
cess router, and the victim host. The LNC64 CMS connection to the router
is on a different interface not accessible through the victim host.
The victim host and client machines are ILNP-enabled as it is a require-
ment for them to be ILNP-capable because of ILNP namespaces being in
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use (see §5.2). All other machines are running an IPv6 kernel because there
is no requirement for them to be upgraded.
Ethernet links among the machines support 1 Gbps full duplex mode.
We used netem2 to emulate various delay environments with varying packet
loss conditions. We emulated three environments with delay of 0 ms, 25
ms and 210 ms. We used 2.5% and 5% packet loss in each direction. For
example, the link between the client and router will be enabled with 5%
or 10% end-to-end packet loss based on an individual network environment
and scenario. We chose such delay and packet loss conditions because they
are expected to occur while a volumetric DoS attack is in progress and this
attack might fluctuate the client traffic between similar delays and packet
losses.
Performance Metric For Measurements
We will use bandwidth measurements on each locator to see if traffic is
distributed among multiple locators. A client is given a specific capability,
and then the solution uses eight locators to fast flux among them. A traffic
monitor is used at the victim host to measure the bandwidth used within
each locator.
Scenarios
The following are the two scenarios which are used for the empirical evalu-
ation of the LNC64 defence:
• Scenario one — Client to victim communication without LNC64 de-
fence. This forms our baseline against which we compare with the
following scenario.
• Scenario two — Client to victim communication with a spoofing-based
volumetric UDP flood attack and a LNC64 mechanism in place.
Note that we did not form the third scenario of an attack while the client
to server communication is happening with no solution in place, because it is
already established that the client does see service disruptions/degradations
while a volumetric attack is in place (see §§3.3.2 and 4.2.4).
Scenario two uses UDP flooding, whereas we could have equally employed
TCP SYN flooding. We assume that a SYN flood will be mitigated due to
inclusion of the NC64 mode within an LNC64 defence. If we had only used
low or high data-rate SYN flooding, then a similar assumption could have
been made for UDP flooding. We checked the victim host firewall rules
during the execution of the experiment to ensure that the NC64 defence will
honour per-client capabilities.
2https://wiki.linuxfoundation.org/networking/netem
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Experiment Configuration
The DNS server is installed with KnotDNS v2.4.1, and the MODCMS is
collocated within the DNS server as a KnotDNS module. The client and
the victim hosts run with an ILNP kernel v4.9.38 with Ubuntu Server 16.04
distribution. The LNC64 CMS, the DNS server, and the attacker machines
use an unmodified Linux kernel with an Ubuntu 16.04 distribution. Each
router is a Ubuntu 16.04 server with packet forwarding enabled, radvd v2.17
installed, and a custom script (written in bash3 v4.3.48) which takes com-
mands from the LNC64 CMS through a SSH-enabled link to update radvd
configurations and upstream paths. The maximum time allowed between
sending router advertisements from radvd is set to 0.75 seconds as is done
by the LC64 defence. Any value less than one second is acceptable because
ILCC (see §2.1.2.1) cache entries update active locator bindings after one
second.
The CMSVD daemon is installed on the victim machine. The victim
machine is using a nftables4 v0.8.3 kernel module as a firewall. The CMSVD
installs NC64 MAPs in the nftables during the LNC64 defence execution.
The attacker machine runs iperf3 v3.1.3 with a bandwidth command line
option set to 1024 Mbps so it can congest the Ethernet link to the victim.
The client machine runs iperf3 v3.1.3 in client mode with a bandwidth com-
mand line option set to 1024 Mbps as well. The victim machine runs the
same iperf3 software in server mode. Each Ethernet link supports 1 Gbps
full-duplex mode.
Data is collected using tcpdump5 on the victim machine. The tcpdump
tool will provide us with the bandwidth measurements required for perfor-
mance evaluation.
Testing
Figure 5.6 shows the testbed used to evaluate LNC64 defence.
3https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html node/index.html
4https://netfilter.org/projects/nftables/
5https://www.tcpdump.org
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Figure 5.6: The testbed for evaluating the LNC64 defence. Nine interfaces
of router five are connected to nine ports of the switch, providing unique
and isolated upstream links. Each interface is configured with a unique
L64 value. Router 5 acts as an upstream access router for the victim. The
attacker attacks on the interface where the client communication takes
place, before enabling the defence. Once the LNC64 defence is enabled, the
rest of the eight locators are used by the defence.
The rest of the routers are also directly connected to an Extreme R© Switch
x45a-48t with isolated ports, using 1 Gbps Ethernet links. Each machine,
apart from the switch in the testbed, is a Gateway R© GR380 F1 machine
with 64-bit Intel R© Xeon R© 8-core CPU (2.27 GHz base frequency)6.
We ran 25 iterations of each scenario based on statistical power analysis.
Each iteration in each scenario was run for 160 seconds with 20 seconds of
guard interval at both ends. The 20 seconds of guard interval ensures that
the measured traffic will be stable and there will be no effects of TCP slow
start on the final results. We ran each iteration of LNC64 for 160 seconds
because with this duration we would be able to see a transition among every
locator at-least once (the transition occurs after every 10 seconds).
It should be noted that scenario one and two were run with 20 minutes
per iteration under the LC64 defence (see chapter 5). This does not affect
our scenarios in this section, because in a LNC64 defence, we are concerned
about the ability of a single host to shift communications among a set of
distinct locators from the fast flux matrix.
6https://ark.intel.com/products/40200/Intel-Xeon-Processor-E5520-8M-Cache-2 26-
GHz-5 86-GTs-Intel-QPI
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We also assume that after activating the LNC64 defence, the access
router (i.e., R5) does not use the attacked link. In each iteration, a differ-
ent NC64 capability was returned by the LNC64 CMS, although there is
no requirement for it because the CMSVD ensures that the NC64 map is
successfully installed and active in the victim host, for a single client, for
the complete duration of the experiment.
5.2.2 Results
Figures 5.7 to 5.9 show the results for this section’s evaluation.
The total traffic from scenario one is divided among a set of eight locators
in scenario two.
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Figure 5.7: The results comparing the two scenarios with no packet delay. One session is run under the LNC64
defence (top row), and the second session is run without the LNC64 mechanism. It also shows the 5% and 10%
emulated packet loss environments.
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Figure 5.8: The results comparing the two scenarios with 25 ms end-to-end delay. One session is run under the
LNC64 defence (top row), and the second session is run without the LNC64 mechanism. It also shows the 5%
and 10% emulated packet loss environments.
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Figure 5.9: The results comparing the two scenarios with 210 ms end-to-end packet delays. One session is run
under the LNC64 defence (top row), and the second session is run without the LNC64 defence. It also shows the
5% and 10% emulated packet loss environments.
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Table 5.2 shows iperf3 communication for each scenario. Locator one
through locator eight are used in scenario two while locator nine is used in
scenario one. It can be seen that traffic coming on L9 is divided amongst
all the locators in scenario two. The aggregate traffic in scenario two is
missing some packets as we did not replay the same traffic in two scenarios
but we ran iperf3 with the same configuration in both scenarios. It is not
the missing packets we want to measure but we are concerned about iperf3
communication divided among a set of locators in different environments
with the same/common software configurations.
Environment/Locators L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9
No delay - no loss 937 982 927 978 968 942 939 938 8672
No delay - 5% loss 56 62 61 59 61 61 56 65 487
No delay - 10% loss 16 16 16 17 15 17 18 17 125
25 ms delay - no loss 811 810 805 797 805 804 816 804 5696
25 ms delay - 5% loss 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 58
25 ms delay - 10% loss 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 36
210 ms delay - no loss 87 90 89 88 91 86 85 89 735
210 ms delay - 5% loss 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
210 ms delay - 10% loss 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 5
Table 5.2: The traffic comparison for the two scenarios with an average
bandwidth of 25 runs in Mbps, where locator nine (shown in yellow) is
only used for the client communications in scenario one, whereas the client
will shift to other links in scenario two. We have rounded up the numbers
to at most 4 significant digits.
In summary, the LNC64 defence enables an enterprise to effectively dis-
tribute the traffic among a set of upstream links without losing the end-to-
end connectivity.
5.3 Client Privacy Side Effect Through LNC64/LC64
Mechanism
When a LNC64 defence is in use, an individual client session will see multiple
ephemeral locators. Otherwise, a single fixed locator value will be seen for
the session (if there is no other defence similar to LNC64 is active). If
it becomes difficult for an eavesdropper to distinguish a particular session
among multiple client sessions, some level of client privacy can be achieved
as a side effect of the LNC64 DoS defence. This side-effect is possible if
ILNP’s control messages for mobility (see §2.1.3) are encrypted.
To show this side-effect, we made use of the ILNP subnet hopping matrix
(see §5.1) with a Python-based emulation. We will again emphasise that,
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if an enterprise is only using a subnet hopping matrix, then it will not be
protected from DoS but it can provide some level of client privacy to its
clients. We can also use prefix hopping matrix, which also protects against
DoS attacks, but for emulation purposes any one of these can be used.
5.3.1 An Alternative To MPTCP ADD ADDR Based Mech-
anism
Client privacy can also be achieved through the path management capa-
bilities of the Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [Ford et al., 2013], e.g., using the
ADD ADDR TCP option which is used to advertise the creation of new sub-
flows. Multipath TCP is an extension of the TCP protocol that allows a flow
to be split into multiple sub-flows that can take different paths from within
the network while maintaining the end-to-end goals of a communication,
e.g., connection continuity.
It should be noted that ADD ADDR can be used by an off-path attacker
to put its own IP address in the ADD ADDR TCP option, hence achiev-
ing connection hijacking. There are other residual threats associated with
MPTCP [Bagnulo et al., 2015], some of which can be eliminated through
the use of ILNP. Future studies can be devised in order to compare MPTCP
(after fixing its threats) and ILNP with its protected LU.
As MPTCP uses TPC options for its path management capabilities, so
it does not perform well if SYN Cookies are enabled because SYN Cookies
are incompatible with TCP options (see §3.1). The MPTCP issues with
SYN Cookies are also documented in [Bagnulo et al., 2015].
An MPTCP-based CMS can be designed which can provide the alloca-
tion and distribution of IP addresses formed using values in the sequences
of prefix or subnet hopping matrix and host identifiers. Afterwards, that
mechanism can be compared to the ILNP-based mechanism where LUs are
encrypted.
The mechanism provided here through the LC64/LNC64 mechanisms
can be used as an alternative to the ADD ADDR-based MPTCP approach,
only when the LUs are encrypted. This demands a future investigation and
empirical comparison between the two.
5.3.2 Emulation Design
In §5.2, we made use of eight upstream links to the Internet, but in this
section we assume that an enterprise has been given a single /58 global prefix
(L pp). An enterprise can use the remaining six bits of the 64-bit locator to
create a locally-managed subnet hopping matrix as shown in Figure 5.3.
In this emulation, we will use the following distinct set of subnet values
for one server:
S = {38, 19, 2b, 3c, 0d, 16, 36, 3f}
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where each element in set S is a hex value of a single L ss (see Figure
5.2).
Figure 5.10: A subnet hopping matrix showing the subnet slots used by
the enterprise host in our emulation. Each subnet is shown as a hex value
of six bits (L ss).
Figure 5.11 shows an enterprise network with one /58 global prefix (L pp)
assigned to it. There is only one global topologically significant path, so,
the LNC64 or LC64 mechanisms will not be able to protect the enterprise
network from a volumetric DoS attack. We assume that there is no attack,
and that ILNP control signalling is encrypted. If an enterprise has two /58
topologically significant global prefixes then it can use two subnet hopping
matrices, so the availability of these matrices scales with the number of
distinct upstream links.
Figure 5.11: Logical diagram of the enterprise network showing
components necessary to enhance client privacy.
Assumptions
We assume that ILNP locator updates are protected so that an eavesdropper
is unable to extract the next active locator value. Otherwise, the eavesdrop-
per can reconstruct a single session by following the locator updates. It is
also assumed that the application data in a single client session is protected
by encryption.
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Emulation Configuration
We used a Python7 script for this emulation, and made the following two
scenarios:
• Scenario one: Client to server communication without a LNC64/LC64
mechanism in place.
• Scenario two: Client to server communication with a LNC64/LC64
mechanism in place.
Both scenarios were emulated with 2 hours of data represented by 7,200
data points. We used only one subnet with scenario one but used eight
subnets with scenario two. Randomness was introduced to the duration
(i.e., the lifetime of an active subnet). We introduced randomness in active
duration of a capability because it help us show the unpredictability of an
active lifespan of a future LNC64 capability. This way an attacker does
not even assess how long the next capability will be active for. It is an
value added mechanism which is not a requirement. In all of our previous
experiments with locator based defences, we used a fixed duration of either
10 seconds or 20 seconds. A maximum duration of 30 seconds is allowed for
a particular subnet to be active in our evaluation. An example subnet to
lifetime sequence is given in Table 5.3 for a part of a client session.
Locator (L64) L1 (38) L2 (19) L3 (2b) L4 (3c) L5 (0d) L6 (16) L7 (36) L8 (3f)
Active Duration (seconds) 6 25 30 12 1 6 11 19
Table 5.3: An example showing the active lifetimes of 8 locators in a chunk
of a single client session.
5.3.3 Results
Figure 5.12 shows the results after running the emulation for 7,200 seconds.
7https://www.python.org/
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Figure 5.12: The results for the emulation showing the client privacy side
effect of an LNC64/LC64 DoS defence. The scenarios one and two are
shown at the left and the right side respectively.
If an eavesdropper looks at a client session generated by scenario two,
then it would be difficult for it to trace the client session. As the session
will use the same destination NID64 value, the eavesdropper will eventually
reconstruct the session. If a session contains multiple TCP connections with
each connection using a different NID64 value, then it would become harder
for the eavesdropper to trace the session.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented a multi-layered defence which can simultaneously
protect an enterprise host and its network from low-rate TCP SYN flooding
attacks and traffic-based volumetric DoS attacks (see §5.2). It combines the
NC64 and the LC64 approaches, and provides a per-client NC64 capability
that has multiple LC64 capabilities within its ILNP session (see §5.1). We
termed these capabilities as L64 and NID64-based capabilities (LNC64).
The LNC64 defence was empirically tested and it was proved that it is
possible to provide multi-layered enterprise security using both namespaces
of the ILNP protocol (see §§5.2.1 and 5.2.2).
We also noticed a side-effect of this defence where there is a possibility
of enhancing the privacy of a client session using the LNC64 defence (see
§5.3). The basic requirement of such a privacy enhancement is to encrypt or
secure ILNP control messages for mobility (see §5.3.2). To test the evidence
of such a possibility, we emulated our defence for a single client session. The
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emulation showed an ILNP client session distributed over multiple desti-
nation namespaces after enabling the LNC64 defence (see §5.3.3). Further
rigorous analytical and empirical studies are required to explore the privacy
features that can be provisioned with an ILNP protocol.
Chapter 6
Conclusion And Future
Works
6.1 Summary And Contributions
Denial of Service (DoS) is one of the most challenging security threats to
enterprises (see §2.3). It is easy to launch but hard to mitigate. This work
focused on its mitigation, specifically for those attacks which use spoofed
sources. By providing mitigations, this research also made it difficult for an
attacker to launch an attack.
This work makes use of ILNP mobility which has been extensively tested
in earlier researches [Phoomikiattisak & Bhatti, 2015], [Phoomikiattisak,
2016]. However the use of ILNP namespaces through Domain Name System
(DNS) to mitigate DoS attacks has not been tested in earlier research. This
work used ILNP mobility (see §2.1.3), its DNS resource records (see §2.2.3),
along with new defence paradigms (see §§2.4.1 and 2.4.2). DNS capabilities
and Moving Target Defence (MTD) paradigms have not been used prior to
this research with ILNP as well.
The following are the major architectural and engineering contributions
addressing our three research questions (see §1.7.2):
6.1.1 New Enterprise Security Architecture
A novel approach to security was designed to show how a MTD paradigm, a
DNS fast flux mechanism, and the concept of DNS capabilities can be used
with an ILNP mobility feature to mitigate low-rate SYN flood attacks (see
§3.1) and bandwidth-exhaustive volumetric DoS attacks (see §§4.1 and 5.1).
ILNP has not been used before with DNS to secure enterprise networks.
Similarly, the benefits provided by MTD, DNS capabilities, DNS fast flux,
and ILNP mobility were used to form a security architecture that inherits
advantages from these domains. An enterprise does not need to trust an
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external body since all novel defences, provided through this research, work
within an enterprise environment.
These defences also provide some level of flexibility in their implementa-
tion. An enterprise can use any protocol for internal control messages among
defence backend entities, or it can collocate or disperse different elements of
the defence at strategic locations to enhance performance or other relevant
metrics.
These defences are our main architectural contributions.
6.1.2 Defence Provisioning For Enterprise Hosts Through
The NC64 Defence
Chapter 3 provided a rationale for securing enterprise hosts against SYN
flood attacks through ILNP’s NID64 namespace-based DNS capabilities. It
was proven that these capabilities provide a valid proof of concept (see §3.3)
and eliminate shortcomings (see §3.1) of an alternate security mechanism,
i.e., SYN Cookies (see §2.3.6.1).
These capabilities provide per-client access control which is beneficial for
future traffic engineering for security as well. These DNS capabilities make
use of host-based firewall and provide flexibility of aggregating as much
client information as possible to grant capabilities through the backend (see
§§3.2.2 and 3.2.3).
The NC64 defence has few important architectural and engineering limi-
tations. It requires end systems to be ILNP-capable due to use of the NID64
namespace. It also requires a modification of the host firewall whenever a
new capability is generated. DNS write performance is another engineering
issue that can be solved through better engineering of CMS, MODCMS, and
CMSVD.
It should be noted that this form of defence is possible through IPv6 as
well (see §2.4.2.1). So, the NC64-based defence is an alternative approach
to host security.
6.1.3 Defence Provisioning For Enterprise Networks Through
LC64 Defence
Chapter 4 provided a rationale for securing an enterprise network as a whole
against volumetric DoS attacks through ILNP’s L64 namespace-based DNS
capabilities. It was proven that these capabilities not only provide proof
of concept (see §4.2) but they achieve security with minimal overhead (see
§4.2.4). Similarly, this form of defence is not possible through native features
of IPv6 (see §4.1).
Volumetric DoS attacks can render all enterprise services unavailable.
Even though the enterprise services within its infrastructure might be run-
ning without any issues, to the outside world it will look as if the enterprise
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is unable to serve external service requests due to its internal infrastructural
issues. Our research has provided a state-of-the-art mechanism to shift an
entire enterprise network to redundant uplinks with minimal overhead while
maintaining existing transport layer connections. We noticed that the LC64
defence increased the client bandwidth (during an attack) once the solution
was in place (see §4.2.4).
The LC64 defence has few important architectural and engineering limi-
tations (see §4.1.1). It requires the end systems to be ILNP-capable. It also
requires reconfiguration of access router interfaces whenever a new capabil-
ity is generated. As an enterprise has full control of its access routers, we
believe it can ease the deployment in future networks while improving our
defences’ engineering. DNS write performance is another engineering issue
that can be solved through better engineering of CMS, and MODCMS.
6.1.4 Multi-Level Enterprise Defence Provisioning Through
LNC64 Defence
Chapter 5 provided the rationale for simultaneously securing both enterprise
hosts and their networks from variable-rate DoS attacks. We employed L64
and NID64 ILNP namespaces through a novel engineering of CMS (see §5.2)
and its interaction with access routers and enterprise hosts. An enterprise
benefits from security against low-rate SYN flood attacks, and bandwidth-
exhaustive SYN and UDP flood attacks (see §§5.2 and 5.2.2).
The current security landscape demands multi-level security where mul-
tiple defence mechanisms are used to defend against a wide variety of DoS
attacks that can occur simultaneously. Our defences are non-intrusive to
other defences, i.e., they do not affect any other defence which can be si-
multaneously used by an enterprise.
The LNC64 defence shared the same architectural and engineering lim-
itations introduced by NC64 and LC64 defences. Also the LNC64 type of
defence is not possible through native functionalities of IPv6 (see §4.1).
6.1.5 Performance Measurements Of NC64 Defence In Di-
verse Environments
NC64 defence which is used against SYN flood attacks might behave differ-
ently in multiple delay and packet loss conditions. To test it against SYN
Cookies under different network conditions, we ran multiple sub-experiments.
We noticed that NC64 gave a valid proof of concept in a wide variety of net-
work conditions (see sections 3.3.2.1 to 3.3.2.3 and 3.3.3).
We also noticed that as the network delay increases, the performance
of CMS also increases. This was partly due to the fact that CMS performs
better while it is not being fully loaded with capability requests. This helped
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us decide that, if we optimise CMS performance, then we can increase the
performance of our defence.
The measurements and insights obtained through this empirical evalua-
tion enabled us to deliver it as our engineering contribution.
6.1.6 Performance Evaluation Of End-To-End Capability Dis-
tribution
§3.4 provided an empirical evaluation of the performance of the end-to-end
DNS request/response mechanism in the presence and absence of NC64 ca-
pabilities. We tested capability distribution performance in multiple delay
and packet loss environments. This evaluation helped us in understand-
ing the performance difference in the presence and absence of our defence
(see §3.4.3). We saw minute differences in performance but, with better
engineering of the defence backend, we can achieve similar, if not better,
performance.
This capability distribution comparison made an engineering contribu-
tion as through these measurements, we are able to assess the extra network
latency that one can expect with our defences.
6.1.7 Eliminating The Capability Sharing Problem Through
NC64 Defence
Capability sharing is the process in which a valid capability is shared with
other clients (also see §2.4.1.2 from attacker’s perspective). An attacker
can take a valid capability and can distribute it among botnet machines to
launch an attack. As the attacker-provided capability is valid, an enterprise
host will allow the attacker’s connection request.
To curb the above situation, we introduced a per-client capability using
an enterprise host firewall and MAPs (see appendix A). A MAP can contain
client naming information, current service information, e.g., port numbers,
originating client network information, etc. We recommend using as much
information about a client and an ongoing connection as possible (see §3.2.2).
Based on this MAP, the firewall can decide whether to allow a client to access
host services or not.
Since our approach is to have flexible content within the host MAPs,
we introduce a powerful mechanism to counter the capability sharing prob-
lem. It is an important architectural contribution as capability sharing is
an architectural problem in multiple non-ILNP based capability solutions.
6.1.8 Quantifying LU Overhead In LC64/LNC64 Defences
A locator overhead is defined as the number of locator update (re)transmissions
required to shift a client session from one network to another. A Locator
Update (LU) packet is a one-way packet that informs a client about new
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active LC64/LNC64 values. An LU ACK is a single one-way packet that
is sent from a client informing the server that its local ILNP bindings (see
§2.1.2.1) are updated and hence data communications can proceed.
We made an average number of locator updates required for a single LU
update to be successful in our testbed for LC64 defence (see §4.2.4). We
also measured LU performance in terms of average Round Trip Time for
such updates. We noticed an average of one locator update overhead for
60 handoffs in a 20 minute window. Similarly, for RTT measurements, we
noticed an average of ∼ 0.6 ms delay for each end-to-end LU (see Figure
4.8).
These measurements are important because we want to minimize the
time and the number of locator update retransmissions to shift clients from
the attacked path to the redundant paths. These measurements and assess-
ments contribute as engineering contributions.
6.1.9 Crisp Separation Of Backend Control Traffic And End-
To-End Data Traffic
NC64, LC64, and LNC64 defences have a similar backend (see §3.2.1,§4.2.2,
and Figure 5.4) that utilizes concepts from the MTD paradigm, DNS capa-
bilities, and DNS fast flux. Each control signal generated within the backend
does not interfere with data traffic (see §§3.2.6 and 4.2.1). We mandated
that each enterprise host and access router should have a dedicated link
with the CMS. Similarly, we mandated that the link between CMS and
MODCMS should be separate.
We used this separation in our testing and made a successful proof of
concept for each defence (see §§3.3.1, 4.2.3 and 5.2.1). This separation is
important for the security of the backend as well. This separation can be
achieved in real networks by allowing control traffic to flow only within the
internal network. This is effectively an architectural contribution.
6.1.10 Measuring Leaked Attack Traffic During Network Tran-
sitions In LC64 Defence
As LC64 defence requires mobility (see §2.1.3), it is important to measure
attack traffic during a transition from one network to another. If attack
traffic leaks to the new network then it can affect services, albeit for a short
duration.
We measured attack traffic during the transitions and noticed that tran-
sitions were abrupt (thanks to low LU overhead (see §4.2.4)), and we found
no attack traffic leakage (see §4.4.3). This measurement is effectively an
engineering contribution.
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6.1.11 Increasing Attacker’s Effort
Planning an attack is an important phase for any successful DoS attack (see
§§2.3.3 and 4.3). If a defence can increase this effort so that an attacker
is discouraged from launching a successful attack, then it can contribute to
further enterprise acceptance.
NC64 defence introduces a per-client capability concept (see §3.2). If an
unauthorized client scans a host (e.g., for open ports), where NC64 based
capabilities are active, then it will not receive any packet replies conveying
information about open ports etc. If an attacker is trying to test vulnera-
bilities in an enterprise host, then it would be difficult for it to assess vul-
nerabilities because its packets cannot reach the Transport or Application
layer of the enterprise host.
LC64 defence introduces the concept of short-term capabilities that are
fast fluxing end-to-end traffic among diverse Internet paths, i.e., the defence
uses a different uplink path for each capability (see §4.1.1). If an attacker
has launched an attack on one path then, after a short duration, it has to
launch the same attack on a different path (for which it has to prepare again
since the next path is unpredictable). Since an attacker has to follow each
path or it has to attack all the paths in order to cripple enterprise service
availability, this will increase the effort on the attacker’s side.
LNC64 defence combines NC64 and LC64 modes (for engineering details
see §5.2). It would therefore be difficult for an attacker to plan and then
launch a successful attack in a LNC64-enabled enterprise network.
The above mentioned aspects of NC64, LC64, and LNC64 contribute ar-
chitectural contributions in the context of an increased effort of an attacker.
6.1.12 Side Effect: Possibility To Enhance Client Privacy
Chapter 5 presents a defence mechanism in which a single client session
can take multiple paths within its lifetime. Each different path means that
the session has different destination namespaces. ILNP achieves this in-
session mobility through a locator update mechanism. Locator updates
convey new network information to the clients. If we can provide encryption
(or any other form of protection) to these locator update packets, then an
eavesdropper will not be able to assess whether the client is using a single
session or multiple sessions with different flows (see §5.3.2).
LC64/LNC64 mechanism-based privacy can be used as an alternative
to MPTCP ADD ADDR-based similar mechanisms (if ADD ADDR TCP
option itself is protected too) (see §5.3.1).
We provide an emulation in §5.3 to demonstrate this side effect. This
side-effect is an architectural contribution with an architectural limitation
of having encrypted ILNP-based locator updates.
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6.2 Discussion
6.2.1 Security Of ILNP-Based DNS Capability Defences
Figure 6.1 shows a logical enterprise diagram with all new architectural
components required for our defences.
Figure 6.1: Logical diagram of an enterprise network. Each new required
element for defences is shown in black.
Each presented ILNP-based defence has a backend which is composed of
a defence-specific CMS, a CMSVD, a MODCMS, and a DNS. The CMS is
part of the protected network, i.e., it is behind a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
The identity of the CMS is secret to an enterprise. The CMSVD daemon
runs on a publicly accessible enterprise host in the DMZ, and it is aware
of the location of the CMS. The DNS server is deployed in the DMZ. The
MODCMS is collocated with the DNS and knows the location of the CMS.
Each access router which participates in the defences can be connected to
the CMS.
Each connection among components within the enterprise backend are
secured by TLS. An outside eavesdropper cannot get the next value of a
capability since its creation and configuration is done within the enterprise.
As location and identity of the CMS is hidden, it is not possible for an
attacker to make a DoS attack on the capability orchestration backend. For
capability distribution, an enterprise uses the same uplinks so an attacker
can congest the uplinks to launch a successful denial of service attack. If
LC64 and LNC64 defences are enabled, then it will not be possible for an
attacker to launch a successful denial of capabilities attack, unless it makes
more effort to congest all upstream links.
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If a NC64 defence is active, then any volumetric DoS attack will make
it ineffective because a NC64 defence is only suitable for spoofing-based
low-rate TCP SYN flood attacks. If an attacker uses a TCP SYN flood
using a client which has a valid capability, then it can cripple the NC64
defence. It is recommended that a strong mechanism should be in place
to distinguish good traffic and bad traffic. There should be a mechanism
to assess the behaviour of an authorized client, so that the CMS can later
revoke a capability from a misbehaving client.
If a LC64 defence is active and a low-rate TCP SYN flood is launched
on all uplinks of an enterprise, then it can cripple the establishment of
incoming TCP client connections. To curb this situation, we recommend
that an enterprise should use either a LNC64 defence, or it should use SYN
Cookies/Caches (or similar) along with a LC64 defence.
If a LNC64 defence is active, then limited availability of enterprise up-
links or a capability of an attacker to launch an attack which can congest
all enterprise uplinks, will become a bottleneck. This bottleneck can be
managed by provisioning of more uplinks and performing measurement to
continuously check the effectiveness of the solutions.
If an attacker attacks the DNS with a volumetric DoS attack, then all
defences will be negatively impacted as this will constitute a denial of capa-
bilities attack. To mitigate such an attack, an enterprise can have more than
one entry point for DNS name resolution. The threat of denial of capabilities
should be further investigated in future research.
CMSVD runs in the publicly accessible enterprise host. It is not possible
to directly attack the CMSVD since it has a dedicated link to the CMS. It
has a host firewall dependency. CMSVD can only be attacked successfully
if an attacker has control (root user role) of the host operating system.
6.2.2 Resource Consumption Of CMSVD, MODCMS, CMS,
And Router Scripts
The CMSVD daemon, which is used by the NC64 and LNC64 defences, uses
one TCP connection to communicate with the CMS. It uses less than ∼0.1%
of system memory and CPU at the victim host. For CMSVD, nftables1
modules must be enabled within the kernel. It also requires root access to
the Linux system, since the firewall rule installation is dependent on root
user. So CMSVD is protected from any non-root user who might compromise
the host to manipulate firewall rules.
For NC64 defence, the CMSVD configures a single interface with the
total number of capabilities that CMS creates. It synchronizes its values
using a seed provided by CMS. If CMS allocates 1,000 capabilities then
CMSVD will configure 1,000 secondary interface addresses/names before
1https://netfilter.org/projects/nftables/
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any DNS request comes through CMS. For LNC64 defence, CMSVD will
configure one or more interfaces based on the requirements and it would
have to use all the NID64 values for each of the L64 values.
The MODCMS daemon, which is collocated with DNS, uses one TCP
connection to communicate with the CMS. In our implementation, this is a
part of the KnotDNS2. It is only limited by the maximum amount of memory
that is used by KnotDNS software. It has a minimal CPU overhead due to
its limited responsibilities. For each capability request from the client, the
path from it to the CMS uses at most two messages (a capability request
and a capability response).
The CMS daemon, which is a standalone software that runs on the CMS
server, uses one TCP connection to communicate with the victim host, one
TCP connection to communicate with MODCMS, and one or more SSH
connections to run scripts on the upstream routers. The CMS software
consumes less than ∼0.1% of system memory and CPU.
In LC64 and LNC64 defences, each participating upstream router has a
script that updates the radvd’s3 configuration file, reloads the radvd dae-
mon, and adds the iptables4 rules for new routes. It takes less than ∼0.1%
memory and CPU to execute once.
6.2.3 Short Duration DoS Attacks
Attackers, sometimes, use short duration DoS attacks to thwart attack de-
tection, its mitigation, and attack correlation. All ILNP defences presented
in this work can equally work for mitigation of such attacks. As these de-
fences cannot be used for detection and analysis, so it is a requirement that
an enterprise should deploy attack detection mechanisms for such attacks as
well. We recommend an automated mechanism to signal the start of these
defences, as they can be enabled and disabled instantaneously.
6.2.4 DoS Attacks From Within The Enterprise
If a TCP SYN flood is launched from within the enterprise then it is possible
to mitigate these attacks if internal clients also get capabilities from CMS
through the internal DNS. If it is a volumetric attack then an enterprise
needs multiple links at the sub-network edges. This research only dealt
with external attacks, but it is possible to use a similar solution within an
enterprise.
2https://www.knot-dns.cz
3http://www.litech.org/radvd/
4http://ipset.netfilter.org/iptables.man.html
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6.2.5 Distributing Traffic Load Among Upstream Providers
In LC64/LNC64
For LC64/LNC64, a DoS attacker has to attack on all available upstream
providers for a successful attack. If there are two 10 Gbps links to the Inter-
net, then the attacker has to have 20 Gbps capacity to attack availability on
both links. Each participating upstream router must be connected to CMS.
The only limitation for CMS scalability is the number of TCP connections
it can support to/from routers, DNS (or MODCMS module) servers, and
victim hosts.
Normally, an organization is connected to the Internet through more
than one link. If an organization is provided with one /56 prefix/L pp then
the LC64 defence is ineffective. This does not hold true for the NC64 defence
which primarily deals with low-rate DoS attacks.
6.2.6 Fast-flux Multi-homing
When the victim server is connected to multiple upstream providers, it is
known to be multi-homed. In the case when a single TCP connection can
use multiple upstream providers for its communication, then this is termed
as multi-path communication.
In LC64 and LNC64 defences, victim servers will be connected to one
particular upstream provider at one time. So traffic coming on all other
non-active upstream providers will be blocked. The victim server will be
continuously changing its upstream providers and this will form a solution
that can be called a fast-flux mobility for defence. As our evaluations did
not use two or more concurrently-active upstream links, we cannot say,
unless empirically tested, that our defences are applicable to fast-flux multi-
homing. It can be empirically tested that if a CMS makes two links active
at the same time so that ILNP-specific multi-homing feature can be used
on both the active links. Later on, this mechanism can employ the ILNP-
specific mobility feature to concurrently shift to two different upstream links.
If we enable soft handoff during a transition from one upstream link
to another in LC64 or LNC64 defence, then each victim will be effectively
multi-homed during the transition.
6.2.7 Vulnerability Scanning And Penetration Testing
NC64, LC64, and LNC64 defences will help reduce vulnerability testing,
node/site probing, and scanning (for definitions see §2.3.3). Ideally, LC64
and LNC64 defences should rotate capabilities in such a way that by the
time an attacker starts a successful scan, the server should have moved to
a topologically significant path. Similarly, in NC64 defence, an enterprise
should make sure that it identifies miss-behaving clients with capabilities.
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Using LNC64/LC64, it would become difficult for the security assessment
team of an enterprise itself to do penetration testing. We would recommend
that an enterprise should test different LNC64/LC64 configurations (e.g.,
duration of fast-flux, using particular upstream links, etc.) on a small enter-
prise network representative testbed to assess which particular configuration
will be best for deployment. If there is an assessor (e.g., an assessment spe-
cialist) to assess how much effort the attacker would need, then the level or
frequency of fast-flux could be defined based on this information.
6.2.8 ILNP Namespace Spoofing
ILNP requires a nonce header (at least) at the start of any TCP or UDP
transport session. A nonce header contains a nonce value which is unique
for each transport session. It is also possible to have a nonce value in every
ILNP packet. The nonce header uses nonce values which are part of the
ILCC state for that transport session.
If an off-path attacker uses spoofed source namespaces for an attack, then
our solutions will easily mitigate (based on the native features of ILNP) that
attack since the machine whose address has been spoofed will not be able
to confirm the nonce from initial setup of communication. In ILNP, nonce
values are part of the ILCC bindings for a particular communication session.
For initial setup of communications, if a client does not have a nonce for a
source namespace, then it drops the packet. Figure 6.2 shows this scenario.
Figure 6.2: ILNP namespace spoofing and its effects on TCP connection
establishment as done by an off-path attacker.
If an on-path attacker uses spoofed source namespaces for an attack,
then our solutions will not be able to mitigate (based on the native features
of ILNP) that attack since the machine whose address has been spoofed
will be able to confirm nonce through its ILCC bindings. For the initial
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setup of communications, if a client has a nonce for a source namespace
then it accepts the packet. For these reasons, we recommend to use as much
information as possible in the MAPs specific to NC64 and LNC64 defences.
In case of L64-based defences, an attacker has to be on all the paths to
compromise the defence. Figure 6.3 shows this scenario.
Figure 6.3: ILNP namespace spoofing and its effects on TCP connection
establishment as done by an on-path attacker.
In the case of IPv6 capabilities, since the nonce is not required for the
initial setup, an attacker would be able to create an initial connection to the
victim server. But as the victim server will fast flux using another prefix,
the machine whose address has been spoofed will not be able to send an
acknowledgement to the binding update. Mobile prefix discovery in binding
updates to the correspondent node uses the return routability procedures.
The machine whose address has been spoofed will not be able to participate
in the binding update return routability procedure. Hence, the connection
would be nulled automatically.
6.2.9 Using Botnets For An Attack
An attacker can use an automated attack program called bot on a compro-
mised client. If a client on which the bot is running is an authorized client,
then it will affect communications even if the defences are in place. If an
attacker is using bots for a volumetric DoS attack, then the bots will see
locator updates during execution of DNS fast-fluxing using LC64/LNC64
defences. Then, bots will be able to follow the fast fluxing, and LC64 and
LNC64 defences will become ineffective. We recommend that an enterprise
should deploy alternate solutions against attacks which are launched using
bots.
Some attacker-owned scripts, i.e., viruses, can go undetected in a client’s
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anti-virus software. For such a scenario, our defences are ineffective. If
an enterprise sees a successful attack using low-rate SYN flooding, then it
needs to investigate its current list of authorized clients and take appropriate
action.
6.2.10 Displacement Of Control From DNS To CMS
Solutions provided in this research do not rely on on-path gateways which,
mostly, conflate connectivity, control, and security. We made sure that the
Application Programming Interface (API) between client and DNS remains
the same while our solutions are in place. Complete control of capabilities
management is behind the DNS, which provides a management layer in a
protected enterprise environment. DNS is in the DMZ but CMS is in a
protected network, i.e., behind the DMZ.
6.2.11 Defence Against Botnet Structure Creation
A continuous change in network configuration, e.g., change in NID64 and
L64 values makes it difficult for a DoS command and control centres to form
effective botnets. Each time there is a change in network configuration, a
botnet has to be reconfigured, and in the face of fast fluxing, attackers have
to cope with these changes. It is best practice for an attacker to minimize
their contact with botnets, so the defences given in this research make it
difficult for botnet owners to hide their identity.
6.2.12 Attack Planning, And Durable Information Aggrega-
tion
Although the objectives of this research do not contain an empirical investi-
gation on whether an ILNP-based defence can stop an attacker’s abilities to
plan an attack or not, it can be analytically established that these defences
provide obstacles for a DoS attacker in planning an attack. The planning
phases of a successful attack initiation contains information gathering using
reconnaissance attacks, mapping networks, e.g., using nmap5, port scan-
ning, link monitoring, etc. Using an ILNP-based defence, attackers have to
keep track of NID64 values and/or L64 values. Since these values are highly
unpredictable to guess, it becomes a difficult job to keep track of them.
An attacker can do port scanning (using a bot) since we haven’t in-
cluded port number randomization in this research, but our shared mapping
between the CMS and the victim has the ability to store any information
(thanks to the latest provisioning in the netfilter module and nftables pack-
age). This feature demands future investigation.
5https://nmap.org/
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 159
6.2.13 End-to-end QoS
End-to-end QoS measurements in the context of a client-side evaluation is
an important aspect for any enterprise. Clients are concerned about perfor-
mance and availability of services and networks, whereas DoS or network
congestion negatively affects both of these aspects. In this work, we mea-
sured availability using bandwidth measurements at the server side using
iperf3’s TCP stream. There are multiple ways to measure QoS for clients,
e.g., through ICMPv6, TCP, HTTP, etc. We rejected the use of ICMPv6 for
measuring availability because of its unreliability in determining the service
effects running on enterprise networks [Z. Hu et al., 2014]. So we needed a
better end-to-end monitoring protocol than ICMPv6. We chose TCP as it
gives us information about the end-to-end connection state which is a better
predictor of availability.
Another aspect of QoS is service performance, which can be measured
using TCP capture at the client side, server side, or a capture device which
sits in between the client and the server.
6.2.14 Industrializing The CMS-based Backend And Scala-
bility
This work is based on ILNPv6-specific and thoroughly-tested Linux kernel
features. If an ILNPv6 implementation is provisioned within the current
production enterprise environments, it would be possible to implement, test,
and provision security through our solutions.
The CMS backend of our solutions can be scaled-up/down or scaled-
in/out since it works in standalone mode. If the enterprise wants to run
CMS backend in a distributed environment with state sharing, then a further
study would be required to check solutions’ effective or performance.
6.2.15 Embedding Intrusion Detection System (IDS) In CMS
Backend
IDS can enhance the security provisioned by our backend. An IDS can
create ACLs which can contain black-listed source addresses/namespaces or
bad-behaving clients which have active and valid DNS capabilities. The
CMS backend can then signal the DNS to restrict forwarding of capability
requests to CMS.
Similarly, an IDS can create specialized white-lists of source address/-
namespaces which indicate to CMS that it can grant DNS capabilities to
these clients for an extended duration, thereby reducing load on the CMS
backend and providing extra capacity to the capability request/response
channel.
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6.3 Future Works
While this research provides a proof of concept for DoS mitigation through
ILNP and DNS, there is more that can be done to solidify it before launching
it in real networks. We list possible future works relevant to this research
in the following:
• Component/testbed Optimizations — CMS, MODCMS, and CMSVD
are custom-built software for this research. CMS and CMSVD sup-
port concurrency, but MODCMS does not. MODCMS is based on the
modular architecture of KnotDNS. Similarly, all of these components
can be further optimized to maximize performance. The main require-
ment for CMS is to have a hidden location and identity from outside
of the enterprise. If it is possible to collocate it with DNS (which is
in the DMZ), while maintaining its privacy, then latency can further
be reduced. Furthermore, if the CMS can provide hopping sequences
and timing information to all routers for an extended period of time,
then the latency can further be reduced.
• Testing with other DoS attacks — We tested ILNP-based DoS defences
with low-rate TCP SYN flooding attacks and TCP/UDP flooding at-
tacks. Conceptually, it can be used or enhanced to mitigate other
forms of DoS attacks. It requires testing with spoofing-based Appli-
cation layer attacks as well.
• Investigations with botnets — The focus of our research was spoofing
based DoS attacks. There should be investigation on the possibility of
mitigation of botnet-based DoS attacks through ILNP-based defences.
• Viability for SDN systems — SDN systems are heavily used in en-
terprises, and DoS attacks are also being launched on SDN networks.
Future work demands an investigation into the viability of DoS miti-
gation through ILNP defences in SDN networks.
• Testing with fast-flux multi-homing — In LC64 and LNC64 defences,
the victim host/network shifted from one upstream link to another
through the use of mobility. If there is a requirement to use more
than one upstream providers simultaneously, then a host/network can
also be shifted to two or more uplinks simultaneously to maintain the
requirement. This scenario can be tested by modifying CMS.
• Evaluating and mitigating backend security — Different backend secu-
rity issues have been outlined in §6.2.1. These issues must be further
investigated to solidify the integrity of ILNP-based defences.
• Evaluating client privacy enhancements — We presented emulation of
the possibility of client privacy enhancements which is a side effect
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of our defences (see §5.3). It should be investigated by performing
empirical evaluation of this side-effect.
• Investigating DoS attacks from within the enterprise — We addressed
enterprise security from external DoS attacks. It would be beneficial
if the same can be evaluated if the attacks originate from inside which
not only target normal enterprise hosts but also CMS and internal
DNS.
• Evaluation in real networks — We tested our solutions in a laboratory
network with emulation of different network conditions. It would be
beneficial if the same can be evaluated in real enterprise networks with
real network conditions. Both results can be compared and relevant
further research can be performed.
• CMS MAP’s context enhancements — NC64 and LNC64 defences re-
quire a mapping between the client information and ephemeral ca-
pabilities to be installed in the victim host firewall. This research
used a MAP that contains client’s NID64 and L64 values mapped to
ephemeral capabilities. If an attacker can spoof authorized client’s
NID64 and L64 values, then NC64/LNC64 defence can become in-
effective. To curb such a situation, we can introduce further granu-
larity in client information within the MAP. Such information might
be source/destination port numbers for the connection and the source
network information of the client, etc.
Appendix A
Identifier-based Mappings’
Specification
In response to a DNS query, CMS creates a unique mapping to be config-
ured at a victim host. There are two parts to this configuration. The first
part configures victim’s network interfaces with all the Node IDentity (NID)
values along with a fixed L64 value for each. The second part of the config-
uration is the configuration of the firewall in the victim. The first part has
to have taken place beforehand while the second part of the configuration is
dynamic and it only takes place when a new capability request comes in to
CMS.
Each mapping contains data which is used by a victim to make decisions
about resource access authorization. There is a single type of MAP which
will show information about active capabilities. A MAP is stored at a CMS
and a victim. It is the responsibility of a victim to enable filtering, based on
the information provided in the MAP. If there is a MAP conflict or a victim
is unable to update its MAP then it has to inform the CMS using an error
condition.
MAP is communicated between a CMS and a victim through a Colfer1
based binary serialization format protocol. Whereas, control plane commu-
nication has two parts. The first part deals with a MAP advertisement which
goes from the CMS to the victim. And the second part is a response from
the victim containing MAP acknowledgement message or error condition to
the CMS. If the CMS does not receive an ACK for MAP advertisement then
it will discard this particular MAP entry from its table. And, in response to
the capability request from the MODCMS, it generates an error which effec-
tively makes the DNS generate a NXDOMAIN message back to the client
so it can make a fresh request.
1https://github.com/pascaldekloe/colfer/wiki/Spec
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A.1 Control Message Types
Each control message contains an msgtype field which uniquely identifies the
type of message in transit. Table A.1 presents all the msgtypes:
Table A.1: Message types used in an Identifier-based capability system
Message Type (msgtype) Code Meaning
MSGTYPE MAP PUSH 0 MAP message from
CMS to victim server
MSGTYPE MAP ACK 1 MAP Acknowledge-
ment from victim to
CMS
MSGTYPE SEED POLICY 2 Seed information from
CMS to target which
helps victim to generate
NID values which are
exactly the same as in
the CMS software.
MSGTYPE SEED POLICY ACK 3 Seed information Ac-
knowledgement from
target to CMS
MSGTYPE CAP REQUEST 4 Capability request mes-
sage from DNS to CMS
containing client infor-
mation e.g. client ad-
dress, originating net-
work, service to be re-
quested etc.
MSGTYPE CAP RESPONSE 5 Capability response
message from CMS to
DNS
Control messages are transported over a TLS based encrypted channel,
which secures these control messages even though these are within an enter-
prise network. But the management can decide to use plain-text messages
for throughput or performance reasons.
A.2 ILNPv6 Specific MAP Advertisement
A MAP advertisement contains a client’s NID and L64 values; a victim’s
one or more ephemeral NID values; and one or more fixed L64 values, as
shown below in the colfer based data structure:
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type map struct {
msgtype uint32,
mapid uint32,
C_NID64 text,
C_L64 text,
E_NID64_1 text,
E_NID64_2 text,
...,
L64_1 text,
L64_2 text,
...
}
For experimental and proof of concept purposes, one capability per mes-
sage is used in this research.
A.3 Map Acknowledgements (MAP ACKs)
A victim will need to send a MAP acknowledgement upon receipt of a MAP
advertisement. MAP acknowledgement is an explicit message that contains
a MAP ACK along with a MAP ID.
A.4 Map IDs And Capability IDs
Each message between a CMS and a victim either contains a MAP, an ACK,
or an ERROR based on a specific situation. Each MAP also contain a MAP
ID. This information might be used for the capabilities’ traffic engineering
mechanisms e.g. in future one can define an explicit message from a victim,
specifying a list of clients who should be black-holed by a security enforce-
ment agent. In that case, a victim only has to send a list of MAP IDs to any
other system which has MAP ID to client information in its configuration.
Similarly a Capability (CAP) ID is used between a DNS and a CMS.
A database in a CMS maintains information about which CAP ID is con-
nected to which MAP ID and hence the mapping. A numerical counter is
controlled at the DNS for CAP IDs. A mapping can also contain information
about originating DNS server of the capability request message so CMS can
maintain another list containing information about which CAP IDs belong
to which originating DNS servers. A CAP ID ensures that some of the state
in the DNS is actually shared with CMS, which can decide future responses
for certain queries.
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A.5 MAP Expirations
Expiration of a mapping means that a specific client should be allocated a
new capability in the next DNS request. A victim will keep communicating
with the client in the same session using old capability but for any other
new session a new capability will be generated.
In our testbeds, we have set an expiration TTL to zero which mean a
specific client will always get a new capability whenever it asks for a DNS
resolution. The TTL for the DNS records will be zero, so, whenever a client
wants to communicate with a victim, it has to send a DNS resolution request.
This way, the client will be obliged to access the victim’s new identity from
DNS server i.e. automatically complying with the management interface of
the capabilities distribution mechanism.
Mapping’s TTL is a duration of the mapping before it expires. It has an
indirect correspondence with the DNS record’s TTL. It is up to the victim
to define a policy which dictates the Mapping’s TTL, hence DNS TTL. One
possible policy might be 5 seconds TTL for all the current mappings. A
victim is also able to send a MAP expiry message to a CMS if it needs
to restrict policy for any client. This message specifically asks the CMS
to expire the current mapping, but it also means that the victim wants to
break any communication with the client on an old CAP. Upon reception of
an expire message, it can generate another mapping after a new DNS query.
If a mapping is expired during an existing TCP connection, we will
lose the session continuity objective but it is up to the victim to use the old
capability until a new session with a new capability is initiated. Since control
channel is secure so fake MAP expiry messages will be ineffective. Also,
for reasons of connection continuity, we will postpone the TTL based map
expirations to the locator-based solution. For an identifier-based solution,
an expiry will mean breakage of the communication, and re-establishment
of the connection unless victim wants to keep an old capability for current
session (and rejecting any new session with an old capability).
A.6 Security Of MAP Related Control Messages
As mentioned earlier that communications among CMS, DNS, and victim
are secured by a TLS protocol. Security of these control messages is not
a hard requirement but it is up to the management to use any particular
trusted security protocol. Since control message communication is within
enterprise network, an enterprise can decide otherwise, for throughput or
performance reasons. The victim’s persistent connection to CMS is over
a fixed address information which is within the CMS configuration. The
address of CMS is hidden in the DNS server’s configuration. This way,
address information about CMS and victim is totally hidden from clients.
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The client can initiate a data connection in whatever way possible as dictated
by the end service. For our experimental purposes we have used NGINX2
client/server HTTP application.
A.7 Firewall Considerations
A victim uses host-based firewall called nftables3. nftables provides new in-
kernel packet classification framework. It also provides mechanisms through
which we can build extremely fast firewall rules in the kernel. Our codebase
contains C programming code which directly manipulates firewall rules using
nftables provided Application Programming Interface (API). Mapping is
created within the kernel which contains only packet accept rules. Other
rules pertaining to input chains are in deny state. CMS address information
is always configured as a trusted entity in the firewall.
A.8 Capability Format Considerations
Capabilities are created using a random seed and a secret key. The pre-
shared secret key, between a CMS and a victim, is communicated at the
start of communication. A configurable number of random seeds are sent to
the victim from the CMS. The CMS and the target create unique ephemeral
addresses using these seeds and the secret key. The victim then configures
its interfaces with these addresses. This way it is ensured that there will
not be any snooping since the capabilities are independently generated at
victim and CMS.
2https://www.nginx.com/
3https://netfilter.org/projects/nftables/
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